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ABSTRACT
Seriality has maintained a pervasive presence across media for over a century. Despite
widespread critical and popular interest into seriality and serial texts, very few booklength theories of seriality have been attempted. Though uncommented upon critically,
Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan have both offered insights into seriality that this
dissertation puts in dialogue with serial media texts. My dissertation begins in the
Victorian era with Freud’s encounter with serial fiction through Charles Dickens. I
then turn to looking at new media texts such as the “Twitterature” of Jennifer Egan
and Joshua Clover, the first season of Sarah Koenig’s and WEBZ-Chicago’s Serial
podcast, and Netflix’s streaming television series Stranger Things. This dissertation
imagines a double intervention into the study of seriality and into psychoanalytic
theory: I explicate and develop the extant serial concerns of psychoanalysis and then,
through serial media examples, I advance a theory of seriality. This is a new reading of
psychoanalytic theory as a body of thought primarily concerned with seriality and the
consequences of theorizing the gap constitutive of seriality. I find that by attending to
the psychic impact of the serial form in early Freudian psychoanalysis, and later in
work from Jacques Lacan, we can understand the foundational influence of media
texts in understanding our psychic lives. While it is common to find in scholarship
today that psychoanalysis is a theoretical relic of the past and has nothing new to teach
us, I argue that—amidst a so-called crisis of theory in the academy since
deconstruction—psychoanalysis may be the only theory that is ready to grapple with
our contemporary serial media landscape, as it is uniquely able to examine serial
media’s ubiquity in our daily lives.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Seriality has maintained an increasingly pervasive presence across media for
over a century. From the nineteenth-century novel, to early film, to popular radio
broadcasts including the soap opera, up to the contemporary moment’s podcasts,
television, short experimental fiction, and even the form of digital content in Twitter
or Instagram stories, the form has defined the last hundred or so years of transatlantic
media experience. Media theorists have long sought to understand why the serial form
has been so pervasive, and what its lasting hold means. Some say that it is a brand of
consumerist interaction with media. Others find it part of the critical interpretive
process through reader or reception theory. Still others find it to be an element in
service of assessing the Victorian novel’s development, of television’s rise in the midtwentieth century or what is called television’s second Golden Age in the early 2000s.
Others find seriality a component of narrative theory or operating within new
television theory. But in these examinations, seriality rarely reaches a full theorization.
In this dissertation, I set out a theory of seriality that—while it does have ties
to capital, consumerism, and interpretation—supersedes these typical categories of
meaning that media scholars have voiced. I argue that psychoanalysis is primarily a
theory of seriality. The serial form of cultural production is one that philosophers, popcultural critics, sociologists, and economists have all acknowledged as a dominant and
immanent cultural form of the modern and contemporary moment. By looking at
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discrete instances of the serial form, such as Sigmund Freud’s reading of Charles
Dickens, Jacques Lacan’s reading of coinflips in “The Purloined Letter,” the
Twitterature of Jennifer Egan and Joshua Clover, the first season of the Serial podcast,
and Netflix’s streaming television series Stranger Things, this dissertation reaches a
theory of seriality by thoroughly considering the serial gap—the one immanent
requirement for anything to be considered serial—and what it does to texts and how it
corresponds to a fundamental gap in the psyche discovered by psychoanalysis.

What Is Seriality?
The Oxford English Dictionary defines seriality as a “Serial arrangement; the
fact or state of being arranged or ordered in a series” (“seriality” n.). The Library of
Congress adds that “A serial is expected to continue indefinitely.” 1 Media scholars
such as Jason Mittell and Shane Denson add additional characteristics, such as
temporality and consumerist production, to the form’s necessary qualities. Perpetuity,
for example, is a seemingly natural component of seriality. Two further contexts show
us slight differences in other resonances of seriality that are worth noting. In music,
the serial is “a method of composition based on a fixed sequence of tones” (“serial”
adj. A. 8). In linguistics, “Of, relating to, or designating a pattern of syntax in which
constituent words appear in a series” (“serial” adj. A. 6).
Defined as it is above, as a pattern or arrangement existing in perpetuity,
seriality appears to be a structure secondary to other concerns – from audience or
reception trends, to the development of other genres, to the commerciality of the form.
Because of this, seriality never gets top billing in media scholarship, despite its recent
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surge as topic of scholarly interest. At stake is more often an inquiry into something
else. Whether it is the Victorian novel, early film serials, soap operas, serial television,
or simply narrative in general, seriality appears as a necessary term to use while
illuminating some other text, context, or concept. As such, seriality itself has rarely
been theorized across media, leaving us with a gap in media scholarship. 2
Lauren Goodlad summarizes the recent surge of seriality studies over the past
twenty years in a January 2019 issue of Narrative devoted to the subject:

Though seriality broadly defined is as old as the human capacity to experience a
sequence, serialization had its first big bang in the nineteenth century with the
advent of cheap paper and the arrival of such celebrity serialists as Honoré de
Balzac, Alexandre Dumas, George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, and many others
whose names we no longer remember. At the turn of the millennium, when
groundbreaking HBO shows such as The Sopranos and The Wire triggered a new
wave of critically acclaimed and commercially successful serials, a new
consciousness of seriality was bound to emerge. (Preface to “Contemporary
Seriality: A Roundtable” Narrative Vol. 27, No. 1 [January 2019], 107).

As Goodlad indicates, the last few years have yielded significant academic work
published on seriality. There are excellent serialization studies (histories of the book
and textual materiality during the Victorian era especially) and, of course, serial
television and media studies. This includes a Velvet Light Trap special issue, Rob
Allen and Thijs van den Berg’s edited collection Serialization in Popular Culture, and
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Frank Kelleter’s edited collection The Media of Serial Narrative. While there is no
shortage of engagements with serial texts, there are few attempts to organize or define
a theory of seriality itself. For example, in his edited collection, Kelleter calls seriality
a “practice of popular culture, not a narrative formalism within it” (15, emphasis
original). For Kelleter, one of the key aspects of seriality is that one can see it evolving
through fan and audience practices (12-13). This widens the scope of seriality studies,
importantly pushing beyond the concerns of narrative. As Kelleter writes, one of the
popular territories for the expansion of serial concerns is to look at fan communities
and new ways of measuring or accounting for reception. While a valuable point, this
approach still uses seriality to consider something else.
Since the theory of seriality presented in this dissertation prioritizes seriality as
such and not its secondary characteristics, I am pushing for a reorientation of the field
of seriality studies. I therefore am prioritizing form, which I will later explain is
intimately bound to psychic form, as my engagements with psychoanalysis will
confirm. To discuss seriality as form, we need to theorize the gap that breaks and
binds any given series, be it a group of people or a television narrative. The study of
seriality needs a thorough consideration of the gap—that which is immanent to all
forms of seriality, narrative and non-narrative—or else the field itself, seriality studies,
is simply playing whack-a-mole in an attempt to understand various discrete iterations
of seriality. While excellent and challenging work has been done in understanding
various and diverse serial pieces this will not eventually give us insight into a serial
whole. For this reason, this dissertation focuses on the hole in the whole. That is, the
serial gap itself.
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By the serial gap, I mean the interruption that confronts viewers, readers, and
listeners in the serial experience as its constitutive element. For this reason, I use the
phrase “serial gap” and “interruptive gap” to refer to the same constitutive element of
seriality. The gap is always an interruption that—at the same time that it breaks—
binds. Typically, this gap has attracted scholarly interest only along the lines of what
readers and viewers of serial fiction do with this serial gap. Sean O’Sullivan writes
that it is “in that between state [of old episodes and new episodes] that we as readers
or viewers do most of our interpreting” of a series (“Old, New, Borrowed, Blue” 123).
We are in the middle “bobbing on the narrative,” O’Sullivan writes (ibid).3 O’Sullivan
determines, ultimately, that it is in this interruptive gap that viewers “luxuriat[e] in the
details” of a story’s construction (ibid). Jason Mittell agrees that this in between
state—the serial gap—is the “constitutive element of serial fiction,” allowing viewers
and series creators to ‘reflect on old tales and imagine new possibilities’ (Complex TV
41). Emphasizing the rabid readership of the Victorian era and the equally rabid
viewing of soap opera viewers, Jennifer Hayward (in Consuming Pleasures) argues
that serial fiction is defined by audience activity rather than its form. While Chapter
Five will be argue for a specific understanding of audience engagement, I will be
emphasizing the opposite of what O’Sullivan, Mittell, and Hayward do. Theorizing the
serial gap is important as it enables us to see what it does to narrative and viewers.
Popular narrative seriality has perpetuated and reshaped itself across aesthetic
and media forms. Serial literature turned into serial radio specials, serial films, serial
television, and serial podcasts. My interest lies in two central moments in seriality’s
development that align with developments in psychoanalytic theory. The first moment
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is at the serial’s peak and psychoanalysis’s beginnings, from the nineteenth century
into the early twentieth century. For Sigmund Freud, seriality is used to problematize
and think through the consequences of the clinical practice of analysis itself. The
second is through the mid-to-late twentieth century, as Jacques Lacan and Jean-Paul
Sartre attend to seriality. For Lacan, seriality shows how the symbolic order is
structured by an impossible hole—a gap—which he calls the real. Extracting and
explicating a theory of seriality derived from under researched references to seriality
made by Freud and Lacan is central to this dissertation.
The connection between psychoanalysis and serial forms is intimate. In
Chapter Two, I will pursue the argument that it is through serial fiction that Freud may
have had cause to first theorize retroactivity, repetition, desire, and drive—all concepts
often used in discussions of serial media, whether in a psychoanalytic context or not.
Theorizing the serial as gapped structure shows seriality is a confrontation with the
self, as the self is also a gapped structure. Attention to this aspect of seriality,
however, fundamentally changes the accepted notions of how the serial form affects
its viewers, readers, and audience. In the below survey of serial media writing, we will
see the typical territory charted by scholars and the gaps (as in the absence of a
rigorously theoretical consideration of seriality as such) present in this discussion. We
will then move to make some initial claims about how excavating the serial
underpinnings to the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan can ground a
challenging and vibrant notion of the serial gap and, thus, serve as the ground for a
theory for seriality itself.
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What Seriality Can Do
Many of the most prominent theorists of narrative seriality—such as Jason
Mittell, Sean O’Sullivan, Elana Levine, Michael Z. Newman, Jeffrey Sconce, and
Roberta Pearson—are in the field of television studies. Looking to serial television
pushes scholars on the brink of speculative territory. Specifically, television studies
seems to want to articulate a theory of the subject when it writes about audience and
reception, or “the viewer,” but there is not really a theory of the subject present. It is
the subject that is accounted for, in terms of quantitative focus such as social media
presence, paratextual engagement, and viewership numbers. As we will see, seriality
in the following accounts is—at best—relegated to a supporting role in the
development of television as an art form or—at worst—is an incidental structural
element that must be managed. In some, but not all of these accounts, a compensatory
argumentative thread appears that puts developments in narrative complexity in
tandem with shifting values of economic necessity (see Wittebols and Crary below).
While I think it is fair to gesture at things like advertising, network profits, and
audience satisfaction as productive constraints on serial storytelling, I do not think it is
appropriate to imply (intentionally or unintentionally) that the economic is the
condition of possibility for the creative. 4 To fix our analytic gaze on market factors for
seriality pushes us away from developing a theory of it. Still, it is useful to establish
this thread in television studies as it neatly parallels some of Sartre’s claims, which we
will eventually demonstrate a need to move beyond. 5
The role seriality typically plays in television studies is as a necessary narrative
development that pushed American television from the simplistic “amnesia series” of
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something such as Gilligan’s Island toward the complex plotting of something like
Lost. More specifically, when the serial storyline form of the soap opera migrated to
prime-time dramas in the late 1970s to early 1980s, “quality” (Robert Thompson’s
term), “narratively complex” (Jason Mittell’s), or “prestige” (a common term in
popular television criticism) television was born. In fact, the serial influence in primetime television today dominates to such an extent that deviation from it has become
noteworthy. When a TV series unexpectedly moves toward the episodic and selfcontained, like the second season of Netflix’s Master of None, it has recently been
considered laudable and significant. 6 It’s worth taking a step back to look at how we
got to the current era of “Peak TV” (as FX CEO John Landgraf dubbed it). 7
Steven Johnson, in Everything Bad is Good for You: How Today’s Popular
Culture is Actually Making Us Smarter, looks to quantify the growing complexity in
television narrative. Johnson, who begins his analysis by “put[ting] aside for a
moment the question of why the marketplace is rewarding complexity” identifies three
elements that form the spine of complex television storytelling (65). Johnson’s
elements are: multiple threading (two or more storylines happening concurrently),
flashing arrows (a more sophisticated form of signposting or foreshadowing), and
social networks (audience engagement on the internet). “Multiple threading” is the
most interesting for a study of seriality. As Johnson writes:

According to television lore, the age of multiple threads began with the arrival
of Hill Street Blues in 1981 . . . Watch an episode of Hill Street Blues side by
side with any major drama from the preceding decades—Starsky and Hutch,

8

for instance, or Dragnet—and the structural transformation will jump out at
you. The earlier shows follow one or two lead characters, adhere to a single
dominant pot, and reach a decisive conclusion at the end of the episode . . . A
Hill Street Blues episode complicates the picture in a number of profound
ways. The narrative weaves together a collection of distinct strands—
sometimes as many as ten, though at least half of the threads involve only a
few quick scenes scattered throughout the episode. The number of primary
characters—and not just bit parts—swells dramatically. And the episode has
fuzzy borders: picking up one or two threads from previous episodes at the
outset, and leaving one or two threads open at the end. (65-66, 67)

Johnson provides visual aids in his analysis that track how many narrative threads
there are per minute per episode in examples from Dragnet, Starsky and Hutch, Hill
Street Blues, and The Sopranos to show the growing narrative complexity in
contemporary television. We can see the veritable explosion of not just story threads
over this time period but how constitutive repetition is to seriality. In other words, the
individual episodes of the serial repeat the overarching structure of the whole.
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Figure 2. Steven Johnson, Story threads per minute table, from Everything Bad is
Good for You, 70.
However, Johnson acknowledges that “the Hill Street innovations weren’t all that
original” and that the series—and its generational influence—is indebted to the
structure of the soap opera (68). Johnson hedges against crediting the heavily
serialized structure of the soap opera as being solely responsible for complex narrative
revolution, as the “genius with Hill Street was to marry complex narrative structure
with complex subject matter” (ibid).
Jason Mittell follows Johnson’s line of argumentation somewhat in Complex
TV, separating developments in television narrative from the influence of the soap
opera. While disagreeing slightly with Johnson on where/ when/ what show first
brought the soap opera to serious television, Mittell agrees with the general premise of
multi-threading changing television narrative: “Soap offered a more popular and
influential model by grafting serial plotting onto standard prime time genres, a
10

technique seen in subsequent 1980s innovators that became major television
landmarks: the sitcom Cheers, the cop show Hill Street Blues, and the medical drama
St. Elsewhere” (243). Like Johnson, Mittell is careful not to credit the soap opera
structure too much:

It is in the prevalence of melodrama in nearly all modes of serial storytelling
that we can find the most commonality between daytime soap operas and
prime time serials, but we should not assume that the latter is somehow
mimicking or transforming the former; instead, we need to understand
melodrama as a much more widespread facet of television narrative that is not
unique to daytime soaps or any single genre category. (ibid)

Mittell defines complex prime-time serials against their daytime counterparts by
relying on Linda Williams’s definition of serial melodrama developed in On The Wire.
For Williams, what makes The Wire a significant work is the way it explores the
dynamic emotional consequences of institutional failure. It is the seriousness with
which it plays in the genre of serial melodrama that The Wire breaks ground and
stands as a marquee work of television fiction. Mittell refers to serial melodrama as a
“mode” of television narrative rather than a genre, but accepts the thrust of Williams’s
argument: it is serial melodrama that is pervasive and studying television in terms of
genre or mode is more clarifying than approaching the serial as form. Mittell pursues
this argument further in Keywords for Media Studies. Seriality—being chiefly aligned
with the denigrated category of soap operas but also being vital to how highbrow
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“serial melodramas” like The Wire and Mad Men are constructed—is used to blur
genre categories for Mittell, so that “genre categories function not by clear formal
definitions, but by cultural assumptions of value, identity, and hierarchy” (340).
Mittell’s interest is in defining or hybridizing genre and he sees seriality as a term that
muddies the waters.
Whether we are referring to it as “multi-threading,” “serial plotting,” or “serial
melodrama” what we are seeing is an inclination against theorizing seriality itself. It is
the seriousness and complexity of the content of Hill Street Blues and The Wire (in the
above examples) that elevate each show above the serial form. We can see in these
above examples that seriality as an organizing structure must be managed in two ways:
it must first be managed by television series producers (do not lapse into soap opera)
and it must then be managed by television scholars (the soap opera cannot define
contemporary “serious” television). Genre distinctions must be erected to separate
soap operas from primetime dramas. Further “serial melodrama” must be defined as a
mode of television and not a genre to itself. Seriality is always in the process of
negotiation in these examples. It is never itself theorized.
We see a different expression of the critical inclination to theorize and quantify
developments in television content over theorizing serial form in Jeffrey Sconce’s
“What If? Charting Television’s New Textual Boundaries.” Sconce identifies an
aesthetic trend in American television: stylized and narratively conjectural episodes
that push the diegetic limits of a series. While, as Sconce writes (echoing Johnson and
Mittell), the movement to more complex television narratives involved the merging of
the heavily serialized soap opera form with three hallmark television genres: the
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detective show (Magnum P.I.), the cop drama (Hill Street Blues), and the medical
drama (St. Elsewhere), it is in the staging of episodes that push the diegetic storyworld
of a given series where television establishes its unique aesthetic. The X-Files is a
consistent touchstone for Sconce. Episodes such as “War of the Coprophages,” which
sees FBI agent Fox Mulder investigate a cockroach infestation as though it was an
invasion of an alien species, is a deadpan comic send up of The X-Files’s own
premise. As Sconce writes:

…these one-off ‘comedy’ episodes gradually transformed into fully conjectural
narratives. These stand-alone stories appear to have no apparent motivation in,
relation to, or impact on the larger universe of the series. They stand as wholly
speculative exercises, as ungrounded fantasies that recast, through radical
stylistic and narrational deviation, the already well-established series
architecture. They all for elaboration and possibilities unavailable to the ‘real’
story line of the series . . . Because they are not framed and/or contained by
traditional realist devices for such deviation . . . they leave viewers wondering
about the episode’s status in the larger X-Files universe. (108)

These episodes, such as Buffy the Vampire Slayer’s near silent “Hush,” and Seinfeld’s
“The Betrayal,” better known colloquially as “the backwards episode,” puncture the
realist architecture of a series. (Sconce wants us to think of these episodes like so:
“What if they couldn’t speak on Buffy?” or “What if a Seinfeld episode reversed its
own causality?”) Furthermore, Sconce begins and ends “What If?” by considering the

13

artistic merits of television. “However dirty, compromised, or implicated in operations
of power,” Sconce writes, “television is an art” (111). Episodes, such as the one-off
“comedy” episodes of X-Files, are crucial to Sconce’s argument for what constitutes
televisual art. These episodes form part of television’s unique poetics.
By locating the art of television in the one-off, radically self-contained episode,
however, Sconce’s argument sets up an implicit binary: the one-off experimental
television episode is art. The pervasive serial situation is the background upon which
the art is performed. The one-off experiment is postmodern, challenging realist
expectations of television as a medium. It is a mark of viewers who are “willing to
watch their favorite shows with greater fidelity and attention” (110). As Sconce writes,
“television must produce ‘parts’ that each week embody the whole while also finding,
within such repetition, possibilities for novel and diverting variations” (101). The
repetition constitutive of seriality is here something that must be managed. Sconce’s
argument operates according to the following unstated premise: seriality establishes
the rules for a given series and it is when the rules are broken that the poetic enterprise
of television can truly be seen.
Michael Z. Newman, in “From Beats to Arcs,” identifies basic storytelling
principles of prime-time serial television. Newman, like Johnson, Mittell, and Sconce,
defines his terms against the soap opera. For Newman, “the [prime-time serial] is
really a hybrid of episodic dramas and serials such as soaps and miniseries” (16).
Pushing in a slightly different direction than the aforementioned media scholars,
Newman looks to audience investment and satisfaction as his organizing principle
(20). To separate the prime-time serial from the soap opera and the miniseries,
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Newman advances a consideration of “beats” (the micro-level of a television episode
which focuses on character development, emotion, and interaction), episodes (which
must balance “closure and serial deferment”), and “arcs” (coherent segments of
emotional movement on the macro-level of a narrative that is “designed to best please
the audience”) (20, 25).
For Newman, the audience is the productive constraint for prime-time serials.
While audience interest is key at the corporate and marketing levels of television
production, I think Newman undercuts his own accessible account of television by
over considering the “commercial imperative,” as he calls it, behind the invention and
innovation in television (17). Newman essentially leaves the reader in the same place
they began the essay. He begins by writing that prime-time television “rewards its
audience and its advertisers at the same time,” and he concludes by saying that primetime television series “are at once a source of handsome profits and intense pleasures”
(17, 25). An analysis of narrative that renders itself co-equal with economic factors
has no place to go: the narrative invention cannot exceed market factors and the
market factors cannot determine the creative content. We are left wanting a little more
of one or the other. 8 Seriality, in this account, is simply a necessary production reality
from which to consider beats, episodes, and arcs and the profits of advertisers.
Seriality, in these television readings, does not itself have substance. It is
incidental, at best. A necessary condition of complex television, but not a sufficient
one. Seriality acquires substance through something else. It is by reversing this
relationship that Freud and Lacan approach seriality. 9 The formation of a series creates
gaps and radiating waves of consequences.
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Psychoanalysis and the Serial in Theory
As Sean O’Sullivan has recently reminded us, Jennifer Hayward and Robyn
Warhol are “authors of what remain, somewhat astonishingly, the only two singleauthor book-length studies of seriality across media and periods” (“Six Elements of
Seriality” 50). Hayward and Warhol stage their studies of seriality primarily through
the activity of audiences and readerly affect. Since this dissertation treads along a
more theoretical and speculative path it will need to begin its intervention from
different sources. It is here that we find two overlapping scholarly gaps that this
project deems central: the gap in media scholarship, which does not theorize seriality
as such, and the gap in psychoanalytic theory, which does not properly reckon with the
importance of seriality to both Freud and Lacan. Freud and Lacan help us to see that
seriality has a psychical and symbolic structure.
I’ll begin with the initial link between psychoanalysis and seriality by tracking
its importance to Sigmund Freud and Charles Dickens. I will demonstrate that
psychoanalysis is always already linked with serial media form, substantiating and
setting groundwork for my claim that these are significant to connect in understanding
media today. Freud sees from the beginning of his career that analysis has the same
problems as seriality does. Seriality is a form that, for Freud, first helps explain the
problems of analysis in the clinic. He then he uses it as jumping off point to articulate
his wider theory. Since its popular inception in 1836 through Dickens, serial media has
been a form that people have clung to and waited for expectantly. Psychoanalysis
shows that this is because there is an interiority, a psychic resonance with seriality; the

16

form itself corresponds to the way that psychoanalysis sees the mind working. There is
an intimacy to the serial form that psychoanalysis interrogates. It is this intimacy that
makes serial media so pervasive. Freud immersed himself in serial media and
discovered that it had clear resonance with the workings of the psyche. Chapter Two
fully explores the relation between Freud’s encounter with serial media and his
development of psychoanalytic theory, but for now it suffices simply to note this
connection. It is necessary to proceed with this idea in mind before our next brief
foray into the history of seriality and psychoanalysis.
To discuss what the serial means in Lacanian theory, I begin with a thinker
who utterly rejected seriality and to whom Lacan aimed to respond on the subject,
Jean-Paul Sartre. Despite the fact that his account of seriality appears in the relatively
unexamined Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre articulates what has become
common sense: seriality is just an aggregate of particulars and thus complicit in
capitalist ideology. For Sartre, seriality can only be a superficial grouping. While
Sartre believes seriality is only embedded in capitalist logic, and thereby, has little
connection to the constitution of the self as subject, Lacan breaks fundamentally with
him on this issue, as we will see when I put each thinker’s work in dialogue. What
Lacan sees is that seriality is its own demanding logic that adheres to something like
his own notion of the real (this argument is explored at length in the third chapter of
this dissertation). Through the very aspect that Sartre criticizes—the gap between the
parts—Lacan articulates his own critically ignored notion of seriality.
This is where Sartre and Lacan begin to support what I am deeming a theory of
seriality that is bound to psychoanalysis and bound to the psyche as form. Because
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seriality includes in it a necessary structural interruption—the gap constitutive of its
own construction—a theory of seriality lays bare the relationship between the
ideological social order and the point of the real (where ideological order loses its
hegemony). The break is not arbitrary or coerced but structurally necessary. Seriality
reveals that an order of connected installments must include within itself points of its
own suspension, precisely the points that psychoanalysis makes its central concern.
Both Sartre and Lacan developed their ideas during roughly the same period of
time, from the late 1950s into the early 1960s. It is therefore perhaps not a stretch to
say that Lacan’s clarification of the “Purloined Letter” seminar was explicitly
formulated against Sartre, such is the specificity of difference between the two French
thinkers. For Lacan, as I have said, the serial is aligned with real, the impossible hole
in the symbolic. In a sense, seriality is the point of non-articulation in the symbolic.
Since rules emerge to form a series, as Lacan explains in his seminar on “The
Purloined Letter,” we can see the effect of the real in the way the signifying chain
curves to accommodate the rules that the series introduces. Seriality, then, has no preexisting character. Seriality constitutes itself as the series forms. Understanding how a
series forms is crucial to understanding signification as such and understanding the
signifier is one of the consistent tasks of Lacan’s seminars.
Sartre articulates his theory of seriality, or what Fredric Jameson refers to as
“the only philosophically satisfactory theory of public opinion, the only genuine
philosophy of the media,” in Critique of Dialectical Reason (xxviii). Seriality, for
Sartre, is that which separates people politically into artificially arranged groups, what
keeps people from organizing as a collective. As Jameson puts it succinctly, “group-
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formation is first and foremost an attempt to overcome the serial situation” (xxviii).
Sartre’s seriality needs to be thought of as a “series” of individuals grouped by capital
and given superficial reasons to relate to each other. Sartre’s most famous example of
seriality—people in a queue waiting for a bus—shows “the intensity of isolation, as a
relation of exteriority between the members of a temporary and contingent gathering,
express[ing] the degree of massification of the social ensemble, in so far as it is
produced on the basis of given conditions” (257 emphasis original). Rather becoming
a collective—or “group-in-fusion,” to use Sartre’s terminology—seriality is what
keeps people a series of individuals. In other words, the demands of modern life and
capital produces groups of individuals who, passively engaging in the same activity
(waiting for a bus), are alienated from each other. This alienation is key for Sartre and
it is the element that can turn a series into a “group-in-fusion,” a politically motivated
collective. The group-in-fusion is predicated on the awareness that “everyone is the
same as the Others in so far as he is Other than himself” (260). (There is overlap with
Lacan here about the necessity of alienation in subjectivity.). This is what Sartre
means when he says that “members of the group are third parties” (374). The groupin-fusion must remain alienated from their circumstances, as “the most lively and
united group is always in danger of relapsing into the series from which it came” (67).
For Sartre, “the group-in-fusion emerges from seriality as a reaction against it, its
subsequent development and fate governed by the danger of its dissolution back into
seriality again” (Jameson xxvi).
Where Lacan sees seriality as an immanent principle by which order and
memory emerge through repetition, Sartre sees seriality as a structure to be escaped.
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For Sartre, the problem of seriality is as a group of individuals rather than a group that
functions as a collective. Seriality is an aggregation of particulars, for Sartre, that can
never form a collective. The only way a group-in-fusion can form is by overcoming
seriality. Part of this involves overcoming an “anti-dialectic” that helps us see how
Hegelian and Marxist thought manifest in Sartre’s idea. As Sartre writes, “This antidialectic, or dialectic against the dialectic (dialectic of passivity), must reveal series to
us as a type of human gathering and alienation as a mediated relation to the other and
to the objects of labour in the element of seriality and as a serial mode of coexistence” (66-67 emphasis in original). In other words, rather than a dialectic which
is driven by the recognition of internal contradiction, as Hegel would have it, this antidialectic is premised on inertia and passivity. It turns the way the world works
(currency exchanges, let’s say) into a kind of magic. Viewed this way, we can see that
Sartre’s theory of seriality constitutes, for him, a theory of ideological formation. If
ideology is that which eliminates contradiction in the world (as Marx and Althusser
have formulated in various ways), seriality, for Sartre, is the prime mover, so to speak,
in that formula. Seriality is all about eliminating the appearance of contradiction. It is
about grouping people superficially in a way bereft of political potential.
And it is here, at the level of contradiction, where we must turn away from
Sartre in favor of Lacan, who gives us room to move forward. While Sartre sees
seriality as a structure that eliminates contradiction and must be done away with,
Lacan’s seriality is all about bringing recognition of impossible contradiction in to the
symbolic (i.e. how can order and memory emerge ex nihilo—from the gap, the real—
when a series forms?). We can link this position to Sartre’s disavowal of the
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unconscious found in Being and Nothingness. In proposing his own notion of
“existential psychoanalysis,” Sartre lays bare the difference between his
presuppositions and what he offers as the orthodox psychoanalytic view: “Empirical
psychoanalysis in fact is based on the hypothesis of the existence of an unconscious
psyche, which on principle escapes the intuition of the subject. Existential
psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious; it makes the psychic act coextensive with consciousness” (728). Lacan’s seriality, explained above, absolutely
“escapes the intuition of the subject.” It is only something one can register
retroactively. This does mark a stark difference between Sartre and Lacan where it is
perhaps unfair to criticize Sartre. For Lacan, seriality is in the foundation of the
function of the signifier. It is embedded in the structure of how meaning arises in
language. Seriality does not travel along similar terrain for Sartre.
Still, in continuing to think with seriality, we can perform nuanced work both
politically and narratologically. There is a point at which we need to leave Sartrean
seriality (but also a point worth coming back to). If we follow Sartre’s ideas to the
letter and push them to their conclusion, we are obliged to reject seriality wholesale
and favor something else in its place (the group-in-fusion is Sartre’s answer).
Following Sartre, we would have to acknowledge the insidiousness of seriality and
capitalism, perhaps drawing conclusions similar to James H. Wittebols, who makes
seriality and capitalist expansion the cornerstone of his analysis in The Soap Opera
Paradigm. As Wittebols argues “[serial] storytelling has increasingly overtaken other
forms of storytelling on television over the last few decades, and that this storytelling
form serves well the priorities of media conglomerates” (2). This kind of analysis
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leads always to its own prior conclusion: we need to get out of seriality. Or, as
Wittebols later argues, it is “the emphasis on profit to the diminution of social and
aesthetic values has had an effect on the creative process behind television
programming and has resulted in a sameness to all television programs regardless of
the particular genre” (6). The point is not that Sartre and Wittebols are wrong, the
point is that neither study of seriality can think with contradiction. The solution is
always to reject seriality.
We could say the same of Jonathan Crary’s 24/7, a study of sleep and
capitalism, which turns to Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason in the book’s final
pages. Sartre looks at the role of media, specifically radio, in producing “indirect
gatherings” of people in modern life (his example is a disconnected group of people
all listening to the same radio program but separated—alienated—from each other).
Relevant for this dissertation is how Crary marries a suspicion of television with
Sartre’s notion of seriality. He maybe has reruns in mind when he writes “Seriality is
the numbing and ceaseless production of the same” (117). Further, Crary writes that
“it is regrettable that [Sartre’s] plan for a study of television in Volume 2 of the
Critique was never fulfilled” (117). This interests Crary who, as he demonstrates in
one chapter, has a serious misgivings about television and, by extension, seriality.
Citing a widely criticized and discredited 2006 Cornell University study on the link
between television viewing and autism, Crary lauds the researchers for “bypass[ing]
the notion that television is something one watches in some attentive manner, and
instead . . . [treats] it as a source of light and sound to which one is exposed” (86
emphasis in original). 10 Crary doubles down on the idea of the television viewer as
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“distracted” and writes of them as though they are victims of the image, exposed to
something that harms them. It is easy to dismiss Crary’s paranoia, especially when he
writes “The precise nature of the physiological attraction of television has yet to be
specified, and may never be, but a large amount of statistical and anecdotal evidence
obviously has confirmed the truism that it has potent addictive properties” (87). Crary
cites none of this supposed “large amount of statistical and anecdotal evidence” and is
content simply to pathologize television as being part of a wider milieu of
technological addictiveness. Following this screed against television, Crary’s next
chapter uses Chris Marker’s La Jetée to “affirm the indispensability of the imagination
for collective survival” in contradistinction to the oppressiveness of television and
seriality (92). Ironically, Marker himself remarks in the DVD booklet to La Jetée that
“I no longer watch many films . . . I feed my hunger for fiction with what is by far the
most accomplished source: those terrific American TV series like Deadwood, Firefly,
or The Wire” (qtd. in Williams 1). Again: it’s easy to dismiss Crary’s argument on
many levels. However, Crary, Wittebols, and Sartre crystallize an important attitude
for us: media is dangerous—especially serial media. In fact, it is so volatile and
threatening that we must censor ourselves from it or protect our children from it. We
should not overexpose ourselves to something like Netflix, even though we want to
immerse ourselves in it. (In chapter four, on Netflix’s binge serials, we will take a
closer look at how this pathologizing of media—particularly television—manifests
itself in popular and academic criticism). This is a perhaps naïve approach to media,
particularly serial media forms, but it’s important to note the kind of suspicion the
serial form has received in these scholarly accounts.
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Whatever merits there are in Sartre’s notion of seriality as a theory of public
opinion, in Jameson’s phrase, it leaves us very little room to continue an investigation
of seriality itself (or even narrative, or political narratives and how they form,
something Sartre would have doubtlessly been interested in). There is certainly a
political dimension to Sartre’s thought that is more immediate than in Lacan’s. This is
absolutely worth holding on to. Further, it is worth remembering the sense of scandal
and suspicion associated with seriality in both Wittebols and Crary. Seriality, in the
view of this short survey of thought from Sartre to Crary, is a contemporary pathology
that needs interrogation and rejection. The only conclusion to fully accepting a
Sartrean view of seriality is to overthrow seriality, expose the evils of the “Soap Opera
Paradigm,” and urge for the group-in-fusion to forge a “possible route out of the
nightmare of serialization and isolation” (Crary 118). We need a way forward that
does not aim at dismissing seriality, however. Still, it is worth remembering the almost
violent reaction to seriality we see in Crary. It is possible that, though their sense of
the insidiousness of seriality differs greatly from mine, Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary
see the real of seriality (in all that word’s Lacanian meaning). Seriality is not a neutral
or neutered form in these accounts, it is a priori filled with manipulative and
damaging content. It is a confrontation, as Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary see. It is a
confrontation worth grappling with, however, not one in need of rejection for
something else.
The move Lacan’s analysis of seriality helps us to make is precisely this: if we
position the real at the center of seriality then we can see clearly how a series is
formed unconsciously, non-intentionally, and against its own interests.11 By
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foregrounding the gap—the real at the heart of seriality—Lacan allows us to work
with and theorize seriality. How we move forward and develop this theory will be in
the proceeding chapters.

Chapter Outline (or Stay Tuned!)
The general thrust of Lacan’s theory of the signifier and its application to serial
media studies is not as far away as we might think. Shane Denson and Ruth Mayer, in
“Border Crossings: Serial Figures and the Evolution of Media,” claim that characters
that recur throughout serial fiction, or “serial figures,” “reflect and document the
evolution of media forms in a marked and condensed manner” (“Border Crossings”).
Their interest is in complicating serial authorship to discuss the transmediality of such
figures as Frankenstein’s monster, Dracula, Sherlock Holmes, Fantômas, and comic
book figures like Superman and Batman. As they write:

The material dimensions of serial narration, which we conceive as a process of
autonomous unfolding, come to the fore in the imbrication of seriality and
modality. This means that stories about serial figures appear, in a sense, to
write (and to update) themselves: they gain a momentum of their own . . . such
that references to the authority or intentionality of an author must appear
obsolete or at least insufficient. (“Border Crossings”)

The fluidity of serial figures across media shows that these figures are malleable, thus
reflecting the soft and/or blurry borders between different kinds of media. The play of
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the serial figure in determining the boundaries of media, for Denson and Mayer, acts
in way similar to the signifier of Lacan. The third chapter of this dissertation will
pursue in greater detail the signifier of Lacan and the emerging of rules, order, and
meaning in seriality. For now, it is important to make clear that the organizing
argument of this dissertation proceeds in the opposite direction from a media analysis
such as Denson and Mayer’s: seriality is not the umbrella term that allows individual
focus on different kinds of media. Such a disquisition ends up telling us about media—
which is a fine and worthwhile project—but not seriality. By way of contrast, this
dissertation uses diverse media texts to understand seriality itself. To understand it not
just as form but as force.
In the chapters that follow, I build a theory of the serial gap starting with two
theoretical encounters (Freud’s and Lacan’s) before moving on to case studies that
show the exigence for theorizing the serial gap. The first chapter discusses Freud as a
reader of Victorian serial fiction and position that experience as important to his
development as a thinker of psychoanalysis. The next chapter explains and develops a
Lacanian theory of seriality, using significant works from the beginning and end of
Lacan’s career. As chapter two discusses with regard Jennifer Egan’s Black Box and
Joshua Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” (a novella and short non-fiction story originally
published on Twitter), rules and order emerge ex nihilo to bind a narrative. Lacan
explores this idea relative to the play of the signifier in his second seminar (of which
the lecture on “The Purloined Letter” has been popularly excised). As Lacan says
often in his seminars, the signifier is the subject for another signifier. This is a radical
departure from Saussurean linguistics where the signifier (S1) is arbitrary and it is the
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signified (S2) that has substance. For Lacan there is no signified nor a referent that
endows meaning to the signifier. It is the signifier as such that allows for the
possibility of meaning.
The next chapter discusses seriality as a form of desire through the first season
of the Serial podcast. The podcast’s serial structure, airing episodes weekly as its own
investigation into the murder of Hae Min Lee progressed, has been lauded by critics as
showing unprecedented “transparency” in investigative journalism. It has also been
derided, for the very same reason, as a breach of journalistic ethics (i.e. airing
speculations and theories as they occur to the investigators, rather than determining
their truth first). Working with and through the overlap/ divergences between Lacan's
and Foucault's ethical projects, Serial’s first season helps to underline the following
claim: seriality is a confrontation with unconscious desire laid bare. The “what” of the
confrontation is variable (journalistic ethics, the value and aesthetic of the cliffhanger)
but why the serial constantly confronts us is chiefly related to its gapped form.
The final chapter deals with binge watching and Netflix’s “binge model” of
seriality. Jason Mittell, in Complex TV, comments that Netflix original series
“forgo[…] the gap-filled serial broadcast experience altogether . . . raising the question
as to whether these multiepisode narratives can be considered serial at all” (41).
Mittell only raises this question and does not take it up in his book. This chapter will
explore the case of Netflix seriality and take aim at this view that Netflix has actually
found a “gap free” way of delivering serial narrative. This chapter will engage
meaning and totality, obstacle and impetus, closure and disclosure. The binge model is
an attempt at overturning what German philosopher Fichte would term the Anstoss at
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the heart of seriality. In other words, serial narrative—being premised on a dialectic of
closure and disclosure—is itself an obstacle to a totality of meaning. If the obstacle to
serial meaning can be removed—that is, episodic installments that disrupt totality—
then the “riddle” of seriality is solved. We can get the best of the seriality (long form
storytelling, engaging characters who viewers “live with” over the life of the show)
without the “worst” of it (having to wait for anything and being interrupted by gaps).
Such is the promise of the binge model. What we will see is that bingeing—both as
method of production and viewership practice—is an attempt at consciously
overcoming seriality that nonetheless sustains it unconsciously. The question the
chapter answers is not Jason Mittell’s, “is the Netflix narrative serial” but “how is the
Netflix narrative serial.” Or, perhaps another way of putting it is this: what do the
serial gaps look like when there are—allegedly—no gaps?
Psychoanalytic theory allows us to view seriality as a primary structure of our
own psychic life. It offers a non-pathological answer to the popularity of seriality and
to the pervasiveness of a phenomenon such as binge watching. Most importantly I’d
like to position psychoanalytic theory as already a theory of seriality, so involved as it
is with thinking through seriality as a form that needs confronting. Given how early
Freud’s references to seriality and analysis are we might further claim that
psychoanalysis proper begins as a theory of seriality almost as much as it begins as a
treatment for hysteria. This story of psychoanalysis as a theory of seriality is as yet
untold. This dissertation will begin with repositioning psychoanalysis as an encounter
with seriality and chart the consequences of this move in subsequent chapters. We will
thereby build a theory of seriality’s single immanent feature—the gap.

28

Before the Break…
This project imagines a double intervention, where each chapter explicates and
develops the extant serial concerns of psychoanalysis and then, through examples of
serial media, advances a theory of seriality. Positioning psychoanalytic theory in this
manner is fitting, given that psychoanalysis is a mode of inquiry primarily concerned
with media and formations of the symbolic. I turn to psychoanalysis because the
serial’s operation upon temporal, textual, and other forms of narrative gaps is
important for what it does to narrative and viewers, readers, and listeners. In other
words, it plays with the symbolic as it forms us as media consumers, and as the serial
form dictates to us—including serial creators. 12 This project emphasizes that the serial
gap is important for what it does to narrative and viewers. The serial gap confronts us
the way slips of the tongue or mishearings do: showing a desire we are not conscious
of, an order we have no control over. The unconscious is wild uncultivated territory. It
has an order all to its own, forming without our consent and against our wishes. It is
because of this that I approach seriality as a theory of the gap that requires
psychoanalytic theory to understand, maintaining the resonance a gap constitutive of
narrative has with a gap constitutive of the subject.
There is real necessity and stakes for developing a theory of serial media that is
grounded in psychoanalytic theory. As I argue, the formation of psychoanalysis itself
occurs against the cut of seriality. My move in linking psychoanalysis and media
through seriality explores aspects of psychoanalytic texts that have received less
treatment than others, and it brings this theory to bear on media studies which has not
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fully developed a theory of seriality as such. We see the unique space that affords a
psychoanalytic theory of serial media in the following section of Hayward’s
Consuming Pleasures: “Linda K. Hughes and Michael Lund comment that ‘we no
longer live in the age of the literary serial.’ This is true only if we feel compelled to
emphasize the adjective here. True, the function of literature for nineteenth-century
society as social cement, as focus of discourse is no longer fulfilled by printed texts.
But literature has been replaced by television and to some extent film.” (5). Hayward’s
notion of seriality as “social cement” is evocative of the idea I am pursuing here. If we
literalize Hayward’s metaphor, seriality is the cement beneath our feet, that which
grounds the social tie. This dissertation argues that the serial gap—the indispensable
and immanent element to seriality—is psychic cement. The serial gap is the hole in the
whole that paradoxically introduces a break at the moment it binds a series (and the
subject).
There is a correspondence between the gap in the subject, as explored
extensively by Freud and Lacan, and the gap in the serial that this dissertation sees as
crucial to understanding seriality theoretically. The break is where the real
psychoanalytic work takes place. It exposes a gap in the subject. As Lacan tells us in
Seminar II:
How should one locate the ego in relation to common discourse and to the
beyond of the pleasure principle? . . . In the end, there exists a kind of mirror
relation between the subject-individual and the decentred subject—the subject
beyond the subject—the subject of the unconscious. The ego is itself one of the
significant elements of ordinary discourse, which is the discourse of the
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unconscious. As such, and in so far as it is image, it is caught in the chain of
symbols. It is an element indispensable to the insertion of the symbolic reality
into the reality of the subject, it is tied to the primitive gap of the subject. On
account of that, in its original sense, within the psychological life of the human
subject it is what appears as closest to, as most intimate with, as on the closest
of terms with death. The relation of the ego to death is an extremely close one,
for the ego is a point of intersection between the common discourse, in which
the subject finds himself caught, alienated, and his psychological reality. In
man, the imaginary relation has deviated, in so far as that is where the gap is
produced whereby death makes itself felt. The world of the symbol, the very
foundation of which is the phenomenon of repetitive insistence, is alienating
for the subject, or more exactly it causes the subject to always realise himself
elsewhere, and causes his truth to be always in some part veiled from him. The
ego lies at the intersection of the one and the other. (210 emphasis mine)
There is much to unpack here, which I will do below in piecemeal fashion. There is,
however, so much to unpack that it will take this entire dissertation to satisfactorily
tease out and develop the ideas Lacan suggests here about the project of
psychoanalysis, the gap, the serial chain of signifiers, and the subject of the
unconscious. For now, let’s parse this long quote in stages:
How should one locate the ego in relation to common discourse and to the
beyond of the pleasure principle? . . . In the end, there exists a kind of mirror
relation between the subject-individual and the decentred subject—the subject
beyond the subject—the subject of the unconscious.
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The notion of a “mirror relation” is evocative of Lacan’s famous “mirror stage,”
though the payoff for this idea comes later in the passage, so I will instead turn my
attention elsewhere. Lacan is trying to establish that, in the view of psychoanalysis,
the subject is subject to the unconscious. As opposed to ego-psychology or a more
commonplace notion of a “subconscious,” there is no possibility of mastering or
getting a grip over the unconscious. The unconscious has its grip over the subject.
There is an echo here to Freud’s famous statement from “A Difficulty in the Path of
Psycho-Analysis” that “the ego is not master in its own house” (143 emphasis
original). What this means is that the subject needs to be thought first in terms of an
intimate relation—that of the conscious “subject-individual” and the “decentered”
subject of the unconscious. The crucial twist here is that the thing most intimate to the
subject—the unconscious—is extimate, which is to say that the unconscious occupies
a space beyond intention and mastery. Again, as Freud has it, the unconscious makes
the subject feel not at home in their own house.
Since what appears on a first approach to be an intimate or interior relation—
that of the subject to the unconscious—is really an extimate one that decenters the
subject from itself, Lacan sees the necessity of discussing a more literal outside: the
social-symbolic space. He continues:
The ego is itself one of the significant elements of ordinary discourse, which is
the discourse of the unconscious. As such, and in so far as it is image, it is
caught in the chain of symbols. It is an element indispensable to the insertion
of the symbolic reality into the reality of the subject, it is tied to the primitive
gap of the subject.
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Lacan makes a complex move very quickly here. Discussing the ego is not just a way
of describing the speaking “I” in all its interiority. Since we are not purely individuals
removed from a group, the social complicates the subject in a foundational way.
Children attempt to understand the meaning behind dictates given to them by their
parents. “Don’t pick your nose” is a common uncomplicated directive—and it needs to
be—because the truth is, of course, everybody picks their nose. What parents mean is:
“Don’t pick your nose in public.” But this entails a complicated and, for a child, an
arbitrary kind of logic. The following is a brief but reasonable imagined dialogue
between a parent desperate to curtail their child running afoul of social mores and a
(probably meta aware) child trying to understand everything:
Why can I not do something in front of everyone that everyone does?
It’s embarrassing.
Why?
It’s gross.
But everybody does it.
But it’s done in private.
Why though? (etc…)
The child fails to see the symbolic necessity of not picking their nose in public. The
point is not to say that the world of adults is childish in its adherence to contradictory
rules, rather that coming to grips with the demand of the other is exactly what
psychoanalysis attempts to unravel. Symbolic reality, as Lacan puts it above, is
inserted into the “reality of the subject.” We can take this to refer conscious
experience, though Lacan is quick to add that the symbolic reality inserted into the ego
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is tied to “the primitive gap” of the subject. There is, again, a double relation between
the intimate and the extimate. Here Lacan is unfurling the demands of a more literal
extimate, that of social and symbolic reality. Further, what Lacan refers to as “the
primitive gap of the subject” refers to unconscious. It’s important not to read this gap
as an emptiness or an incompletion. The gap, rather, is a space with an interior logic to
it that can only be glimpsed in the external world of the symbolic. In other words, we
see the structure of the unconscious when the illusion of conscious mastery over the
speaking “I” breaks down through slips of the tongue, mishearings, and misreadings. It
is this understanding of the gap that Lacan explores elsewhere in Seminar II when he
performs a critical reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” What Lacan
gets into in that lecture is the logic of the serial gap. This notion of a gap that is not a
blank or emptiness but a space with rules and the order that curves signification
around it is at the forefront of this dissertation’s understanding of what it means to say
“serial gap” as a phrase. (The third chapter will talk explicitly about Lacan and “The
Purloined Letter” but it is important to lay down a definition of the serial gap now.)
In the next section of text, Lacan emphasizes that the ego is a “point of
intersection.” Before moving on to looking at what it is a point of intersection
between, we need to state that the ego is site of enormous tension. The ego is not a
pass-through for stacks various stimuli that, in a sort of quasi math equation, amounts
to what the subject is. The subject, rather, is caught in a relation between the intimate
(what the subject consciously knows) the intimate-extimate (the unconscious, which is
barred from the speaking subject) and the social-symbolic, an extimate-intimate. The
social-symbolic is an extimate that has the subject already implicated in it. As in our
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above example where the child attempts to understand and internalize contradictory
social rules that will guarantee the consistency of its public acts (i.e. why it’s proper to
not pick their nose even though everybody dose it).
With this preamble in mind, Lacan brings the idea of death into the equation
for the ego and the subject seemingly out of nowhere:
On account of that, in its original sense, within the psychological life of the
human subject it is what appears as closest to, as most intimate with, as on the
closest of terms with death. The relation of the ego to death is an extremely
close one, for the ego is a point of intersection between the common discourse,
in which the subject finds himself caught, alienated, and his psychological
reality.
Lacan, importantly, links the ego with being closest to death. Why link the ego with
being closest to death? The answer is that Lacan is moving the specter of death away
from the body and into the realm of, as he says at the end of this section,
“psychological reality.” The move here is designed to separate psychoanalysis from
biology.13 Death is figured here as a social-symbolic element, part of that which the
subject finds themselves “caught, alienated.” This alienation is doubled for, as we
have already established, the subject is alienated from their own psyche. The subject is
alienated, decentered, unmoored from their interior life and their daily interactions in
the social-symbolic. We see that this is another valence to the “mirror relation” Lacan
mentions at the top of this long quote section. The distance the subject feels internally
(psychically) is reflected externally (socially).
Following this mirroring metaphor, Lacan says:
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In man, the imaginary relation has deviated, in so far as that is where the gap is
produced whereby death makes itself felt. The world of the symbol, the very
foundation of which is the phenomenon of repetitive insistence, is alienating
for the subject, or more exactly it causes the subject to always realise himself
elsewhere, and causes his truth to be always in some part veiled from him. The
ego lies at the intersection of the one and the other.
Lacan’s mirror-stage, which this dissertation will codify further in Chapter 3, operates
on the premise that the subject sees in the image an illusory totality (this is what Lacan
also calls the imaginary). Lacan will later reorient his terms to position the imaginary
as that which covers the gaps in the symbolic—the impasse of the real—but here it is
important to note how Lacan sees the world of symbols generated by “repetitive
insistence.” This is an idea I want to import into our thinking about the serial, as
repetitive insistence. This repetition creates gaps, as repetition does not mean
replication. Repetition creates and ensures difference, thus producing gaps in what we
might otherwise see as a totality. Through this alienating phenomenon of repetitive
insistence—which, it is tempting to call “seriality” full stop, but this brings Lacan in
line with Sartre and ignores the clear differences between their approaches to
seriality—the subject is confronted with two gaps: one in the social and one internal.
Because of these gaps, the ego is not fully realized in either the psyche or the social. It
is this mirrored relation (mirrored not in the sense of the mirror stage, rather in the
sense of doubling), that indelibly influences the subject. The ego lies at the
intersection of the other of language and symbols and the other of the subject (the
unconscious). The “truth” of the subject is veiled, intimate yet extimate.

36

A psychoanalytic theory of seriality—as this dissertation presents—relies on
my argument that the subject and the series are inextricably linked via the gap. The
concepts explained above—the gap, the subject, the serial chain of signifiers, the
subject of the unconscious—are not static, however. In other words, this introduction
has laid down provisional definitions for key terms that chapters will later develop.
Taking its cue from Lacan’s seminars—the serial endeavor that defines his thought—
these dissertation chapters will offer a progression of understanding on what the serial
gap is and does. We have thus far established in a preliminary way the field of seriality
studies that this dissertation is intervening into. We have done important introductory
work into Freud and Lacan. We have started to understand the psychic cement that is
the serial gap.
1

http://www.loc.gov/issn/issnbro.html

Sean O’Sullivan echoes this claim in “Ingmar Bergman, Showrunner,” which he uses to preface his
own intervention, “…I would like to sketch out four provisional terms, as a way of considering seriality
across media. By way of preface, I should say that few have really attempted such a catalogue, perhaps
with good reason. The most prominent exceptions are Jennifer Hayward and Robyn Warhol, both of
whom have broached definitions in books that considered seriality in particular relation to audiences
and affect” (114).
2

O’Sullivan does not seize on the drowning implications of this image, which will become more
important in this project’s fourth chapter.
3

4

Lee Erickson, in The Economy of Literary Form, opines that consumer capital creates the conditions
of possibility for artistic expression:
Since readers read within a framework of desire, the economy of literary forms can be
described from the perspective of reception as well as that of production. In this way, literary
forms can be viewed as historical, aesthetic products of market forces reaching a momentary
equilibrium between the aspirations of writers and the desires of their audiences . . . literary
form is as much a product of the marketers and the readers as it is of the authors (8).
It is disappointing that Erickson does not consider or reckon with the inverse of his claim: that it is
artistic expression that creates avenues for capitalist enterprise. (But perhaps this is a “Chicken or the
Egg” problem.) Regardless, Erickson usefully equivocates consumption with desire. From the
standpoint of Erickson’s economics, desire is that which can be counted, charted, and marketed to. As
he writes, “The aggregate calculus of such individual desires is then reflected in the market by the
demand both for individual literary works and for genres. The more a work or a genre provides intense
immediate pleasures for readers, the more likely it is to be a bestseller” (9). Erickson is, again, talking
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about desire as though it can be counted in book sales and markets only. Despite writing otherwise,
Erickson is quantifying consumption, not theorizing desire. Furthermore, there is no unconscious at
work in Erickson’s consuming subject. Consumption is conscious and can be accounted for whereas
desire is unconscious and cannot be satisfied. The argument being made here is no mere pedantry.
Desire is in the realm of theory, it is not in the realm of the practical, the logical, or the market. The role
of unconscious desire and seriality will be taken up in Chapter Three.
5

Not move on entirely, as we will see. (No spoilers…)

See: Alison Herman’s “Master of None is a Love Letter to the Episode.” https://theringer.com/masterof-none-season-2-alan-yang-aziz-ansari-7be1ecffa87e Television critic Alan Sepinwall has twice
written on this subject, here being the most recent: http://uproxx.com/sepinwall/in-defense-of-theepisode-again/
6

7

https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/proof-tv-full-list-1400-859851

It is no surprise, then, that in Newman’s Legitimating Television, co-written with Elana Levine, that
the Newman pushes back on the economic factors behind television’s current Golden Age. The authors
question the efficacy of television’s current privileged position in the media landscape and argue that
TV is currently successful at reaffirming hierarchy and regressive cultural binaries.
8

It’s tempting to think here of Derrida’s notion of the supplement as a way of reversing this
relationship. Derrida, in Of Grammatology, argues that the supplement, which is ordinarily seem as
secondary to something, is precisely what the primary thing depends upon.
10
Crary leaves out that the Cornell study was authored by economists and that the paper was
immediately criticized by other economists. The fact that no significant research since this tendentious
Cornell study has confirmed or furthered the findings is hardly a feather in its cap, either. Something
that, again, Crary leaves out. http://freakonomics.com/2006/10/17/tv-causes-autism-i-doubt-it/
9

11

It is true that seriality—especially American televisual seriality—adheres to capitalist friendly notions
of accumulation and the projection of satisfaction ever forward into the future. Wittebols in particular
does well to show the “soap opera paradigm” at work in news reporting, sports telecast, and fantasy
football leagues. In thinking about Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary, we might say that seriality is not a form
of capital, though it is a capitalistic form. Understanding seriality as a form—the logic of its sequence—
helps to us to understand the logic of capitalistic accumulation. Another way of putting it is to state that
a seriality informed by the real is not a tool of capital (nor is it necessarily wieldable in total) and that
understanding seriality can demonstrate one way of understanding how capital expands and proliferates.
I mean “media consumers” not in the consumerist sense, but as a catch-all term to name those
receiving the serial form whether it is visual, audio, or textual. I’d like to preserve the active
connotation the word consumer has over something like “audience” which connotes more easily as
passive.
12

When Lacan talks about death here, he likely has Freud’s death drive in the back of his mind. Freud
himself first attempts to locate the death drive in the realm of the biological, though his later thinking on
the topic moves it firmly into the realm of the drive being a psychic organ. This dissertation will explore
the relation the drive has with seriality and the gap in Chapter 2 and 3.
13
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CHAPTER 2

SERIAL FORM, SERIAL PSYCHE: FREUD’S ENCOUNTER WITH DICKENS

This chapter will chart a brief history of the development of a few major
psychoanalytic ideas showing their indebtedness to thinking through seriality. I will
advance an understanding of the role seriality plays in the discovery and structure of
psychoanalysis by working through an initial explanation for why psychoanalysis has
the unique capacity for enabling us to theorize seriality. Showing the dynamic
connection between the serial structure as such and psychoanalytic thinking is the
central objective of this chapter. Exploring the consequences of this connection will be
the task of future chapters. Here the goal is to show the primary relationship seriality
has to psychoanalysis through Freud’s encounter with the serial fiction of the
Victorian era (primarily the work of Charles Dickens). 1 Scholarly work on the
serialized fiction of Charles Dickens often explains Dickensian characters, plots, or
storyworlds through psychoanalytic ideas. This chapter’s main claim is that we should
acknowledge that the reason psychoanalytic theory grafts so well onto understanding
the serial fiction of Charles Dickens is because the serial fiction of Charles Dickens
heavily influenced Freud’s own understanding of the psychoanalytic project. Freud
encounters serial fiction, particularly the works of Dickens, and it is through that
encounter that the fundamentals of psychoanalysis foment.

Dickens Before Freud
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Advances in print technology and periodical distribution allowed the
production and distribution of serial novels, magazines, and journals to flourish during
the Victorian Era. It was during the latter stages of the nineteenth century when Freud
began to articulate in writing the clinical practice that would come to be known as
psychoanalysis. The roots of psychoanalysis, I argue, lie in the serial form itself. In
1836, when Charles Dickens makes the decision to not just distribute The Pickwick
Papers serially but to write the novel concurrently with its publication, he legitimates
the serial form’s commercial viability and literary potential. 2 While, historically
speaking, Freud missed this initial boom of serial production, he was well positioned
to observe the way the serial structure was present and apprehendable in everyday life.
His observation of the practice of reading daily serials in newspapers will serve as a
touchstone for his thinking through one of the most basic problems of the clinic and
we can see the evidence of how much the serial form occupied his thoughts through
the written correspondence with his wife Martha (which will be discussed later).
Before diving into those references, however, it is instructive to see how Dickens
scholarship has often noted the corollary between Freudian psychoanalysis and
Dickensian characters, plots and themes. There is, in these references, a teasing gap of
causality, with the advent of psychoanalysis seeming to afford the opportunity to read
back on Dickens. Exploring the possibility of a more direct causality between Freud,
Dickens, and the serial form will be taken up after.
As Peter Gay writes in The Naked Heart, "Half a century before Freud,
Dickens knew that the most innocent can damn themselves as the most guilty" (270).
Indeed, reading Freud alongside Dickens has long been at the root of Victorian literary
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criticism, particularly at the level of character analysis. Lawrence Frank looks to
Dickens as a way to extend Freudian ideas beyond the scope of their typical usage in
literary scholarship with “In Hamlet’s Shadow: Mourning and Melancholia in Little
Dorrit.” In it, Frank painstakingly pulls together critical readings of mourning and
melancholia in Hamlet to show their applicability to Little Dorrit. Frank builds brick
by brick to the following conclusion: the story of Dickens’ Arthur Clennam—by
insistently pointing to a time before the father—anticipates Kleinian and Kristevan
amendments to the orthodox Freudian interpretation of mourning and melancholia as
concepts (886). Most intriguing for our purposes is the connection Frank makes
between Dickens’ description of Rome in Little Dorrit and Freud’s description of it in
Civilization and Its Discontents. Frank classifies both of these references as an
“archeological figure of speech,” writing that Dickens and Freud use Rome as a way
of imagining a physical site as having a psychic life (883-4). Frank stops short of
drawing a clear line of influence between Dickens and Freud here. His interest is more
in showing how Dickens can be read to extend the discourse of mourning and
melancholia we see in Shakespearean readings of Hamlet. In so doing, he shows the
territory that exists for seeing Freudian ideas in Dickensian characters and a shared
metaphorical language (in the Rome example) between Dickens and Freud.
For the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting study of Freud and
Dickens comes from Albert Hutter’s in “The High Tower of His Mind: Psychoanalysis
and the Reader of Bleak House.” Hutter pushes against the growing tide of
postmodern literary criticism in the late 1970s to argue that psychoanalysis can
provide a universal framework for understanding a literary text that nonetheless allows
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for variation and difference in readerly experience. His project in this essay is not
unlike the overarching goal of this dissertation, which positions seriality as a universal
logic that nonetheless allows for radical break and difference to emerge.
Hutter writes that Dickens’ style of serial writing “exploits a process of
splitting and reintegration” (310). Splitting, in Hutter’s terms, separates characters
from larger social institutions, from family, or from the group in general, and allows
Dickens to explore isolation and individuation as a thematic. Fragmentation, for
Hutter, “creates caricature, and the caricatures themselves—like the Jellybys or Mrs.
Snagsby—recall the novel’s preoccupation with parental care and parental loss” (ibid).
For Hutter, psychoanalysis is best used as a theory of universal subjective
development. “We are, at birth absolutely dependent,” he writes, “but we always
remain ‘relatively dependent on a mother,’ or on some nurturing relationship” (311).
Hutter positions a psychoanalytic theory of individuation as central to Bleak House,
writing “it accounts for the thematic core of Dickens’ story, the relationship between
Esther and Lady Dedlock, between mother and child, which derives its dramatic
impact from a traumatic separation, a subsequent reintegration which cannot be
maintained, and the ultimate loss of the mother” (ibid). Ultimately, Hutter asks and
answers the most important question, “How can psychoanalysis account for readers’
various backgrounds, assuming a reasonable ability and sensitivity to the text on the
part of different readers?” (312). His response, which partly echoes the claims made in
this chapter:
The answer, I think, must be that it cannot account for response if it equates
response with a single statement about latent content, but that it can account
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for a wide range of response if it analyzes psychological structure. The
combination of Esther’s story with the complex plot and narration should
evoke in the reader of Bleak House a response to a psychological problem
(separation) which continues through life, and to a universal adaptive process
(splitting). Different readers are bound to respond in different ways, but it is
possible to describe broadly the nature of their psychological response and to
relate it to the structure of the text. (312-313 emphasis in original)
Hutter’s emphasis on a structure of the psyche supports the inquiry being made here.
The further move is to see how Freud’s encounter with the serial form itself
occasioned the psychoanalytic ideas that Hutter is making use of in his analysis of
Dickens above.
We see more tantalizing connections in John O. Jordan’s Supposing Bleak
House. Jordan focuses on how Freudian psychoanalysis can help a reading of the
content of Bleak House. Jordan is particularly influenced by Cathy Caruth’s approach
to trauma.3 The way Cathy Caruth describes trauma as “an event that . . . is
experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not
available to consciousness” grafts nicely onto Jordan’s disquisition on Esther
Summerson (qtd. in Jordan 46). Caruth’s “emphasis . . . on the ways in which trauma
speaks belatedly and from displaced sites of articulation,” pushes Jordan to make a
connection with the displaced temporality of Esther’s narration in Bleak House (46).
He further proposes that understanding Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit shows us
that Esther’s trauma stems not from being separated from her mother but from the
harsh treatment Esther received from her godmother (47). The point here, however, is
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not to delve into trauma studies but to establish how Freud is first given to understand
trauma. In the following sections, we will explicate nachträglichkeit, show how, for
Freud, trauma is a series, and that it relies on retroactivity to be apprehended. As the
chapter and dissertation will go on to show, the encounter between psychoanalysis and
seriality is no mere chance nor a cute coincidence. Rather it is a formational
encounter.
The argument I am pursuing here is not that the psychic life of Dickensian
characters grafts well onto psychoanalytic concepts and could thus be argued to
anticipate Freudian psychoanalysis. Rather it is at the level of form that I wish to make
my argument. Jordan refers to the story of Esther and her mother as a “protopsychoanalytic mythic structure” (44). My claim is that the serial form itself provides
propulsion to Freud’s thinking through the problems of analysis. In this sense, the
serial form itself is the “proto-psychoanalytic mythic structure.” Another way of
putting it is that what fascinates John O. Jordan about psychoanalysis with regard to
Dickens is possibly what fascinated Freud while he read Dickens. Where Jordan takes
repetition compulsion and the return of the repressed to understand the disturbed
temporality of Bleak House, I am proposing that it is Freud’s encounter with serial
fiction that sets the stage for Freud’s own later breakthroughs in understanding
repetition compulsion, retroactivity, trauma, and the unease of endings. We can see in
the following personal and professional references to seriality that what interests Freud
in the serial is nachträglichkeit—the idea of deferred action or backwards causality so
critical to Freud’s understanding of trauma—as a formal narrative device. He is
likewise troubled by the specter of the end of the psychoanalytic session, likening it in
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Studies on Hysteria to the “To Be Continued” of serial fiction. In other words, it is not
surprising that the Freudian idea of nachträglichkeit grafts so well onto the study of
Dickens when it is Freud’s affection for serial fiction that first provided him a
structure for understanding the fundamentals of analysis in the first place. Further, the
Victorianists’ recourse to Freud attests to the pervasive presence of seriality as
structuring force of both Dickens’ texts and Freud’s thought.

The Poets Knew It First
Freud left us with two smoking guns to proffer this discussion. Focusing on two
statements—one made in his personal correspondence with his wife, Martha, and the
second made in Studies on Hysteria, the first major psychoanalytic text—I will pursue
the argument that it is through serial fiction that Freud first theorized retroactivity,
repetition, desire, and drive—all vital concepts in discussions of serial media
discourse.
With the serial moment of the nineteenth century reaching its later stages, Freud
reaches maturity as both reader and thinker. S.S. Prawer, in his invaluable A Cultural
Citizen of the World: Sigmund Freud’s Knowledge and Use of British and America
Writings, opens the door for us to approach Freud and his thinking along the axis of
his personal and private thoughts as well as his published work. Prawer does this by
focusing his book’s treatment of Freud on his personal correspondence, particularly to
his wife Martha. While Freud’s letters to Fliess are well-known both in and out of
psychoanalytic circles, this correspondence is far less readily available and is scarcely
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used in critical thinking on Freud. It is my intention to show the value of these letters,
serving as they do as a missing link in his published writings.
In his letters to Martha, Freud wrote frequently about literature, with the work of
Charles Dickens occupying a special place in those letters. Freud admired Dickens so
much that the first gift he ever gave his wife was a copy of David Copperfield. Such
was Freud’s love of Dickens that he wrote brief critiques to his wife, like the
following “review” of Dickens’s Bleak House dated 5 October 1883: Freud tells
Martha it “ranks far below [David Copperfield],” or as Freud refers to it, “that
incomparable work” (Prawer 71-72). He thought Bleak House “tendentious and hard,”
like most of Dickens’s later writings but, he adds, “I don’t want to spoil it for you; its
beauties are obvious, while its faults have to be sought for” (ibid). I write only halfkiddingly that this may have been the first “spoiler alert” in the history of written
communication. Significantly, Freud notes that he felt so involved with Dickens’s
characters and narrative world that he found it hard to write to his wife in German
rather than “Dickens’s English” (ibid). To the extent that we can take these brief
statements from Freud’s personal correspondence as representative for things he was
thinking through in his mental life, we can see that he was often given over to the
contemplation of serial fiction (lest we forget that letter writing is also itself a serial
endeavor).
In fact, Freud’s experience with seriality parallels 21 st century consumption
much more closely than one might think. Freud seems to have engaged in what we
might call “binge reading” with George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. In a letter to Martha
dated 26 August 1882 Freud writes, “I read [Deronda] with mounting puzzlement and

46

interest until an hour ago, discounting a few hours of sleep. My well-known
impatience made me hurry to get to the end” (Prawer 74).4 It’s easy to see how
Freud’s future notion of repetition compulsion could have fomented from this
serialized conception of analysis as practice. For example, when we are talking about
serial stories we are already talking about repetition, just as we are talking about
repetition in the very act of going to analysis. So, when Freud discovers the repetition
compulsion of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, we should not fail to
note the resonance it has with encountering serial narrative:
But how is the predicate of being ‘instinctual’ related to the compulsion to
repeat? At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon
the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in
general which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly
stressed. It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to
restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of
organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent
in organic life. (43 emphasis in original).
James Strachey, as is well-known, translates both the German words “instinkt”
(biological instinct) and “trieb” (drive in excess of biological necessity) as the English
word “instinct.” Nevertheless, what Freud is getting at here is the drive— “an urge in
organic life to restore an earlier state of things.” The Freud who stayed up late to finish
reading Daniel Deronda is here, endeavoring to “return to an earlier state of things”—
a state where Freud was not possessed by the tension of needing serial closure. To
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help us with the above statement, we need to look at the Lacanian reading of this
passage from Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This “earlier state of things” is a prior
state of loss or lack. Like characters in a sitcom, we agitate to return to the very state
of lacking the object that troubles us (breaking up with partner with whom we long
lusted after…before actually getting to know them; leaving the job we thought we
always wanted…until we actually did it). Freud is stuck in the middle and wishes to
return to the Freud who was not troubled by the encounter with the serial. The drive
delights in this middle space—this failure to obtain closure. The death drive enjoys
failing to obtain its object rather than obtaining it. It doesn’t desire the end but to
remain stuck in the middle. In fact, we might even see that the Freud who wanted rid
of Daniel Deronda is a Freud attempting to rid himself from the drive. It would not be
until 1920—thirty-eight years after he sent the above letter to Martha—that he
discovers the drive and ever after it remained a concept that challenged Freud’s entire
thought process. As he writes in Civilization and its Discontents, his last major work,
“To begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed
here [that of death drive], but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon
me that I can no longer think in any other way” (79). We see though that Freud does
not first encounter the drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but that the radicality of
the drive first foments in Freud’s thought through his encounter with serial fiction. It
was a preoccupying notion, for Freud, one that would later be taken up and explored
by Jacques Lacan. 5
For now, we see that from the very beginning—Studies on Hysteria—Freud is
thinking through analysis as a process of serial reception. This is precisely one of the
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ways I want to position psychoanalysis in this project—as a mode of narrative inquiry
that was influenced by seriality and a mode of narrative inquiry that later influenced
narratively inclined theories.6 Any account of seriality should consider Freud in light
of his own experience with seriality and the echoes that experience has in ideas such
as retroactivity, repetition compulsion, desire, and drive. As he writes in Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality, “the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (88).
Freud’s mature theories are the “refinding” and rearticulation of thinking through
serial narrative as he first outlined in Studies on Hysteria.

Studies on Hysteria
In 1895’s Studies on Hysteria, the text that announced the psychoanalytic
method to the world, Freud recognizes that analysis has a serial problem. While the
talking cure requires the analysand’s narrative to form free of interruption, the analytic
session itself has to end at some point. It is these “interruptions . . . imperatively
prescribed by incidental circumstances in the treatment, such as the lateness of the
hour,” which occur “at the most inconvenient points, just as one may be approaching a
decision or just as a new topic emerges,” Freud writes (297). In short, the purely
practical endpoint to a session means that an analyst and analysand cannot talk about
everything in a single session. The interruption, the end of the session, confronts the
analysand with an ending that occurs before the analysand is really ready to leave.
Freud is compelled to liken this to the experience of reading serial fiction:
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Every newspaper reader suffers from the same drawback in reading the daily
installment of his serial story, when immediately after the heroine’s decisive
speech or after the shot has rung out, he comes upon the words: ‘To be
continued.’ In our own case the topic that has been raised but not dealt with, the
symptom that has become temporarily intensified and has not yet been
explained, persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be more troublesome
to him than it has otherwise been . . . since by themselves they cannot take any
steps towards getting rid of it, they suffer more, to begin with, than they did
before the treatment. (297-298)
The phrase “to be continued” interrupts the narrative in a serial story. It announces that
continuation is not forthcoming at the moment and this is what makes the serial
interruption so fascinating: it imposes an ending while announcing itself as a link to
the next installment. The interruption cuts the narrative—“To be continued” makes the
reader aware of the structure of the story, breaking the continuous fictive world—but
also binds it to the next installment.
It’s worth pausing again on the weight that interruptions give to that which
precedes them. Freud writes, “the topic that has been raised but not dealt with . . .
persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be more troublesome to him that it has
otherwise been” (298). The acknowledgement here is what form does to content.
Whatever “topic” the patient brought up may have been innocuous but, because that
discussion could not end of its own volition (through a formal interruption), the
specter of it “persists” and becomes more “troublesome” than it would be otherwise.
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This is the same kind of trouble—wanting rid of the topic raised but not dealt with—
that Freud attempts to eliminate by binge reading Daniel Deronda.
Freud draws a corollary between the patient who “suffers more” as a result of
the psychoanalytic session ending abruptly and the newspaper reader who is
confronted by “To Be Continued.” Freud here is describing the effect of a cliffhanger.
Possibly invented by Thomas Hardy—who literally has a character hanging off a cliff
between two installments of A Pair of Blue Eyes—the cliffhanger is one of serial
storytelling’s trademark narrative tools. A cliffhanger—by interrupting a narrative
scene before its resolution—holds the reader/ viewer/ listener in suspense, causing
them to “suffer more” than if the tense situation had simply reached its conclusion.
What both serial narrative and analytic experiences share, as Freud shows here, is a
gap that breaks continuity at the same moment that it binds it. Just as we feel we are
on the verge of some knowledge—knowing who the killer is in a serial story, or
realizing why we acted with unexpected hostility to a family member the week before
in analysis—time is up, the narrative suspended. We have to get off the couch and
wait a week to take up the same topic again.
By referencing the structure of the serial, Freud notes the interruptive and
retroactive continuity of analysis in Studies on Hysteria. Despite identifying these key
aspects of psychoanalysis early on it is possible that even he did not understand how
profoundly seriality is ingrained into the analytical structure. The canonical story told
of Freud’s development in understanding trauma post-1919 is that the experience of
treating soldiers after World War I changed Freud’s understanding of neurosis. 7
Perhaps those experiences in the clinic unlocked his own “deferred” understanding of
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seriality as an analytic structure. I say this because the next step in our look at
psychoanalytic theory’s encounter with seriality is to see that serial fiction has the
structure of trauma as understood by Freud. Deferred information in a serial always
makes sense of a prior question, to the point where it seems the later revelation caused
the initial event. This is what Freud comes to understand with greater clarity after
WWI and, to my mind, it is not an observation that grows out of Freud encountering
an entirely new situation (i.e. analyzing postwar patients) but one where the new
situation makes sense of Freud’s prior thinking on seriality. It is how Dickens
happens—serially—that matters for Freud, not the “what” of Dickens—the dead
babies, the disappearing/ reappearing parental figures, the orphans, the problematic
mothers)—we see above.8

Retroactivity and Serial Trauma
One of the links between psychoanalysis and seriality is the vexed relationship
both have to the idea of an ending and how intermittent ends, in effect, rewrite what
came before. Nachträglichkeit is one of Freud’s most important concepts for
understanding this (one he gets, possibly, from Hegel and the movement of dialectical
thinking). In “Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses” Freud says, “The sexual
experiences are bound to have a pathogenic effect. But they produce their effect only
to a very slight degree at the time at which they occur; what is far more important is
their deferred effect, which can only take place at later periods of growth” (281).
Nackträglichkeit, “belatedness,” or “deferred action” is best thought of along the lines
of retroactivity: the idea that meaning emerges not linearly from cause to effect but
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from effects that posit their own cause. German film and media critic Thomas
Elsaesser glosses the concept:
Freud was interested in temporality (as rupture, gap or discontinuity rather than
as time’s linear arrow of sequence and succession). He speculated that time
was a dimension that mankind had invented to protect itself from discontinuity
and the contingent, and that it was a subjective category (rather than the
physical, thermodynamic principle of entropy); this is why he introduced the
notion of Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, suggesting that in our thinking
about ‘time’ we let effects rewrite their own ‘causes.’ (“Freud as media
theorist: mystic writing pads and the matter of memory”102)
Nachträglichkeit is an important early term for Freud. Though he will stop using the
term with such regularity after 1898, the idea of retroactive meaning and backwards
causality never leaves his thought. 9 He returns to the concept most explicitly in “The
Wolf Man” case (published in 1918) where he even re-explains the term (45). Most
important for our purposes is that deferred action depends upon a gap. Seriality shares
the structure of trauma as understood by Freud.
In Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (written in 1895 but unpublished
until 1950), he first outlines the difference between what we might understand as a
common-sense notion of trauma—that trauma is unary and single-event focused (e.g. a
car accident is traumatic)—and the idea of trauma pursued by Freud. “We invariably
find,” Freud writes, “that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by
deferred action [Nachträglichkeit]” (356 emphasis original). 10 Freud recounts the
story of a patient, Emma, who is “subject at the present time to a compulsion of not
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being able to go into shops alone” (410 emphasis original). Emma attempts to explain
her behavior by reference to an incident which occurred at a shop when she was
twelve. As Freud recounts, “[Emma] went into a shop to buy something, saw the two
shop-assistants . . . laughing together, and rushed out in some kind of fright. In this
connection it was possible to elicit the idea that the two men had been laughing at her
clothes and that one of them had attracted her sexually” (ibid). The patient explains
her symptom—not being able to enter shops alone—by reference to this singular prior
event.
Freud, however, is unconvinced of this unitary explanation for the symptom.
Referring to this initial event as “Scene 1,” analysis unearths another “Scene,” an even
earlier one, that both better explains the symptom and shows how trauma is made
apprehensible through a series:
Further investigation now revealed a second memory, which she denies having
had in mind at the moment of Scene 1. . . . On two occasions when she was a
child of eight she had gone into a small shop to buy some sweets, and the
shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her clothes. . . . We can now
understand Scene I (with the shop-assistants) if we take it in conjunction with
Scene II (with the shopkeeper). All we need is an associative link between
them. She herself remarked that a link of this kind was provided by the
laughter. The shop-assistants’ laughter had reminded her of the grin with
which the shopkeeper had accompanied his assault. (411)
What Freud engages with here as analyst is a search for coherence in a discontinuous
narrative. This search for coherence is, as Elsaesser writes above, an attempt to snap
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into relation discontinuous or broken time. The analysand’s narrative is an interruptive
one that can only be made sensible retroactively. These two scenes were four years
apart. The first scene, being laughed at by shop-assistants, is determined by the
analysand as the genesis of her present compulsion to not go into shops alone. To have
such an extreme reaction to this laughter suggests to Freud that there must be
something else imbuing the laughter with its powerful content. This unearths another
memory, again at a shop, but this one far more serious—a sexual assault. What Freud
realizes is that the sexual assault suffered by Emma at age eight was not registered as
a sexual assault until her visit to a shop at age twelve.11 The laughter of the shopassistants at her clothes felt assaulting in nature and brought to light “an affect which. .
. had not [been] excited as an experience” initially (413). So, it was the laughter of the
shop-assistants that retroactively called forth the trauma of the prior assault.
(Remembering, of course, that the prior assault occurred through Emma’s clothes.) Or,
as Freud puts it regarding this incident, “We invariably find that a memory is
repressed which has only become a trauma after the event” (ibid, emphasis in
original).
Trauma, for Freud, relies on deferred action, or a seemingly innocuous incident
calling forth the trauma of a previous event. The registration of this trauma is
retroactive, it does not occur continuous with the subject’s experience of time. 12 This
makes trauma a series. We might recall Marx’s famous correction of Hegel that
history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. We might imagine Hegel’s riposte:
that one needs the farce to be able to fully register the tragedy. 13 Regarding trauma and
repetition compulsion, Zupančič nicely summarizes the Freudian insight: “what the
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compulsion to repeat repeats is not some traumatic and hence repressed experience,
but something which could never register as an experience to begin with. The trauma
which is being repeated is outside the horizon of experience (and is, rather,
constitutive of it). This emphasis is absolutely crucial: the trauma is real, but not
experienced” (107). Trauma is an impossible hole in our symbolic experience. It
cannot be recalled like an innocuous memory, it confronts us—just as Emma was
confronted by the shop-assistants’ laughter at her clothes.
Seriality confronts us with a gap that interrupts closure. This interruptive gap
causes the analysand to “suffer more,” as Freud tells us, linking seriality and the gap to
distress and tension. The gap is always already fraught. There are no empty or blank
gaps, only confrontations with the serial form.

The Death Drive and Repetition
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud first begins to articulate his discovery
of the death drive. The importance of the death drive to Freud’s theory cannot be
overstated. The acceptance or rejection of Freud’s theory of the drive is something that
separates psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners. Jacques Lacan’s oft-mentioned
“return to Freud” positions the drive as Freud’s most indispensable logic. Freud first
defines the death drive as “an urge in organic life to restore an earlier state of things,”
or the “inanimate state” (43, 46).14 (We will need to complicate this definition but for
now it will suffice.) Importantly, this is not a singular or linear “urge” but a circuitous
repetitive path carved against biological interest. As Richard Boothby puts it in Freud
as Philosopher: Metapsychology After Lacan, what separates the Freudian Trieb from
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animal behavior—and the idea of “instinct”—is “[the drive’s] complete detachment
from biological need and from any naturally designated object of satisfaction” (137138).
While Freud was developing his own notion of the death drive in the aftermath
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle he was aghast to see that his colleagues attempted to
find a drive for every possible behavior (i.e. a drive to hoard, for example, which is
separate from a drive to eat excessively, which is separate from a drive to explore,
which is separate from…). What's wrong with these ad hoc “drive inventions” is that
they all have an aim or an end (i.e. a drive to hoard aims at accumulating something or
accumulation in general). Drive, for Freud has no other aim than to repeat itself.
Responding to this “mini-tradition” of misreading the drive, Lacan famously claims, in
“Position of the Unconscious,” that “every drive is virtually a death drive” (719).
What Lacan means is that the death drive is not simply one drive among many, rather
it is fundamental to the subject as conceived by psychoanalysis as such. It designates a
gap in being that cannot be filled in, as the subject is constituted around this gap.
The above quote from Beyond the Pleasure Principle may seem to indicate a
linearity or teleology for the subject in psychoanalysis. If there’s an urge in organic
life to reach an “inanimate state” that makes life an uncomplicated path toward death
(the most inanimate of states), right? Not exactly. As Freud writes, the death drive is
responsible for inspiring the human subject to “diverge ever more widely from its
original course of life and to make ever more complicated detours before reaching its
aim of death. These circuitous paths to death . . . would thus present us today with the
picture of the phenomena of life” (46). The death drive is the engine of life. It is the
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motor in the subject that allows us to “die differently,” as Alenka Zupančič puts in in
her recent What IS Sex? (106).
The “circuitous paths” Freud identifies above hint at the core of repetition
embedded in the death drive and, thereby, in the subject. Helpfully clarifying the
crucial aspect of repetition involved in the drive, Zupančič writes,
Now, instead of conceiving the death drive proper as the fundamental
omnipresent tendency to return to the inanimate (a kind of magnetism of the
inanimate), we have to conceive it as originating in another (kind) of repetition
occurring within this “conservative” repetition; as repetition within repetition:
namely, repetition of some (partial and, so to speak, extracurricular)
satisfaction accidentally produced within this conservative repetition. This is
very much in tune with how Freud, in “Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality,” deduces sexuality and sexual drives: as a surplus
satisfaction/excitation that occurs in the course of the functioning, and
satisfaction, of different organic functions. (Like the famous “pleasure of the
mouth” occurring in the course of satisfying the need for food.) This surplus is
not an external but an internal cause of tension, and of constant pressure; and,
paradoxically, the drive originating in this surplus does not aim at lowering or
annihilating that tension/excitation, but on the contrary at repeating it, again
and again. (103)
It is repetition that becomes central to understanding the death drive, as Zupančič
clarifies. The drive does not simply involve the subject in constitutive repetition,
compelling it to repeat excitations, but defines the subject through this very repetition.
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This repetition is both constitutive of the subject and continuous for the subject. Since
constitutive and continuous repetition is at the heart of seriality and Freud’s drive, we
might be moved to state that the drive is serial. Grasping the logic of a seriality that
forms against our conscious wishes or acknowledgement will be Lacan’s project,
which he articulates through the signifier (though it has a clear correlation with the
unconscious as well).
It is worth pivoting back to Dickens here. The earlier survey of Freud’s place
in Dickens scholarship will not have been much use in establishing a causal link
between the two if a notion as critical to Freud’s thought as the drive is absent in the
study of Dickens. Robert E. Lougy’s “Desire and the Ideology of Violence: America
in Charles Dickens’s Martin Chuzzlewit” deals principally with Dickens’s conflictual
relationship with the United States of America, offering that evidence of this tension is
embedded in Martin Chuzzlewit. His interest in both the Dickens text and
psychoanalysis amounts to more than psycho-biography, as he argues that Martin
Chuzzlewit is a text that explores Freud’s death drive: “America in Martin Chuzzlewit,
like the landscape of Eden, is both tomb and womb, the place of beginning and end,
both Alpha and Omega . . . Dickens was fascinated by the struggle between the forces
of life and those of death and his characters are often death-haunted, drawn towards
those landscapes of cessation and ease” (586). The death drive, as we have seen, is
such a crucial notion for Freud. It is hard to overstate how the drive caused a revision
to Freud’s previous ideas of the body being, in some ways, homeostatic (e.g. the
pleasure principle regulates psychical or bodily excitation to extend it). After the
discovery of the death drive, Freud is obliged to observe the primacy of a compulsion
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to repeat loss. Lougy’s phrase “tomb and womb” is a nice way of seeing the overlap of
Freud’s idea in Dickens’s fiction. The idea “tomb and womb” is seen specifically in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle when Freud notes the tendency in fish to live close to
where they are born rather than move toward necessary resources, thus securing an
easier or longer life.
Lougy’s scholarship in particular makes for an excellent mini-case study. His
2002 essay, “Filth, Liminality, and Abjection in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House”
returns to the Freudian idea that “filth is unavoidable” to examine the unavoidable
excrement of/ in Bleak House. Like Lawrence Frank, Lougy is compelled to explore
Kristeva and “the relationship between filth, the feminine and the symbolic order”
(475). He finds in Bleak House, however, a strong illustration of Freud’s uncanny: “In
his final prefatory remarks to Bleak House . . . Dickens tells us that ‘I have purposely
dwelt upon the romantic side of familiar things,’ thereby alerting us to the fact that his
novel will be situated at the site of Freud’s uncanny, the unfamiliar in the familiar”
(477). Seven years later in “Dickens and the Wolf Man: Childhood Memory and
Fantasy in David Copperfield,” Lougy is compelled to write a meta-critical note on
why “Freud and Dickens, yet again?” (407). His explanation leans in to one of the core
arguments proffered here: Freud was a reader of Dickens (ibid). The task then is to
take note of the radiating consequences and connections of Freud’s encounter with
Dickens. For Lougy this means he is “especially intrigued by their shared interest in an
unknowable past and a haunted present . . . For Freud and for Dickens, the problematic
dynamics and origins of memory, especially childhood memories, are similarly
entangled, complicating” (ibid). Not only do the two share conceptual interest in “an
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unknowable past and a haunted present,” as Lougy puts it, but the thinking of each is
structured and ruptured by seriality.
I will now attempt to pull all of the above terms and ideas (retroactivity,
repetition, the drive, the unconscious, seriality) together. Psychoanalysis, at bottom, is
a retroactive investigation of the psyche. What psychoanalysis effects, with its discrete
sessions, is the exact form of a serial, in this respect. On the one hand these sessions
are discrete and self-contained but on the other they are connected via the gap that
both separates and binds them. This is both the problem of the structure of analysis
that Freud considers in Studies on Hysteria and a problem in the content of sessions
themselves. As Freud notes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “Patients repeat . . .
unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference and revive them with the
greatest ingenuity. They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while it is
still incomplete” (21). In 1895’s Studies on Hysteria, Freud notes that sessions end too
soon, always in the middle of the analysand recalling or thinking through something.
This creates a gap in the session itself, a gap of unresolved content. This lack of
resolution causes the analysand to suffer more as they cannot rid themselves of what
has been left unsaid. In 1920’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud is moved to
observe that this meta-structure to the scheduling of psychoanalysis is active in the
individual sessions themselves, where patients “seek to bring about the interruption of
the treatment while it is still incomplete” (21). This self-sabotaging action is, as Freud
understands, the work of the drive and its compulsion to undermine and repeat. The
drive, being the motor of the unconscious as Freud discovers, ingrains repetition into
our psychic functioning. The unconscious is structured on a repetition that does not
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progress—like the patients Freud observes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—but
nonetheless moves forward, recalling the Library of Congress’s definition of
seriality—a publication expected to continue indefinitely. Theorizing the serial gap,
and its influence on psychoanalysis, is to fully consider the mind as understood by
psychoanalysis. While not every psychoanalytic concept can be understood with
recourse to seriality, the core of how psychoanalysis understands the subject and the
function of analysis itself is deeply rooted in the logic of seriality.

“Make them laugh, make them cry, make them wait.”
As much as Dickens’s characters and worlds occupied Freud’s thoughts it is
the serial form, its constraints, and its dialectic of closure and disclosure that affected
the development of Freud’s professional thinking. Most importantly it is the problem
of the gap that captured Freud. Variously attributed to Charles Dickens, Wilkie
Collins, or Charles Reade, the phrase “Make them laugh, make them cry, make them
wait” neatly summarizes the serial writing ethos. 15 (We might also easily imagine
Freud having said this, perhaps cynically, about analysis.) Peter Barry, in his literary
and cultural theory primer, Beginning Theory uses this phrase to explain the inner
workings of narrative and one of its primary appeals, “The central mechanism in
stories is delay, to be specific, delay in imparting . . . information—the Victorian
novelist Wilkie Collins famously said that the formulae for writing a successful novel
is ‘Make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait’” (217). The gap is represented
here as an active feature of the writing and content itself. It is not simply an absence
which readers or viewers fill with paratext engagement, nor is it the incidental design
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of a publishing schedule. It is alive in the text and it is not reducible to the “live”
experience of a serial.16 The serial writing ethos urges making readers wait. In other
words, a serial publishing schedule forces readers to wait by design but that delay
means nothing if the content is not itself gapped in some way.
As we saw in Freud’s letters to Martha, it is the gap that he responded to as a
reader. As we saw in Studies on Hysteria, it is the gap that troubled him as an analyst.
Freud understood the virtue of “make them wait” as a reader, as evidenced by his
hurry to get to the end of Daniel Deronda. He also understood the imposition of the
gap for analysis. Understanding the formal necessity and the psychical cut of the serial
gap is the connective tissue for many of Freud’s most important insights and
discoveries (as discussed above). In fact, Barry hits on something with the punctuation
of the “make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait” that we can see in Freud.
Most iterations of the phrase use commas or semi-colons to separate the clauses. Barry
puts a dash after the first two clauses thereby emphasizing the importance of the final
clause. More important is the punctuation itself. The dash cuts the line. It is not just a
stylistic flourish on Barry’s part but a piece of punctuation that alerts us to the
presence of the gap.
Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda draw our attention to the stakes immanent to
just this kind of punctuation in their recent The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute
Knowing, a new look at Hegel’s speculative notion of absolute knowing formed
through a study of two dashes (one at the end of Phenomenology of Spirit and the
other at the beginning of The Science of Logic). Comay and Ruda are writing about
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Hegel and the development of his thought here, but they might as well be writing
about the logic of seriality, the gap, and the function of repetition:
Every repetition is the echo of an earlier repetition. Between these two dashes
opens up the interstitial space in which thinking learns what it means to move
from one side of the Moebius strip to the other and back again. Within this
transitional space philosophy rehearses the question of what it means to begin
anew. The beginning move seems to vanish, but there is a compulsion to
reinscribe this vanishing move in every step that follows, and this repetition
throws us back to an even earlier rehearsal . . . We move on, yet we keep
repeating, we seem to make progress, yet only in returning, we backslide, and
yet we lurch forward. Ent-schluss and Er-innerung, repetition and advance,
repetition in advance. (108)
As Comay and Ruda see with Hegel’s dash, the dash Barry puts in the middle of
“make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait” helps us to visualize the
opening up of the interstitial space of the serial form that this chapter has taken on.
The gap is the decisive element in seriality. It is the condition of possibility for
repetition and iteration, which narrative seriality is premised upon. Gaps, as we saw in
the example of Freud’s patient named Emma, allow for the retroactive articulation of
meaning. Gaps haul us back, force us to repeat or rehearse. They push us forward (or
perhaps we only “lurch” forward, as Comay and Ruda suggest).
It is worth mentioning that the first line of the above quotation is itself a selfconscious echo of Freud’s own declaration in Three Essay on the Theory of Sexuality
that ‘the finding of an object is always the refinding of it,’ which we saw in an earlier
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section of this chapter. Repetition, central to the serial form, has been a constant
source of inquiry for Freud. Indeed, psychoanalysis—from the very beginning—has
been deeply invested in thinking through the consequences of seriality, as we have
seen through references to both personal and professional writings of Freud’s.
Through positing a serial starting point for his thinking of the psychoanalytic project,
we can see how understanding such core psychoanalytic notions as Nachträglichkeit,
the unconscious, repetition, and death drive require a theoretical consideration of the
gap. Refinding the gap at the heart of Freud’s theory fills in a gap of scholarly
attention and sets the stage for our continued exploration of seriality as a gapped logic.

1

My work on seriality in this context complements that of many foundational scholars in the fields of
Victorian seriality and periodical studies.
Among the first in the field to discuss the theoretical complexity offered by serial forms is Margaret
Beetham. Beetham attends to a central concern of periodical studies – that periodicals are so diverse in
type and form that it is difficult for scholars to draw appropriate conclusions or theories of the works.
These issues, she notes, can be drawn together under the umbrella term of “boundary problems” (97).
But, Beetham finds, these problems actually form the genre’s distinctiveness across its varied iterations.
She writes, “it seems that the essential quality of the periodical, its serial form and the other ways in
which it seems to resist closure, can be read as a sign of its strength as a potentially creative form for its
readers. In other words, we could argue that the difficulty of defining the periodical in terms of
recognized genres and publishing modes is associated with a set of characteristics which make it a
potentially disruptive kind of text” (98). This includes the operations of structure and closure: these
operations may refer to these periodical texts’ divisions, regularity of release, beginnings, and/or
endings; as well the very physical, concrete structures of their readers’ lives including the developing
discipline of clock-time, such as the planned release of particular periodical papers on Sunday because
of its new function as a “leisure day” for workers within capitalist industrial societies.
Building upon Beetham’s work, Mark W. Turner has observed the interpretive possibilities made
available when scholars consider not only the material content of serial works, but what he deems the
temporal “periodical-ness” (310) of periodicals. By this, he means how these works construct or
challenge Victorian notions of time – from the past including play with the English pastoral, to the
present’s “newness,” to the “forward-moving culture” of the future (310). As Linda K. Hughes and
Michael Lund have pointed out, this temporal condition of the periodical means that the “progress and
pause” (Hughes and Lund 63) of serials has real critical significance. Turner ultimately suggests that
“part of the periodical-ness of the periodical is exploring the various ways that time was imagined and
experienced by nineteenth-century readers” (312).
Additional concerns of textuality, textual forms, and gender comprise a significant body of current work
in periodicals. Laurel Brake, for example, takes up the genre’s paratexts, looking at the “supplement” as
literary form. Lyn Pykett brings critical attention to the roles of Wilkie Collins, Mary Elizabeth
Braddon, and many other women in both writing and producing serial forms, including the development
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of the sensation novel and publication through syndication. Most recently, Caroline Levine argues that
Victorian utilization of serial forms for narrative suspense means that writers and readers understood
suspense not as corruptive “pleasure,” but rather, as stimulus for active speculation in The Serious
Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian Realism and Narrative Doubt (University of Virginia Press, 2015).
Lauren M. E. Goodlad devotes a final chapter of her The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic: Realism,
Sovereignty, and Transnational Experience (Oxford University Press, 2015) to connecting the trope of
Babylon as hallmark of modernity within the realist narratives of AMC’s contemporary television serial
Mad Men (2007-2015) and Anthony Trollope’s The Prime Minister (November 1875-June 1876).
2

Jennifer Hayward, in Consuming Pleasures, 3, 24.

3

There is a difference between the way Caruth and Freud approach trauma. For Caruth, the traumatic
event is always inaccessible. For Freud, as we will see below, the traumatic event is called forth
retroactively (though, like Caruth, Freud observes that direct confrontation with the prior traumatic
event is not possible). The second event in a series allows the prior one to be symbolizable through the
process of analysis. While the patient cannot access directly the traumatic event, the analyst can see
how the patient’s subjectivity is curved around the trauma. This may be a way to understand Lacan’s
order of the real. The real, as we will see in the next chapter, is included in the symbolic, though it is
inaccessible. We can apprehend the real by seeing how the symbolic curves to accommodate it. The real
is a point of impossible articulation that which escapes symbolization itself, but which nonetheless
affects symbolization and signification around it.
4

Freud is reading a bound volume copy of Daniel Deronda, rather than reading it in its initial eight-part
serial print run in 1867 (when he would have been 11 years old). One might be tempted to say that this
no longer makes the novel serial, which is an argument explored in depth in Chapter Five (with
recourse to Netflix television, which bind and then release an entire serial television show all at once).
The position of this dissertation is that the serial gap cannot be eliminated by printing Daniel Deronda
as a single novel or releasing The Wire in a single DVD/Blu Ray boxset. Believing only in seriality as a
momentary and transient phenomenon makes it elusive. Further, it disobeys one of the cardinal rules of
seriality: that meaning can only be apprehended retroactively.
5

Lacan will turn to the signifying chain to make sense of the drive, removing it entirely from the
biological context Freud first puts the drive in. As he writes in Seminar VII, “If everything that is
immanent or implicit in the chain of natural events may be considered as subject to the so-called death
drive, it is only because there is a signifying chain. Freud’s thought in this matter requires that what is
involved be articulated as a destruction drive, given that it challenges everything that exists. But it is
also a will to create from zero, a will to begin again” (212).
Peter Brooks’ Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative is possibly the most wellknown use of psychoanalysis in narrative theory and will be engaged with extensively here. While
Brooks writes often of desire and the death drive, he seems to conflate death drive with Heidegger’s
being towards death. For Heidegger, death is the cause of anxiety in life, an anxiety that works to set
the ground for meaning. So death drive, for Brooks, is more at work in the desire to reach the end of the
narrative than it is a concept useful for viewing the failure to master the compulsion to repeat. He
writes, “The desire of the text (the desire of reading) is hence desire for the end, but desire for the end
reached only through the at least minimally complicated detour, the intentional deviance, in tension,
which is the plot of narrative” (102). Brooks’ understanding of psychoanalysis in evidence here is an
example of a critical development in psychoanalytic thinking. Current understanding of psychoanalysis
actually sees this “minimally complicated detour” as not just the thing that causes desire, but desire
itself (the objet a of Lacan). It is the impediment that creates conditions for desire and it is the drive that
enjoys the failure of satisfying desire. In this one line we can see the difference between how Brooks
understood psychoanalysis in his time and how—through the intervention of thinkers like Žižek and
Zupancic—we understand it now. Brooks understands textual desire as a desire for the end but it has to
be complicated in some way, whereas really it's a case of the complication itself.
6
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Much important work linking psychoanalysis to narrative theory has occurred in Queer theory. Judith
Roof’s Come as You Are: Sexuality & Narrative pushes back on Peter Brooks’ end oriented and
teleological notion of narrative desire, arguing that it valorizes a heterosexual and masculinist
conception of pleasure. Lee Edelman, in No Future, offers a theory of the drive—focusing on what he
sees as a raw negativity—in his reading of Hitchcock’s The Birds. Val Rohy’s Lost Causes: Narrative,
Etiology, and Queer Theory argues that the backwards causality favored by Freud in his notion of
sexual etiology and Nachträglichkeit is crucial to claiming causality for queer sexualities that is not
simply biological.
The common textual references in support of this view are “The Uncanny,” footnotes added to the
“Wolf Man” case study, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle. See Cathy Caruth’s “Parting Words:
Trauma, Silence, and Survival” (intervalla 2 [2014-15]: 20-33); Shoshana Ringel’s “Overview: History
of Trauma Theory” in Trauma: Contemporary Directions in Theory, Practice, and Research, edited by
Ringel and Gerrold R. Brandell (Sage Publications, 2011); and Marc-Antoine Crocq and Louis Crocq’s
“From shell shock and war neurosis to posttraumatic stress disorder: a history of psychotraumatology”
(Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience vol. 2, 1 [2000]: 47-55).
7

While this chapter focuses on the close connection between Freud and Dickens, we’ve already seen a
wider consideration of psychoanalysis in the work of Dickens scholars. Frank draws his readers to the
ideas of Melanie Klein and Julia Kristeva toward the end of his essay on Little Dorrit. In an allied
move, Dickens scholars have made use of the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Beginning his
“Desire and the Ideology of Violence: America in Charles Dickens’s Martin Chuzzlewit” with a lengthy
quotation from Lacan, Robert E. Lougy argues that Dickens’s early writings evince a fascination with
“how [people] are born into a network of signifiers that govern not only our birth into the social order
but also our exit from it” and how “we are the unconscious heirs of codes and laws that constitute
human culture” (569). The ease with which Klein, Kristeva, or Lacan can be brought to bear on Dickens
can hardly be surprising given how important Dickens and the serial form is to Freud. The psychical
effects of the serial form on Dickens, however, is a topic beyond the scope of this chapter and
dissertation.
8

9

Lacan will later expand Nachträglichkeit through his emphasis on the importance of punctuation, seen
both in his idea of le point de capiton and the punctuated or “short” psychoanalytic session. This will be
explored in Chapter II.
Strachey translates nachträglich, which is an adverb, as “deferred action.” The word “retroactively”
might be closer to Freud’s meaning and it is the sense of term that this dissertation will use most often.
10

Relatedly, Jean Laplanche uses the term après-coup, translated as “afterwardsness” in English, to
understand Nachträglichkeit. See Jean Laplanche “Notes on Afterwardsness” in Essays on Otherness.
New York: Routledge. 1999.
11

This, Freud suggests, has to do with Emma being much closer to puberty and this aware of her own
sexuality and the sexuality of others than she would have been at age eight.
12

We might even be moved to recall that in Dickens scholarship it appears that Freud caused the
Freudian to appear in Dickens, rather than the other way around.
13

In the revealed religion section of the Phenomenology, Hegel makes the point that only the comic
consciousness of Christianity allows us to full recognize the tragedy of unhappy consciousness: “We
now see that the unhappy consciousness constituted the counterpart and the culmination of the
consciousness that was perfectly happy within itself, namely, the comic consciousness. All divine
essence returns back to this comic consciousness, or it is the complete self-relinquishing of substance”
(431 Pinkard).
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14

Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton,
1975), 43.
15

This is hardly an exhaustive compilation of references, but it is a representative one. Goodreads, a
website for sharing book recommendations, has a page listing “make them laugh, make them cry, make
them wait” as a Charles Dickens quote. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/914125-make-them-laughmake-them-cry-make-them-wait
William Cane’s Fiction Writing Master Class teaches aspiring writers lessons based on the methods and
techniques of famous authors. His section on Dickens attributes the “make them laugh” phrase to him,
using it as a model for developing intricate tone and plotting (qtd. in Freese “Write Like Charles
Dickens” https://www.writersdigest.com/editor-blogs/there-are-no-rules/write-like-charles-dickens).
GW Dalquist’s Guardian article on serial writing attributes the “make them laugh” quote to Wilkie
Collins. Interestingly, the article has a correction at the top say the Dalquist misattributes the quote to
Collins and that it is “usually ascribed to Charles Reade.”
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/jan/06/featuresreviews.guardianreview1
Tellingly, none of the references to the “make them laugh” phrase—Barry’s included—point to where
any of these authors are alleged to have said this.
16

Toby Miller briefly offers the repetition typical of a serial to discern the difference between genres in
Television Studies: The Basics and later to quantify temporal audience engagement with a serial text
(i.e. that the wait between episodes is used as a proxy for the characters in the fictional world) (82-83,
126). Miller sees, in a different way, the relationship between time and seriality that Freud thinks is so
central to the analytic experience—the temporal gap that causes the analysand to “suffer more.”
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CHAPTER 3

LACAN AND THE SERIAL REAL

Dickens scholar Grahame Smith has urged fellow scholars to observe a change
in the way they discuss Dickens’ seriality: “if I could change one aspect of Dickens
studies with a wave of my magic wand, it would be to substitute the phrase ‘serial
writing’ for ‘serial publication’” (“Dickens and Critical Theory”). 1 Smith argues that
the phrase “serial publication” obfuscates the reality of Dickens’ working methods”
(ibid). The difference between “publication” and “writing” is in the “distinction
between becoming and being” (ibid). For Smith, a novel such as Bleak House is in a
“continuous state of becoming” and observing the seeming liveness of seriality is
crucial to appreciating that aspect of Dickens’ writing (ibid). Smith is not alone in
emphasizing the “becoming” of seriality. This is why contemporary scholars of serial
narrative such as Frank Kelleter put so much weight on audience interactivity: there is
an exchange between audience and author where the two inform and alter each other
thereby affecting the serial text. Perhaps there is not a more famous example of this in
literature than Dickens changing the ending to Great Expectations on the suggestion
of a reader (Edward Bulwer-Lytton, to be exact).
In the last chapter, Freud shows exactly the attraction to and problematic of the
gap for analysis. What Freud enables us to see is that the serial form itself produces its
own kind of suffering. This is because the serial gap is a priori fraught and a site of
tension. Freud’s insight into the serial gap is evident in his theories of retroactivity and
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the death drive. Jacques Lacan will pick up where Freud left off and seize the gap to
articulate the logic of his notion of the real, thereby showing that the serial gap
influences and orders outside the control of authors or audience. Where Sean
O’Sullivan has recently designated six elements for seriality that are “choices,” Lacan
allows us to see that conscious choice is simply not the way seriality works. 2 In the
beginning of his career, Lacan talks about how the rules that govern the internal
functioning of a series emerge and toward the end he links seriality with the real.
Putting these two moments together shows us something I am calling “the serial real.”
It also lets us understand how Lacan is a thinker of structure—literally how a series is
structured, by what internal rules is a series structured or ordered—and of the real. I
will refer to him as a structuralist of the real as a result.
After establishing how Lacan understands seriality and how he extends some
of the Freudian ideas discussed in the previous chapter, we will use long form
“Twitterature” examples—written by Jennifer Egan and Joshua Clover respectively—
to advance Lacan’s ideas into the realm of new media seriality. 3

Lacanian Seriality Part I: Rules ex nihilo
Jacques Lacan makes a key contribution to the psychoanalytic theorization of
seriality by bringing structural linguistics to psychoanalytic theory. In fact, the engine
behind his “return to Freud” is not just an emphasis on the death drive but the
discovery of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic model. 4 Lacan, through his friend
Roman Jakobson, became interested in linguistics and quickly understood the role it
might play in understanding the psyche. His theory of psychoanalysis is
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simultaneously a theory of signification, which possibly accounts for Lacan’s
seemingly outsized impact on the world of cultural analysis. Lacan theorizes the
structure of signification in terms of a relationship between his three famous
categories of symbolic, real, and imaginary.
Lacan’s three orders of the symbolic, imaginary, and real all need to be thought
together (though the imaginary is the first to emerge in Lacan’s work). As Lacan says
in Seminar II: Ego in Freud’s Theory and in Technique of Psychoanalysis:
In the symbolic order the totality is called a universe. The symbolic order from
the first takes on its universal character. It isn't constituted bit by bit. As soon
as the symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols . . . however small the
number of symbols which you might conceive of as constituting the emergence
of the symbolic function as such in human life, they imply the totality of
everything which is human. Everything is ordered in accordance with the
symbols which have emerged, in accordance with the symbols once they have
appeared. (29)
Lacan is here talking specifically of the symbolic as term but is keen to note that the
world of symbols and signification does not emerge “bit by bit” or, in other words,
does not emerge first with the imaginary, then the symbolic, and then the real (or any
other ordering). As Lacan says later, “one shouldn’t think the symbols have actually
come from the real” (238). Lacan is saying that the whole order emerges all at once,
seemingly out of nothing, which he will prove later in the seminar with recourse to
Edgar Allan Poe’s story “The Purloined Letter.” The symbolic, then, is a structure that
creates the possibility for signification. The real, most clearly articulated by Lacan in
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Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, points to openings
and breaks within the symbolic structure. In the “Tuché and Automaton” lecture from
that seminar, Lacan frequently refers to the real as an encounter, laying out its
traumatic valence: “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter
in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first
presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in itself already
enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma” (55).5 The imaginary is what we
use to cover over the real—the points of break or trauma that Lacan mentions above—
and apprehend a cohesive whole. It is the imaginary that allows us to believe that
when we are dealing with the symbolic, we are dealing with a coherent world (as
Lacan explains most famously in his essay on “The Mirror Stage”). The imaginary
repairs the rift of the real that opens up in the symbolic, although it does so in a way
that leaves the rift, albeit obscured to consciousness.
Lacan’s way of thinking about the symbolic order—which is threatened by the
real and cohered by the imaginary—allows us to understand the way seriality
functions beyond even what Freud himself makes possible in his early writings. Let’s
begin with a jumping off question: Why does Lacan need to separate these orders if
they all arrive together, intrinsically tied? Lorenzo Chiesa explains that “the Symbolic
as Symbolic is inherently prevented from symbolizing itself” (Subjectivity and
Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan 122). We need to negotiate the gaps in
signification to understand anything at all and, most importantly for our investigation
of seriality here, we need to see how and why the symbolic is structured.
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The key for a theory of seriality is the relationship that Lacan lays out between
the symbolic and the real. This relationship preoccupies him throughout his
intellectual career but it finds a perfect expression in his account of serial relations in
the Appendix to “The Seminar on the Purloined Letter.” The Appendix systematizes
the structural logic of seriality that Lacan finds lurking in Poe’s short story. In Seminar
II, he already investigated how a symbolic structure has a determinative effect on the
ways in which subjects act and on what they can or cannot do. After being consulted
by the French police, Auguste Dupin helps the police return a stolen letter to an
unnamed woman who is well-known in French society. The stolen letter in question,
the police tell Dupin, is being used to blackmail the woman on behalf of an unsavory
man referred to as Minister D—. The police search D—‘s house and are bewildered at
not being able to find the letter. Dupin manages to find it seemingly without trouble
and explains his method to the police. The short version is that Dupin realized that
D—would know the police would search his home so he hid the letter in plain sight.
The long version of how Dupin knew this is explained by Dupin recounting how an
eight-year old boy made a fortune predicting results in a game of “Odds and Evens.” It
is this game that fascinates Lacan and underpins his thinking on seriality.
Lacan imagines a game of coin tosses being played in consecutive fashion.
Obviously, the relationship between one coin toss is strictly accidental or by chance.
The idea of “chance” is important to Lacan. In “The Unconscious and Repetition”
lecture of Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, he
says, “What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs . . . as if by chance”
(54). The “as if” is crucial here. Lacan stages his intervention in the realm of the
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seeming chance to push back on the core Saussurean idea that the relation between
signifier and signified itself is arbitrary and the ideological belief that chance governs
our life within the symbolic order. He recognizes that while the result of each toss of
the coin is arbitrary if we group coin tosses all of a sudden certain results emerge as
impossible. As Lacan says, “Simply connoting with (+) and (-) a series playing on the
sole fundamental alternative of presence and absence allows us to demonstrate how
the strictest symbolic determinations accommodate a succession of [coin] tosses
whose reality is strictly distributed ‘by chance’” (Ecrits 35). Lacan is saying that while
the factor of chance does not on its own eliminate symbolic necessity because it is
serially structured the symbolic order takes up chance events and inscribes them in a
system of necessity. This necessity enables us to see the way in which the symbolic
does not just determine what is possible but also enables points of impossibilities—
what Lacan calls the real—to emerge.
In Lacan’s example, + and – stand in for heads and tails. Through this he
generates a rudimentary “language” and “chain of signifiers.” Taking the following
example from Bruce Fink’s The Lacanian Subject, we see this instructive chain:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Toss Numbers
+ + – – + – – – + Heads/ Tails Chain

There is, obviously, a 50/50 chance that an unloaded coin will flip either heads or tails
on each and every toss. Lacan’s point is that, when subjected to signification and serial
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sequence, what seems to be arbitrary and random is ordered by rules that emerge from
the gaps in the serial sequence itself.
Such an order can be seen when grouping the tosses. For example, grouping
tosses in pair combinations gives us four possible pairs: ++, – –, + –, and – +. Fink
designates pair + + as 1, “the first level of coding we are going to introduce, and it
marks the origin of the symbolic system we are creating” (17). The two alternating
combinations of + – and – + are given the number 2 and the tails-tails (– –) pair is
given the designation 3. These numeric designations form a signification matrix that
changes random coin tosses into a system with memory and order. As Fink shows:

+ + – – + – – – + Heads/ Tails Chain
1 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 Numeric Matrix Category

Reading this random set of coin tosses in terms of pairs already produces the kinds of
memory and order that Lacan’s notion of the serial is premised on. As Fink explains:
It is already clear at this point that a category 1 set of tosses (+ +) cannot be
immediately followed in the lower line (i.e., the line representing category
numbers) by a category 3 set, as the second throw in a category 1 is necessarily
a plus, whereas the first throw in a category 3 has to be a minus . . . We have
thus already come up with a way of grouping tosses (a ‘symbolic matrix’)
which prohibits certain combinations . . . We have generated an impossibility
in our signifying chain, even though we have not determined the outcome of
any particular toss. (17-18 emphasis mine)
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Fink follows this up by equating the above coin toss rule with “a spelling rule” such as
“I before e except after c” though he is keen to note that “the rule we have just created
knows no exception” (18). Again, Lacan’s claim is that these tosses constitute a
language, with all the order and memory that implies. Fink, noting the appropriateness
with bringing a notion of a “chain” to language, writes “most rules of spelling and
grammar concern the way letters and words are strung or chained together, dictating
what can and cannot precede one letter or term and what can and cannot follow it”
(18). Fink pushes this observation further and discovers other rules dictated by this
system of groups of coin tosses. Playing the string out with more tosses shows that
“the chain prohibits the appearance of a second 1 until an even number of 2s has
turned up” (18). This prohibition is Lacan’s justification for his claim that the
signifying chain “remembers or keeps track of its previous components” (18).
Though it seems hard to imagine that a series of coin tosses can include
possible or impossible results, Lacan demonstrates this must be the case, as he shows
that observing a series of coin tosses allows for groups, order, and rules to emerge as
though they constitute natural laws (noting the corollary to how he describes the
symbolic, imaginary, and real emerging at once as an apparent whole).6 Lacan’s point
about the signifying chain is that first, it has memory; second, it has its own order
(“law,” in Lacan’s phrasing); and third, that these things emerge out of nothing.

Lacanian Seriality Part II: The Serial Real
Lacan’s post-script to his lecture on “The Purloined Letter” is his most
thorough working through of how rules, order, and memory emerge through
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repetition—such as repeated coin flips. That lecture has given us a way to articulate
Lacan’s initial insights into seriality. Still, “The Purloined Letter” lecture is not the
only reference he makes to seriality throughout his public seminars, which means we
have to push a little further to fully examine seriality in the Lacanian sense. This gives
us one final—and complicated—move to make to establish a notion of the “serial
real.” I put the phrase in quotation marks because Lacan himself comes close to
employing this exact phrasing but, what’s more, I think the phrase “serial real” helps
to manifest Lacan’s theory of seriality more coherently than it actually is in the text of
Lacan.
Remembering from the introduction that Lacan’s theory of seriality is opposed
to Sartre’s is important here. Sartre sees seriality as a superficial grouping. There is no
meaningful connection between the parts in a series. Further, it is an outside force that
determines the relation between parts in a series. Capitalism groups a number of
people waiting for a bus in a city center, in his most famous example. It keeps people
disconnected. Lacan, on the other hand, formulates his notion of seriality as radical
coherence. He is here against the notion of the discontinuity favored by Sartre in his
idea of seriality.
It is this sense that I am going to refer to Lacan as a structuralist. I do not mean
this in a provocative way nor am I attempting to stage a debate between structuralism
and post-structuralism. It is true that, in the beginning of his career, Lacan is, of
course, influenced by noted structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss. Above I mentioned the
initial influence that structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure had on his thinking.
What I have in mind is to tease out how Lacan thinks about structure literally. Asking
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how the appearance of things is ordered might be one way to conceive of a leading
question. Specific to our concerns here, though, is how he considers seriality as
structure or how does he determine the structure of a series. Remember, for Sartre
seriality is defined by an outside agent. For Lacan, seriality is defined by the gaps
between parts and the gaps within parts. To understand this logic, we must establish
what the serial real means. We are going to work with one of Lacan’s clearest and
most challenging definitions of the real; a definition not coincidentally appearing in
the second seminar where Lacan explicitly references seriality. We are going to push
the consequences of this definition to show how it substantiate a concept like a serial
real. Grasping the serial real will confront us with the following question: how can
something be impossible and inaccessible and the site of the new all at the same time?
In Seminar XX, Lacan says that, “The real can only be inscribed on the basis of
an impasse of formalization” (93). The real is an impasse of formalization but can be
inscribed because of this very same impasse. We will need to ask an important
question to get the most out of this statement. It will frame how we proceed. If the real
is an inaccessible void how can something observable like rules and order spring from
it? This would seem to imply that the real is either not inaccessible or that rules and
order cannot spring from it. My claim is that the real is inaccessible and rules and
order spring from it. Importantly it is not the same rules every time. Lacan is quite
clear about this when discusses the “chance” relations of coin flips. A different series
of flips will occasion different rules, but all series of flips adhere to rules that emerge
as the series forms. Molly Anne Rothenberg, in The Excessive Subject, seems to have
something similar in mind when she emphasizes the creative force of the real: “The
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new enters thought by way of the Real” (The Excessive Subject 183). This brings us
back to our leading question: How is this possible—how can the new emerge—if the
real is an impasse of formalization? Slavoj Žižek is helpful on this point:
The real is, of course, in a first approach, that which cannot be inscribed,
which ‘doesn’t cease not to inscribe itself’—the rock upon which every
formalization stumbles. But it is precisely through this failure that we can in a
way encircle, locate the empty place of the real. In other words, the real cannot
be inscribed, but we can inscribe this impossibility itself. We can locate its
place: a traumatic place which causes a series of failures. And the whole point
of Lacan is that the real is nothing but this impossibility of its inscribing. The
real is not a transcendent positive entity, persisting somewhere beyond the
symbolic order like a hard kernel inaccessible to it, some kind of Kantian
“Thing-in-itself.” [In] itself, it is nothing at all, just a void, an emptiness in a
symbolic structure, marking some central impossibility. It is in this sense that
the enigmatic Lacanian phrase defining the subject as an ‘answer of the real’ is
to be understood: we can inscribe, encircle the void place of the subject
through the failure of its symbolization, because the subject is nothing but the
point of failure of the process of its symbolic representation. (“The Lacanian
Real: Television”)
The real is impossible. The real is a site which causes a series of failures. Through the
failure of the real to be formalized or symbolized, it can be inscribed (or “encircled” to
use Žižek’s word choice). The real curves symbolization around it in the same way
that rules emerge in a series of coin flips to dictate an impossibility of coin flip
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combinations or repetitions. We cannot see the real itself, but we can see how it allows
for the new to burst forth: by inscribing an impossibility that did not previously exist.
The real makes its absence felt.
Alenka Zupančič takes up this very point in The Ethics of the Real. As she
writes, “[The Real] concern[s] something which appears only in the guise of the
encounter, as something that ‘happens to us,’ surprises us, throws us ‘out of joint,’
because it always inscribes itself in a given continuity as a rupture, a break or an
interruption” (235). The real is a site of rupture. This is what it means for conditions of
possibility and impossibility to emerge at once. She continues, “According to Lacan,
the Real is impossible, and the fact that ‘it happens (to us)’ does not refute its basic
‘impossibility’: the Real happens to us (we encounter it) as impossible, as ‘the
impossible thing’ that turns our symbolic universe upside down and leads to the
reconfiguration of this universe. Hence the impossibility of the Real does not prevent
it from having effect in the realm of the possible” (ibid). Intriguingly, Žižek’s and
Zupančič’s word choices recall the language of seriality: Žižek speaks of a “series of
failures” and Zupančič describes the real as a site of rupture, break, or interruption—
all word choices friendly to a discourse of the serial gap. A blend of Lacan’s concerns
in “The Purloined Letter” post-script and this late career articulation of the real helps
us to formalize Lacan’s inquiry into seriality: rules emerging impossibly from the gap
between so-called chance relations to order them. “The Purloined Letter” lecture lays
out the mathematics behind the theory and the Encore seminar ties the serial to the
real.
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In Seminar XX, Lacan offers an intriguing window into how the serial
underpins his thought generally:
Don’t forget that, at the outset, the relationship between signifier and signified
was incorrectly qualified as arbitrary . . . Now what passes for arbitrary is the
fact that meaning effects seem not to bear any relation to what causes them.
But if they seem to bear no relation to what causes them, that is because we
expect what causes them to bear a certain relation to the real. I'm talking about
the serious real. The serious . . . can only be the serial” (19 emphasis mine).7
The real allows for the emergence of the new, as Molly Anne Rothenberg writes. It is
an impasse of formalization that curves the symbolic around it, as Žižek and Zupančič
have argued. To bring into conversation the early Lacan of Seminar II and the late
Lacan of Seminar XX is to see fully how his theory of seriality is central to his
thinking in general.
Lacanian seriality links the real with relation (curving the symbolic,
determining how signifiers relate to one another, to put it in simple terms). As he says,
the relation between signifier and signified is not arbitrary (say, as the signifier
“smoke” is to actual smoke), nor is it indexical (as “smoke” is to fire). These examples
have nothing to do with a series. This is the important point. Just as trauma arises in a
series in psychoanalysis—as Freud explicitly shows in the previous chapter—so too
does signification. To use Lacan’s terms, “smoke” to actual smoke and “smoke” to fire
do not form a series and, thus, are not “serious.” What is serious—what involves the
real—would be a relation like this: as smoke is to a smoker. In smoke and smoker, we
see an impossibility continuity that Lacan’s thinking of seriality makes manifest. The
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disjunction creates the coherence. The only way that smoke and smoker are related as
signifier and signified is through a repetition that creates a new rule for language.
For Lacan, seriality is an idea of radical connectedness. Whereas for a thinker
of seriality such as Jean-Paul Sartre, seriality is about disconnecting or disorienting
people, seriality for Lacan is a chance to glimpse the radically contingent way
symbolic relations are cohered. Studies of television seriality like John Ellis’s Visible
Fictions and the multi-author compendium High Theory/ Low Culture, tend to view
seriality in the way Sartre does: as discontinuous and fragmentary. With reference to
John Ellis, Jane Feuer writes:
…television narrative operates through the segment, i.e. a relatively selfcontained scene that is discontinuous with other segments. Ellis goes on to
argue that ‘movement from one segment to the next is a matter of succession
rather than consequence.’ Thus, for Ellis, all television narrative is serial rather
than linear, in the sense that ‘the series implies the form of the dilemma rather
than that of resolution and closure.’ (Ellis qtd. in Feuer 102).
Seriality, in the terms I have been developing through Lacan, is a theory of radical
coherence. It is not about succession. It holds that even something as random as coin
flips have rules that order their appearance. Repetition sets up the rules of the game, so
to speak. This is clear in the television episode, contra Ellis. While a largely
conventional laugh track sitcom like All in the Family will rely on similar storylines
(e.g. Archie Bunker is a racist who feels increasingly victimized by his oversensitive
daughter and son-in-law), it does not allow for the exact same joke to appear
throughout an episode. The rule, then, is to begin with a set of common expectations
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about what an All in the Family episode should be and create within those limitations.
While segments, in Ellis’s terms, may bounce from storyline to storyline, there are still
overarching internal rules that govern the episode. Repeating the exact same joke, for
example, and expecting big laughs would be a betrayal of audience investment and be
tantamount to a contempt of character. 8
This is the same point Lacan makes in “The Purloined Letter” seminar. As he
writes, “…I do not claim to extract from the real more than I have presupposed in its
given—in other words, nothing here—but simply to demonstrate that they already
bring with them a syntax by simply turning this real into chance. . . the effects of
repetition that Freud calls ‘automatism’ come from nowhere else [but the real]” (32).
The real is the deadlock of symbolization, that which cannot be articulated in a
symbolic register, but which persists in that very field and, paradoxically, holds it
together. The site of trauma is an oft repeated example, but we might also think of
Alain Badiou’s example of how infinity completes the field of numbers—even though
infinity as a number is impossible to conceptualize. The real is this gap, this
impossibility of articulation and synthetization. It is also, as Lacan points out, serial,
dependent upon repetition. What gets repeated in repetition automatism, according to
Lacan, “is a product, not of nothing from the real . . . but precisely of what was not.
Note that it then becomes less astonishing that what is repeated insists so much in
order to get itself noticed” (32). Or, in other words, it is not the content of what is
repeated that is interesting but the fact of repetition itself—the insistence—as serial
form. The serial form depends on absence, or an interruptive gap, rather than
continuity and contact.
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Seriality is also where Lacan offers a theory of repetition that builds off of
Freud. For Lacan, repetition provides the structure to symbolic relations. Seriality is
the grouping of random events. On the level of things as they appear (in the symbolic)
there has to be causality. Apprehending the causality of the seemingly random is
central to Lacan’s entire invention in the “Purloined Letter” seminar. Remember, as
above, rules and order emerge out of nothing to order a series. This series has a
symbolic appearance—heads following a tails following a tails, etc.—that seems to be
chance succession. Lacan’s point is to see how the real curves this symbolic
appearance. We see the impossible holes in the whole that act as its vital support. We
see here that Lacan is, in a way, a structuralist—but a structuralist of the real.
Thinking through the idea of the serial real pushes past the deterministic problems of
rigidly structuralist thinking, as in our way of thinking through serial structure allows
for the real, an order of impossibility that nonetheless orders symbolic relations (again,
the hole in the whole).

Lacan avec Twitter, Part I: Black Box, Odd Poetry, and Serial Rules for
Language9
On May 25, 2012, Jennifer Egan published a sci-fi spy thriller for The New
Yorker.10 The novelty of Egan’s story is that it was told in series of tweets on The New
Yorker’s Twitter account over a period of nine days. Black Box tells the story of Lulu
(who goes unnamed in the text), a character from Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad.
Lulu infiltrates the “residences of the violent rich” and acquires closely guarded data
for either a secret American anti-terrorist organization or the American government
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itself (Section 39). As Egan recalled in an interview about constructing her serial
novel experiment via social media, “I’d . . . been wondering about how to write fiction
whose structure would lend itself to serialization on Twitter. This is not a new idea, of
course, but it’s a rich one—because of the intimacy of reaching people through their
phones and because of the odd poetry that can happen in 140 characters” (qtd. in
Clark). When Egan describes part of her interest in Twitter serialization is seeing what
kind of “odd poetry” can occur in 140 characters, we see that she is interested in how
material constraints affect creative work. But it is not just the character constraints of
the tweet that creates the “odd poetry” of Black Box. It is the gap between tweets
where we see rules emerge outside the character limit. These rules “quilt” the meaning
of Black Box.11 By moving Egan’s metaphor of “odd poetry” from Twitter’s character
limit to the serial gap, we can understand Black Box as a text that illustrates and
reinforces Lacan’s approach to seriality.
Much of the Black Box is told through “Field Instructions,” or helpful tips for
agents in the field. These instructions are given in second person perspective, as
though they could be given to any person, any “you”—which invites the reader to
imagine themselves in the world of Black Box. Egan gradually makes it clear that
these instructions are not being given to any protagonist in general but to one
protagonist specifically. Egan’s storytelling appears to operate according to
contradictory rules. Egan often uses “if” and “may” to suggest that Lulu’s experience
is more universal, that what’s happening “may” happen to others, but this is her way
of showing what is actually happening to Lulu on a seeming minute to minute basis.
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Importantly, these rules are not able to be apprehended clearly in single tweets alone
but become understandable only as the series of tweets that comprise Black Box form:
In the aftermath of [temporary] blindness, the accretion of objects around you
may have an almost sensual quality. (section 28, emphasis mine)

Your abrupt awakening may feel like a reaction to a sound. / In moments of
extreme solitude, you may believe you’ve heard your name. (section 33,
emphasis mine)
We learn about what happens to Lulu through passive voice narration. The effect this
passive narrative has is that it puts a layer of distance between what is being described
and what happens. Since this “may” be happening, it also might not be happening.
And—just as college professors tell students in first year writing courses—the passive
voice obscures who is doing what to whom (e.g. Tea was made. Where? How? By
what magic?). In Egan’s adroit hands, however, the passive voice is employed
stylistically—part of her odd poetry—and, what’s more, its usage creates a rule for
narrative meaning in Black Box.
If Lacan can prove that rules and order emerge in the flipping of a coin, surely
we can prove that rules beyond Twitter’s character limit emerge in Black Box and help
to convey its meaning. As we read Black Box we are confronted by—and then
internalize—a serial structure around which the narrative forms. The passive voice
introduces a temporal gap into Lulu’s actions. Since we almost have to mentally
convert the passive narration to active and present tense while reading, the passive
voice creates a stumbling block for us as readers. To read Black Box literally means
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any of the story may or may not have happened. To understand the rules that emerge
as the tweets of Black Box form a series, we see that the passive voice is actually
active and it describes not possibilities but actualities. This is a new rule for language
that did not exist before.
For example, readers are not told that Lulu has taken secret photos through a
camera implanted in her eye but, in so doing, has accidentally blinded herself and
must attempt to cover it up. We are told instead, “The camera implanted in your left
eye is operated by pressing your left tear duct” (section 25). Later we are told:
A flash is far more dramatic in total darkness. / An epithet in another language,
followed by ‘What the fuck was that?,’ means you overestimated your
Designated Mate’s handset absorption. / A bright, throbbing total blindness
means you neglected to cover your non-camera eye. / Distance yourself from
agency in the flash by crying out, truthfully, ‘I can’t see!’ (section 27)
Again, as a reader, we have to mentally convert this passive voice to active and
present tense in order to make sense of the narrative as a description of an ongoing and
active event. Likewise, we have to imagine that we are not reading a possible version
of events that could occur for any spy, but actual description of one spy’s mission.
This gap in narrative content reflects and reinforces the gapped form of “Black Box.”
Rather than making the world of the text vague and directionless, Egan’s passive voice
is able to make this world feel full of danger and intrigue. We are obliged to grasp the
contradictory logic of Lacan’s seriality here. Gaps—temporal gaps introduced by
Egan’s unique use of the passive voice, in this case—make her serial story world
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whole (cohere it, in other words). This apparent wholeness, of course, is riddled with
gaps that guarantee its apparent consistency.
It is not simply the character limit that creates Egan’s “odd poetry,” as she
suggests in her interview with The New Yorker, but it is the relation to the gaps within
tweets (the temporal gaps described above) and between them (how subtle and
unstated rules for language carry across tweets) that are responsible for the “odd
poetry” of Black Box. The formation of a series allows for unique rules to emerge,
such as “if” not being a conditional and “may” actually meaning “is.” These rules
constitute Egan’s “odd poetry” and they emerge naturally through negotiating
Twitter’s restrictions (in the way the coin tosses above form their own internal rules
amid the restrictions of the outcome of one flip being either heads or tails). These rules
ground her Twitter novel and determine its meaning. It is not the character limit itself
that does that but what Egan develops as a result of that restriction. The repetition of
the second person, the violation of the conditional, and a passive voice that is actually
active and present, are all unique rules that emerge to order meaning in Black Box’s
serially constructed world. But, importantly, these rules also rule Egan’s prose. Having
established “if” and “may” clearly meaning “is,” Egan cannot use “if” and “may” in
any normative sense. As in Lacan: the conditions of possibility and impossibility arise
simultaneously as a series forms.

Lacan avec Twitter, Part II: Joshua Clover and “Live” Seriality
If Jennifer Egan’s Black Box is a testament to what can be achieved by
thinking of the limits of the tweet as a productive restriction for serial fiction, Joshua
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Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” is an example par excellence of Twitter’s ability to serve
as a platform for the unexpected and the “live.” Clover’s story, which would
eventually become a Twitter “hit” and receive reaction coverage in online publications
like Salon and Slate, began as something he believed would have the audience of two
people. Recounting the background of the story in an interview for Salon, Clover says:
I saw that a Twitter acquaintance of mine was at a U2 concert in New York,
and he was bored and regretted it. I tweeted back saying I’d like to say I’d
never had the same experience, but I had…I said it was a very complicated
story, but one of the better stories of my life. He encouraged me to tell it . . .
So, I decided I would, with no sense of how it would work, or direction, or
anything.
(https://www.salon.com/2015/07/23/joshua_clover_on_his_accidental_hit_twit
ter_tale_howiquitspin_i_literally_believed_it_would_be_the_two_of_them_rea
ding_it/)
Asked why Twitter seemed like the right medium to tell the story of how he quit Spin
magazine, Clover replies, “It didn’t. There was never a moment where I thought: this
would be a good story for Twitter. It was the way I had to communicate with someone
trapped at a concert. That’s the magic of the medium, isn’t it—that someone can be
trapped, but amused or diverted by someone narrating a series of events from 3,000
miles away.” Clover, a poet and scholar of critical theory, told Salon that he had “no
experience of making narrative—[but] I got a sense of it as I went along. It was a bit
improvised and a bit intuitive” (Salon). As with the “odd poetry” of Egan’s Black Box,
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Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” gives us another clear example of how the rules for a
series arise as the series forms.
More so than perhaps any other medium, Twitter is a “live medium.”
Following trending hashtags gives users access to “real time” news, reactions, hot
takes and counter hot takes all centered around a single evolving issue or event. For
this reason, Twitter is the go-to medium for following celebrities, political news, or
sports in large part because of its capacity to “air” many different voices all reacting to
an unfolding event at once. Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” was just such a live event.
Our big question is the following: Do rules and order emerge in a live event just the
same as they do for a pre-planned serial novel experiment on social media like Black
Box? The answer would have to be “yes” if the theory of seriality I am rooting in
Lacan is sound.
An important note before proceeding: When referring to Clover’s story as he
wrote it, I will be using the hashtag title of #HowIQuitSpin. When referring to the
finished document as a whole, I will, at times, use quotation marks and refer to it as
“How I Quit Spin.” Removing the hashtag, however, does have the effect of
smoothing over the gaps constitutive of “How I Quit Spin’s” construction. From a
Lacanian perspective, removing the hashtag gives an illusory sense of wholeness to
Clover’s story. This discussion will be picked up later in the chapter.
#HowIQuitSpin centers around Joshua Clover’s attempt to get fired from Spin
magazine. Clover was living in Paris at the time, getting paid monthly by Spin to write
music reviews, features, and columns. It was “the life,” he says, but he began “to feel
like [he is] just selling stuff to kids and . . . it doesn’t feel right” (Tweet 5-6). His
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solution was to get himself fired “bc quitting seems onerous and dull” by writing an
incendiary review of Party Music, an album by the political hip-hop group The Coup
(8). Clover tweets:
For 200 words I describe the album very conventional[ly]. But the second half
of the review shifts gears. / The 2 nd half says, if u just listen to this album, yr a
poseur. It’s a 5. There’s only one way to take the album seriously / that’s to go
down to the Spin offices & throw a brick thru the window. I give the address.
If u do this, I write, its [sic] a 10 (11-12).
Clover assumes he will be fired immediately but, as it turns out, Spin love the review.
“They want to tweak a word or 2” but otherwise are completely behind the review
(17). This sequence of tweets show a more traditionally serial aspect to Clover’s
storytelling. When Clover writes that there is “only way to take the album seriously”
he ends the tweet there—on a cliffhanger of sorts. As readers we are waiting to
discover what is “the only way” to take The Coup’s Party Music seriously. When
Clover writes that “the second half of the review shifts gears” that thread of thought
“shifts gears” and announces a change in tone we will read in the next tweet. As he
admitted in the interview quoted above, he got a “sense” of the story as he wrote it,
apprehending the rules of his own storytelling form organically.
As in Egan’s pre-planned Black Box, Clover writes his story in chapters.
Unlike Egan’s story which has numbered section breaks, these chapter ends seem
intended to emphasize the information contained in the previous tweet. The end of the
first chapter provides an excellent example: “My weird feeling is this: that we have
been going out so long, I have to break up with Spin in person. It feels right. / But
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there’s a problem: I don’t really have the spare cash for a transatlantic flight. This is
where U2 comes in. / END OF CHAPTER 2” (22-24). Clover, who has told his friend
stuck at a U2 concert that he has a similar story, is bringing #HowIQuitSpin back to its
initial purpose. The end of each chapter is accompanied by a temporal break. Between
the “END OF CHAPTER ONE” tweet and the beginning of chapter two nearly an
hour and a half elapse. Between two and three, it’s a twelve-minute gap. Chapter three
ends at 1:01 am and Clover doesn’t take the story up again until 9:31 the next
morning, the story being far too long already to tweet to his friend stuck at a boring
U2 concert. In fact, the U2 aspect of the story turns out to be a MacGuffin, though not
an intentional one. The initial purpose of the story—talk about a boring U2 concert to
a friend stuck at a boring U2 concert—gives way to what emerges as the story’s actual
purpose: a snapshot of immediately post-9/11 life, art, and political critique, wrapped
in a story about quitting Spin magazine. 12
We see the story’s eventual purpose and intrigue beginning to emerge out of its
initial premise toward the end of chapter two. This might be the first moment that we
see new rules emerge to order #HowIQuitSpin. (Granted we need to perceive Clover’s
story as a whole—as “How I Quit Spin”—to retroactively make this connection.)
Clover arranges to get passes to a U2 show in Paris and trades one pass to a U2 superfan from Dublin in exchange for travel vouchers. He uses the vouchers to arrange for a
flight to New York. The beginning of chapter three reminds us of the stakes: “so the
day comes to fly off to NYC; haven’t been back since GWB took office. 2 months
since Coup review, 3 weeks since U2” (41). The beginning of chapter five gives us an
image and another political take that helps to illuminate the Clover in the story: “I
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recall this keenly. I recall sleeping on the banks of the Charles River. It is unclear to
me I will get another job. / I remind myself the world doesn’t let mid-class white guys
starve, that this tightrope always has a net if yr in my shoes. / bc this is the terrible
thing I have come to know. I try to let the terrible knowledge calm me down [as I go
to the meeting where I will quit Spin]” (52-54). Clover uses these temporal gaps to
reset and focus the story in an analogous way to how a television series like Lost used
season finales and season premieres—simply, to close a season long story line and
then suggest a way forward with a teasing bit of new information. He uses end of
chapter and beginning of chapter tweets to set the scene for his reader. With
devastating effect Clover gives us this three-tweet sequence:
“[walking] under the bridge & out into the sun, blue sky, pretty far dwntwn,
running along. A plane hits the WTC. Then another one. / END OF CHAPTER
FIVE / there’s nowhere to go from there but that’s the thing, stories keep going
when there is no place to go. A demoralizing fact” (60-61).
What Clover shows us, as does Lacan, is how repetition—literally tweeting and then
tweeting again—creates a series, and a series allows for retroactive discovery of its
own internal rules. Seriality generates its own context. While many of Clover’s tweets
that explicitly reference 9/11 in #HowIQuitSpin could be excised as quasi-aphorisms
without context, for example, “11:00 comes an hour after 10:00 no matter what. Even
when such things seem impossible,” these tweets form a chain of signification that,
while needing to be read forwards (linearly) can only be made sense of retroactively
(63). This idea is woven even into the logic of Twitter’s feed, where new tweets
appear first, pushing older tweets further down. For our purposes, in considering the
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serial story on Twitter, this temporal mechanism reinforces the idea that it is the next
tweet that makes sense of the previous tweet. We need the next tweet to make
retroactive sense of what came before (following the rules of Freud’s
Nachträglichkeit). The tweets do not necessarily make complete sense on their own. In
less esoteric terms, word order, or sequence, is what matters. Not a single one of
Clover’s tweets received over 58 likes which, considering the pop culture coverage of
this story, shows that it is the sequence and the ongoing experiment of #HowIQuitSpin
as it developed that transfixed readers, rather than any individual pieces of insight. The
final tweet in the sequence is the most liked, almost as though the Twitter community
is collectively patting Joshua Clover on the back for a job well-done.
When Clover later tells Salon (quoted above) that he had “no experience
making narrative” but “got a sense of it” as he went along, we can see the evidence for
that claim in these organic rules that emerged in the course of his writing “How I Quit
Spin.” Again, the sequence of the tweets helps to generate #HowIQuitSpin’s rules and
rhythm. Where chapter six begins with the shock and devastation of the World Trade
Center attacks, it ends with a wry bit of gallows humor: “My friend says to his dad,
what do you think? / This will literally be the first opinion we have heard not fed to us
by the television. We have been utterly bewildered. / Tony hesitates, smiles, a warm
smile, a calming and infectious smile, says Well they had to come down sooner or
later / END OF CHAPTER SIX” (85 - 87). Chapter seven, then, must change the
viewpoint of the story from the macro to the micro given what Clover has just written
above.
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As Clover later writes, “It is time for me to go into the offices I have suggested
get bricked & walk into the managing editor’s office and quit / END OF CHAPTER
SEVEN” (103). The bulk of the rest of #HowIQuitSpin consists of Clover explaining
how his attempt to quit the magazine did not go as planned. Contrary to what he
believed, he could not simply quit. He was embroiled in a contract dispute—chapter
eight ends with Clover telling us that, upon returning to Paris, he receives an email
from Spin that says he owes them sixteen thousand dollars—that brings us back to
#HowIQuitSpin’s initial tweets.
Clover’s first two tweets in #HowIQuitSpin are, “I moved to France on the day
GWB was inaugurated. Email was a little squiggly in 2001 but good enough. / So I
kept my Spin gig. The contract details matter” (1-2). Clover finally gets to the part of
his story, over 100 tweets later, where the contract details come into play. Not only do
we see the payoff and importance of a tweet that, one hundred some odd tweets ago
has drifted somewhat in the memory, but the sequence of Clover’s storytelling is
interrupted. Setting up who was working in the Spin offices and when, Clover
mentions the managing editor, Craig, who hired him four years previously, had been
recently deposed. A friend tweets at Clover looking for clarification on who the
managing editor is and when they would have been hired—a meaningless detail for
most people reading “How I Quit Spin” after its completion and entrance into what
Slate called a “piece of popculture art.” While the request for clarification is
undoubtedly calling attention to a minor point of bureaucratic information, it does
meaningfully interrupt Clover’s storytelling. As we see below:
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Figure 1. Joshua Clover, #HowIQuitSpin Tweet sequence, July 19-20, 2015.

In the midst of Clover resetting the stakes and situation for his readers—as one can see
clearly in tweet 119 when Clover gives his readers a series of “afters” establishing
where we are in space and time in his story—we have this interruptive tweet of
clarification. Going through “How I Quit Spin” in Storify (a now defunct web service
that flips the temporality of tweet order while maintaining its medium specific look) is
that we only have Clover’s reply to @mehpatrol, not the tweet he is replying to.
Again, while the tweet itself and the reply is utterly unremarkable, it’s instructive in
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seeing how one tweet that is not a part of #HowIQuitSpin can disturb the rhythm and
story flow when reading it as “How I Quit Spin.”
This reply irrupts the idea that “How I Quit Spin” is a timeless whole—
something that The New Yorker’s reproduction of Egan’s Black Box gives us. The
interruption of Clover’s reply reminds us that we are reading gapped narrative. Here
the real of seriality emerges and it’s a little unpleasant. We want to navigate away to
continue to be absorbed in Clover’s story, entranced by the idea that #HowIQuitSpin
is itself a narrative totality, in other words, that it is not a part of Twitter, that it is
“something else” (a “piece of popculture art,” perhaps). Lacan’s real, as above, is best
described as an impasse of formalization, that which cannot be incorporated in
symbolic reality without contradiction but is, nonetheless, there. The presence of the
above reply tweet breaks the imaginary totality of “How I Quit Spin.” This is the
difference between #HowIQuitSpin and “How I Quit Spin.” “How I Quit Spin,” is the
way the story is referred to in articles by Slate and Salon (it is even the way this serial
story is cited in this dissertation). While, as above, Joshua Clover tries to distance his
story from the medium in which it appeared, the rhythm and rules that dictate the
structure and internal functioning of “How I Quit Spin” arise from gaps in disclosure.
Twitter’s hard restrictions at the time “How I Quit Spin” was published—a 140
character limit and a limit on the number of tweets one could publish in a given timeframe (aka “Twitter jail”)—while noteworthy are less determinative of the story’s
form than the internal rules we observed above. Removing the hashtag and putting the
title between quotation marks is the work of Lacan’s imaginary—making something
appear whole. Insisting here on the hashtag calls attention not just to the medium but
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how the story resists totality. While there are literal spaces and gaps in the title “How I
Quit Spin,” the stylistic convention of naming a literary story obscures them. Instead
of imagining the gaps—the serial real—we imagine a totality. The way the quotation
marks hide the gaps in plain sight and give to us a sense of totality is a perfect
example of the function of Lacan’s order of the imaginary. #HowIQuitSpin, by
leaving no spaces, forces a recognition of the story’s form and, paradoxically, its gaps.

The Serial Real is Serious
Scholars of narrative seriality such as Jason Mittell and Frank Kelleter tend to
focus on the symbolic interplay between author, text, and audience, often noting the
observable documents of fan engagement such as “theory crafting” on subreddits or
message boards, fan fiction, and participation in Alternate Reality Games (ARG) that
offer fans the chance to experience a TV series’ world during the gap between
seasons.13 Similarly, Ruth Page, in “Seriality and Storytelling in Social Media,” argues
that seriality should be approached in a contextual rather than formal way. She writes:
…seriality is best understood as a relative rather than an absolute quality and
should be approached from a contextual rather than a text-immanent
perspective. From a contextualist stance, perceptions of seriality will depend in
part on an interpreter’s perspective rather than being determined by the
properties of the text taken alone. Sometimes both producer and audience will
experience the story in a serial form, but this need not always be the case:
seriality might be perceived only by the narrative’s producer or only by readers
or viewers. (49)
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Page’s essay highlights a few aspects of Twitter seriality that I have called attention to
above (e.g. the sequence of tweets, word choice, character restriction). 14 Where we
diverge is on this fundamental question: is seriality best approached on the grounds of
the particular or on the grounds of the universal? Or, in Page’s terms, is seriality best
apprehended along its relative or absolute qualities? This binary is missing a term that
changes the question altogether: the real. This dissertation is interested in positioning
the serial gap as the immanent quality of seriality—hole in the whole that determines
structure and meaning—so is important to clarify what this means exactly. What Ruth
Page seems to be guarding against is any model of seriality that predetermines what a
given serial object is. What’s more, she is emphasizing the different experiential levels
of seriality to show that seriality is not a monolith. On this point, I completely agree
with her—but with a Lacanian twist.
Understanding the serial gap as that which orders seriality—as an immanent
quality to seriality regardless of text or context—does not mean that the gap flattens
all serial objects to mean the same thing, as Ruth Page pushes against. It is in this way
that the serial gap is universal: it is a particular that changes all particulars. As we have
seen in the examples of Egan and Clover, there are rules beyond the tweet characterlimit that introduce the unique character (no pun) to their stories. Egan’s “if” and
“may” and the rhythm of Clover’s chapters are rules that emerge from the gap to
dictate the shape of future tweets. These Twitter case studies show us that seriality is
not a pre-existing structure encrusted on a group that orders its units—as Sartre has
it—but a group in which the gaps—the real of seriality—produce its own structure.
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1

http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/turkey/turlit09.html
Coincidentally for the larger argument of this chapter, Smith writes, “An example [of the carnivalesque]
from a later novel might be the Freudian, and Biblical shearing of the grotesque head of Casby by
Pancks in Little Dorrit, to the accompaniment of that carnivalesque laughter of those who have been
oppressed by Casby in his role as their hypocritical landlord.” Smith intriguingly calls the shearing of
Casby “Freudian” rather than noting that the concept in Freud might itself be Dickensian.
While O’Sullivan acknowledges that the serial is the “art of the between,” thinking of the serial gap as
not always already a fraught site means missing the real (“Six Elements of Serial Narrative” 63).
2

3

Though not a widely used nomenclature, the term brings together the planned fiction of Egan and the
spontaneous non-fiction of Clover for our purposes. Twitterature seems to have been coined by Michael
Rudin in “From Hemingway to Twitterature: The Short and Shorter of It” The Journal of Electronic
Publishing, 2011.
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics was given during Freud’s lifetime but not available until
1916. Freud never makes mention of having read it. The point is simply that Freud couldn’t have
integrated linguistics to psychoanalysis, so Lacan’s move is something that Freud did not have the
background to make.
4

Here Lacan universalizes Nachträglichkeit and elevates Freud’s structure for trauma to a place pivotal
for understanding symbolic relations.
5

6

In a crucial paragraph of the Appendix Lacan writes:
Indeed, it suffices to symbolize, in the diachrony of such a series, groups of three which
conclude with each toss by defining them synchronically—for example, through the symmetry
of constancy (+ + + and ), noted as 1, or of alternation (+ - + and - + - ) , noted as 3, the
notation 2 being reserved for the dissymmetry revealed by the odd in the form of a group of
two similar signs either preceded or followed by the opposite sign (+ —, - + +, + + -, and )—
for possibilities and impossibilities of succession to appear in the new series constituted by
these notations that the following network summarizes. This network at the same time
manifests the concentric symmetry implicit in the triad—which is, let it be noted, the very
structure of concern in the question continually raised anew by anthropologists whether the
dualism found in symbolic organizations is of a fundamental or apparent character. (35)

In the French, le sériel, or, as Bruce Fink clarifies, “what forms a series.” I have, of course, seized on
both the English translation and the French meaning in my analysis above.
7

To put it another way, the reason why Seinfeld’s many catchphrases work is because they are not
overused. The “Soup Nazi” says “no soup for you” three times. George’s girlfriend who coins “yadda
yadda yadda,” utters the phrase three separate times before she explains that she “yadda yadda’d”
shoplifting.
8

An important note: when quoting two tweets or more from Egan’s and Clover’s stories I make use of a
slash to separate one tweet from another. This is, of course, a convention for citing lines of poetry that I
am intentionally trying to echo. In Old English poetry, a caesura—denoted by a double vertical line like
this || —emphasizes a pause in the verse. In standard musical notation a double slash— // —indicates a
breath. Typical quotation of poetry uses the single slash to denote a line break. These notations do not
denote “nothing,” or a suspension of the thing itself (be it a musical composition or an epic poem), but
rather make manifest a break or a gap. In what follows, the slash between tweets separates them as units
of meaning, evidencing the temporal gap between them, while also indicating “the narrative cut” that is
already there. Segmenting a whole into a series introduces these invisible wounds to the text. The slash
here acts as a kind of scar allowing us to see the formal work that serial storytelling does. It is from that
textual encounter that the legibility of the wound emerges—the interruptive gap that curves and
influences the resulting text.
9
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This chapter will be quoting from the version of Black Box published on The New Yorker post its
initial Twitter run. The reasons will become clear in the “How I Quit Spin” section of the chapter.
10

In Seminar III: The Psychoses, Lacan conceives of le point de capiton (“the quilting point”) as the
moment of punctuation that allows the symbolic order to make sense. As Lacan says, “It’s the point of
convergence [the quilting point] that enables everything that happens in this discourse to be situated
retroactively and prospectively” (Seminar III 268). The quilting point affects meaning forwards and
backwards. Understanding the quilting point allows us to see that, for Lacan, punctuation is that which
ensures retroactive meaning. One of the more interesting employments of this logic in Seminar III
occurs here when Lacan says, “This famous fear of God completes the sleight of hand that transforms,
from one minute to the next, all fears into perfect courage. All fears—I have no other fear—are
exchanged for what is called the fear of God, which, however constraining it may be, is the opposite of
a fear” (Seminar III 267). What Lacan is saying is that the point de capiton simplifies our problems and
fixes the solution to them at a single place or with a single entity (i.e. the fear of God above).
Ideologically, we can see this today in the conservative fear of the “illegal immigrant,” which fixes
fears of Global Capitalism, or looming environmental catastrophe, all fears can be wrapped up in the
figure of the illegal immigrant.
11

12

There is a link that bridges 9/11 and Clover quitting Spin, apart from these two events accidentally
coinciding around the same time. The original album cover to The Coup’s Party Music depicted MC
Boots Riley holding a detonator in front of two buildings that look suspiciously like the World Trade
Center, exploding in a way that looked suspiciously similar to what happened on 9/11. This original
cover concept was “supposed to be more of a metaphor for destroying capitalism,” according to MC
Boots Riley, lead member of The Coup. But the problem for the band is it doesn’t look like a metaphor.
It looks like reality and recalls Slavoj Žižek’s observation in Welcome to the Desert of the Real that
9/11 was imagined popularly in films like The Towering Inferno, meaning the trauma of 9/11 came
from a popular fantasy becoming lived reality. This is another way of understanding the retroactivity of
trauma central to psychoanalysis and to Freud’s idea of nachträglichkeit explored earlier in Chapter
Two.
13

Mittell has written somewhat extensively on this point, especially as it regards The Lost Experience
ARG that ABC studios provided fans in 2007, (Complex TV).
Page also calls attention to what she refers to as “non-narrative” seriality, such as the process of
writing and editing Wikipedia entries (46). I’m unsure if she would disagree with me on the following
point, but I think she actually shows that there is no non-narrative seriality. Any series—be they iPhone
updates or patches to a video game—could be considered non-narrative at the level of denotation but at
the level of connotation these “non-narrative” installments tell a story of bugs, errors, user demand, and
content creation in a way different from but similar to her example of the editing history of Wikipedia
entries. The narrative content is found attendant to the installments here—in their surrounding
context—not in the installments themselves.
14
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CHAPTER 4

THE IMPOSSIBLE DESIRE OF SERIAL

Starting October 3, 2014, a podcast from WEBZ-Chicago and This American
Life called Serial aired over the span of three months. Hosted by investigative
journalist Sarah Koenig, and assisted by producer Julie Snyder, the podcast revisited a
murder case in Baltimore from 1999: the murder of high school student Hae Min Lee.
The podcast’s title seemed cheeky. It pointed vaguely toward the genre of the show as
true crime investigation, bringing to mind the sensational figure of the “serial killer.”
But more importantly, it named the form of the podcast—a work of nonfiction
unfolding as its hosts performed week-to-week research on the podcast’s subject.
The first season of Serial shows the inextricable relationship desire has with
seriality. The second and third seasons of Serial eschew critical features of the first
season. Gone, in season two’s look at the military desertion case of Bowe Berghdal, is
the reporter interviewing the subject of reporting model from season one. In season
three, the live investigation model that unfurls a greater mystery (not unlike the
literary fiction of Charles Dickens) is exchanged for episodes that deal with discrete
court cases taking place in Cleveland, Ohio. Through these self-contained stories,
Serial season three accomplishes a look at the United States’ justice system writ large.
The way Sarah Koenig and Serial innovate their investigative techniques is not the
point of this chapter. What Serial season one—and only Serial season one does—is
highlight for us how desire (in the psychoanalytic sense developed by Lacan) is made
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manifest in seriality. Therefore, this chapter will show how desire moves Sarah
Koenig from a reporter looking for an alibi in a suspiciously litigated court case to a
reporter who desires to be the alibi.
Starting with the discussion of journalistic ethics that the first season of Serial
elicited from scholars and listeners, this chapters moves to explore the ethical
dimension of psychoanalysis; territory that, for Lacan, demands a theoretical
consideration of desire. I argue that the actual ethics Serial suggests has its basis in
just this ethics of desire that Lacan put at the center of his seventh seminar. Serial,
however, shows us that desire is inextricably bound to the serial form. Serial’s
landmark first season generated both massive listener interest and critical
condemnation. Experts in the field of journalism lauded the series as a revelation,
while others questioned just how “ethical” it was for Sarah Koenig to be reporting a
story that she had not finished, thus allowing the fissures, inconsistencies,
speculations, and tensions of the investigative process into her storytelling as Serial
episodes began to air.
After showing how the journalistic conversation on Serial’s ethics is premised
on the series’ relation to truth, I turn to Michel Foucault and his ethics of truth-telling
known as parrhesia. Foucault’s notion of parrhesia is dependent upon one’s
relationship with an interlocutor, just as Sarah Koenig’s reporting in Serial’s first
season relies on her relationship with the incarcerated Adnan Syed (and vice versa)
and the listener’s relationship with Koenig. But Foucault alone does not take us far
enough into the ethics of desire, specifically, which is the crux of the serial form. To
bring us fully—specifically, to the territory of desire—I return to Jacques Lacan.
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Through a careful negotiation of what each thinker brings to bear on Serial, I claim
that seriality opens the space for relationships to form (journalist to investigation,
journalist to subject) and for desire to emerge. This relies on my assertion that the
ethical questions posed by Serial are opened up by its form, not its content, and that
the theoretical investigation of seriality done here reveals the process by which a
journalist assumes a role in a story. By engaging with the ethical projects that Foucault
and Lacan proffer, we can see that Serial uses the problems of seriality to advance a
different ethics of journalism, an ethics more concerned with uncovering truth through
the embrace of desire, speculation, and the vicissitudes of interlocutorship than in any
previously validated "journalistically responsible" method of investigation.

Journalistic Ethics
Many experts and commentators have weighed in on just how ethical it was for
Sarah Koenig to be reporting a story that she had not finished, thus allowing the
fissures, inconsistencies, speculations, and tensions of the investigative process into
her storytelling as Serial episodes began to air. Serial's uniqueness as a cultural object
comes from its revival of the serial format for radio storytelling, commonly thought of
as more a mid-20th century media phenomenon. The podcast’s employment of the
serial form has generated both massive interest and critical condemnation. My
argument is that the ethics that Serial suggests (but doesn’t fully embrace) has its basis
in an ethics of desire inextricably bound to its serial form.
Koenig’s reporting, if we are to understand Joyce Barnathan, President of the
International Center for Journalists, entails nothing less than an exciting and necessary
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rupture to the form of traditional journalism (“Why Serial is Important for
Journalism”). This act, this break from tradition is fundamental to Serial’s appeal.
Koenig’s use of seriality imbues her reporting with the “anxiety” and “soul searching”
that, Barnathan notes, is present in the process of traditional journalism but absent in
the final product. Barnathan sees Koenig introducing a new “transparency” to
journalism, instilling it with a different kind of credibility.
Yet, what Barnathan sees as “transparency,” others see as a breach of
fundamental journalistic ethics. For all its formal innovation, the bulk of the ethical
criticism levied against Serial takes issue with the form. Focusing her concerns on the
issue of form, Jessica Goldstein of Think Progress interviewed three experts in media
ethics: Jane Kirtley, Donna Leff, and Edward Wasserman. Leff thought that the
“foremost” obligation journalists have is to “tell the truth,” and conceded that the rest
is “art” or “storytelling” (“The Complicated Ethics of Serial, the Most Popular Podcast
of All Time”). As she says, “those are questions of taste and art and narrative arc, but I
don’t think they’re about ethics” (ibid). Leff did worry, however, about potential
problems with Serial’s end. What if Sarah Koenig had discovered Hae Min Lee’s
actual killer? Would she misdirect and tease the narrative to skirt around information
she was knowingly withholding from the audience? As Kirtley says, “I don’t think
there’s any problem with continuing your investigation [after finding key
information], but I don’t like the idea of keeping core information away from the
listener” (ibid). Would she pretend to have just stumbled upon it? These questions
proved to be unfounded, but they are certainly not groundless. It is merely important
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to note that for these journalism and ethics scholars, Koenig’s approach encouraged
distrust, not belief as it did for Barnathan.
Edward Wasserman was perhaps the most skeptical of Serial’s radical
deployment of seriality (though he did note that it was “riveting”). He writes, “the
downside [of releasing information as it is uncovered is if] there are speculations that
are being raised that are defamatory, and turn out to be false. That’s a concern” (ibid).
So much of Koenig’s reporting is informed by what Barnathan calls “transparency”—
the exact thing that makes Wasserman uncomfortable. Goldstein goes on to ask
Wasserman if there is a way to allay these fears without fundamentally altering
Serial’s structure. Asked if perhaps the answer is to produce the entire series before
airing an episode, Wasserman replies, “This may be the old school me speaking, but I
would be more comfortable with that,” though he does admit that doing so means “you
lose a certain amount of dramatic edge” (ibid). Despite the potential for Leff and
Kirtley’s concern about Koenig manipulating the narrative arc around information she
was withholding from the listener being arguably more prevalent in Wasserman’s
model, his prescription for “solving the ethical problem of Serial” is an interesting
one: he wants Serial without the serial. 1
The form of Serial ruptures Sarah Koenig’s reporting, separating it from
traditional journalism or documentary filmmaking. Even regular reporting on the
same story (say, a presidential campaign) is not serial; there may be a sequence of
news items written about the same topic, event, or person, but that does not constitute
serial reporting. Serial reporting, the kind practiced by Koenig, is a punctuated and
punctured whole, a chain of installments each deferring a totality of meaning to the
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next installment. When we talk about seriality, we are concerned with gaps and how
serial gaps generate their own rules and order. In this case, we can see how the gap is
generative of desire. These concerns bring Serial into the fold of this dissertation’s
ambition to establish a psychoanalytic theory of seriality. Serial is not simply a crime
drama, told meticulously. It is not simply entertainment rooted in hard fact. It is not
simply a challenge to the justice system, to notions of truth and innocence. It is all of
these things, and because it is all of these things, I argue, it instantiates an ethics of
desire.
Seriality posits a gap in knowing, a delay in disclosure, an interval in
storytelling. Its history is in the literary but that does not make it opposed to evidence
based investigations of truth. Far from it. It is the gap that seriality introduces that
Serial employs so adroitly in its narrative. Koenig uses this gap that the serial form
requires to advance an ethics of reporting that is concerned with discovering “the
truth” only. Journalists, of course, are concerned with “the truth,” but few—if any—
other journalists consider truth within a serial narrative structure. This leads Koenig to
explore hunches, opine out loud, and to reach tentative and journalistically
irresponsible conclusions. Contrary to critics, I do not believe this behavior needs in
any way to be reined in; it needs to considered on its own merits and, ultimately,
pushed to inhabit its own ethical territory.
To see more fully the ethical territory that Serial charts, it is useful to look not
at models in the field of journalism but models in philosophy. We will need to survey
the critical conversation surrounding the ethicality of Serial’s first season. We will
then look to Foucault and his ethics of truth-telling known as parrhesia. Foucault’s
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notion of parrhesia is dependent upon one’s relationship with an interlocutor, just as
Sarah Koenig’s reporting in Serial’s first season relies on her relationship with the
accused and convicted Adnan Syed (and vice versa). But Foucault alone does not take
us far enough. To bring us further—specifically, to the territory of desire—we will
turn to psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. What Foucault leaves out of his analysis of
parrhesia and the ethical position of the interlocutor is exactly the thing that
psychoanalysis (and Serial) interrogates: the desire of the Other. I argue that it is not
possible to consider ethical acts—be they speech acts or otherwise—without a notion
of the unconscious desire that operates in supposedly ethical work.
Our reading of Lacan will not strictly be a corrective of Foucault, however.
Each thinker’s ethical project needs to borrow from crucial elements of the other for
the purpose of articulating the ethical ground of Serial. We need to make an argument
for the unlikely fusion of Foucault and Lacan to see the different conception of ethics
that Serial instantiates. Then we will move to consider the following: how does that
notion of ethics challenge Serial and how does Serial challenge that notion of ethics?
What can Foucault and Lacan reveal about Serial and what can Serial reveal about
Foucault and Lacan? By engaging with the ethical project each of these thinkers
proffer, we can see that Serial uses the very form of the show itself to advance a
different ethics of journalism, an ethics more concerned with uncovering truth than in
being journalistically responsible.

Serial in Critical Dialogue
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In “Serial, Seriality, and the Possibilities for the Podcast Format,”
anthropologists Mariam Durrani, Kevin Gotkin, and Corrina Laughlin explore how
Serial’s expert use of the podcast form might provide a road map for anthropologists
to transmit their academic work. The authors see how Serial fits—and challenges—
anthropology’s core tenets as a discipline, particularly as it regards subjectivity and the
representation of diverse cultures and communities of color, like, according to the
authors, Serial’s near “public anthropology” of Muslim Americans problematically
told from the singular perspective of a white journalist (595). The authors struggle
with balancing the intimacy of Koenig’s radio voice and the closeness she feels to the
subject of her investigation with her racial and class detachment from it. Commenting
on Koenig’s analogy of the case to Shakespeare’s Othello and Adnan as being “not a
Moor exactly but a Muslim all the same,” Durrani et al. write, “The fact that Koenig
relies on an understanding of Muslimness here that spans from Shakespearean
representations of the Moor to Adnan Sayed, a Pakistani American from Baltimore,
shows that her investments in the politics and ethics of representation do not quite
meet the rigorous standards that we, as academics, would like to think that we have for
ourselves” (ibid). Koenig fails to be detached enough and allows her own cultural
history to determine her account.
Others have argued for Serial to be granted special dispensation on issues
exactly like this. Conor Friedersdorf, writer for The Atlantic and founding editor of
The Best of Journalism, agrees. “White reporters covering minority communities
should proceed with great care, thoughtfulness, and sensitivity—and scrutiny of their
coverage is important,” he says, though Friedersdorf steadfastly defends the podcast’s
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shortcomings, offering: “Serial is a reflection on a murder case and the criminaljustice system reported over ‘just’ a year, which is to say, it is researched with more
effort and depth than 99 percent of journalism produced on any beat in America”
(“The Backlash Against Serial—and Why It’s Wrong”). Durrani et al. do
acknowledge this position—that for whatever criticism Sarah Koenig and Serial
deserve for the unchecked white privilege operating in the background of the show,
we could not even have these rich and important discussions on race, representation,
and privilege without Serial—but it is clear that they do not support it. What the
anthropologists shy away from is part of what made Serial such a phenomenon—it
took risks. It is the serial form itself that is at the root of all of these ethical quandaries.
It both produces the very narrative element that attracts Durrani, Gotkin and Laughlin
to wonder at the potential use of the serial form for their discipline, but it also repels
them. The serial form of both releasing information and speculating about it as it is
released produces the ethical questions that give pause to the authors’ analysis and
recommendation of the podcast form for anthropology.
What ties all of these concerns together—questions about the form, the
dispensing of information, the speculation that is tantamount to public slander, the
unacknowledged white privilege—is Sarah Koenig herself. Barnathan defends
Koenig’s objectivity in Serial by stating, “What makes Serial so special and so
meaningful for journalism is reporter Sarah Koenig’s transparency . . . As she says, she
has no skin in the game. She is simply looking into a story about a promising high
school student of Pakistani origin accused of killing his former girlfriend, Hae Min
Lee, an exuberant, talented teenager of Korean descent” (“Why Serial is Important for
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Journalism,” emphasis mine). It is not accurate to say that Koenig has “no skin in the
game.” In the first episode, “The Alibi,” Koenig makes her position in this
investigation clear with two statements that virtually bookend the opening entry to
Serial. Introducing the concept and approach to the series, Koenig says, “I'm not a
detective or a private investigator. I'm not even a crime reporter. But, yes, every day
this year, I've tried to figure out the alibi of a 17-year-old boy.” The episode closes
with an email exchange between Koenig and famous missing witness Asia McClain
(i.e. “the alibi” in “The Alibi”):
All this time I thought the courts proved it was Adnan that killed her. I thought
he was where he deserved to be. Now I'm not so sure . . . I just hope that
Adnan isn't some sick bastard just trying to manipulate his way out of jail." I
wrote back, "Believe me, I'm on exactly the same page." (ibid, emphasis mine)
Koenig positions herself—from the very beginning—as the “lost witness” to the entire
case. The first lines of Serial are “For the last year, I've spent every working day
trying to figure out where a high school kid was for an hour after school one day in
1999—or if you want to get technical about it, and apparently I do, where a high
school kid was for 21 minutes after school one day in 1999” (ibid). Her relentless
quest to find Adnan’s alibi leads to the identification with Asia McClain we see in that
snippet from their email exchange—“Believe me, I’m on exactly the same page [with
the lost witness].” If Serial was concerned simply with finding “the alibi”—Asia
McClain—it could have ended after one episode. It is not, however. It becomes,
through the gaps in its serial telling, concerned with Sarah Koenig’s attempt to become
the alibi for Adnan Syed and her struggle with whether that is right, whether Adnan is
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guilty or innocent. Koenig has a tremendous amount of “skin in the game,” contrary to
Barnathan’s assertion, and this is precisely what makes Serial so compelling and such
a rich site for theory and discourse. We start to see that the ethical question posed by
Serial is opened up by its form: seriality reveals the process by which a journalist
assumes a role in a story. Seriality opens space for relationships to form (journalist to
investigation, journalist to subject) and for desire to emerge as a mode of inquiry.
What Serial does is show how Foucault’s ethics of parrhesia and Lacan’s ethics of
desire emerge through a serial narrative structure. This is the strength of Serial, not its
ethical blind spot.

Koenig and Foucault
The turn to theory can, at times, seem a way to treat abstractly a concrete
worldly situation—just as the serializing of a 1999 murder case can seem to turn
people into characters and traumatic real life drama into entertainment—but that is not
the case here. I submit that it is only with a proper grasp of what theory can bring to
bear on this discussion of ethics that we can truly and fully understand Serial. Michel
Foucault’s work on ethics focuses on the necessity of a relationship with another as
the basis for truth telling. Jacques Lacan will trouble Foucault’s conception of ethics
by introducing the unconscious and desire as fecund territories for ethical inquiry.
Sarah Koenig serves as the chief interlocutor for two audiences vital to Serial’s
narrative development. Both are obvious: Adnan and the listener. For a way to help us
begin to theorize the contours of ethics, truth telling, and the necessity of the
interlocutor, I turn to Michel Foucault. Foucault’s oeuvre is particularly invested in the
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criminal or delinquent subject, making him a natural thinker to approach for Serial.
However, we focus not on concepts like the Panopticon or a work like Discipline and
Punish here, but on parrhesia. Foucault develops his notion of parrhesia—a
“modality of truth telling”—most schematically in The Courage of Truth, a series of
lectures conducted at the College De France from 1983-1984 (2). Foucault’s work on
parrhesia exerts influence on the fields of politics and law to this day. 2 Philosophical
parrhesia is “frank speech,” the speech exchanged between friends, with an
interlocutor who one risks offending with their personal truth. Political parrhesia is
“fearless speech,” the truth-telling that risks one’s position or standing in democracy,
as “democracy is not the privileged site of parrhesia but the place in which parrhesia
is the most difficult to practice” (58). This is because parrhesia requires truth-telling
without any hiding and without the rhetorical flourishes that often manifest themselves
in the practice of democracy. One’s duty, so to speak, is to the truth; not to curate an
image, lobby for political advancement, or to cover oneself in rhetorical glory. I want
to focus on this basic structure for truth-telling that Foucault posits in The Courage of
Truth, as it is germane to a discussion of Serial, a narrative premised on truth-telling
and truth-investigation. It also, usefully, troubles the kind of ethical journalism
practiced and implied by Sarah Koenig. It allows us to focus on her relationship—
interlocutorship, if you will—with Adnan Syed, troubling the ethicality of that utterly
fundamental relationship for Serial.
As Foucault sees it, truth-telling is the basis for the development of an ethics of
the self. Despite this focus on the individual, Foucault is adamant about the role of the
other in The Courage of Truth. Indeed, while the focus of ethical practice is always on
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the self in Foucault, it is only insofar as the self is connected to others. As Foucault
says, “In ancient culture, and therefore well before Christianity, telling the truth about
oneself was an activity involving several people, an activity with other people, and
even more precisely an activity with one other person, a practice for two” (5). In line
with his characteristic rejection of the institutionalization of religion, Foucault is
against the idea that an expert or specialist (like the priest in Catholicism) needs to be
a part of this truth-telling equation and that confession needs to be the model for truthtelling itself. Instead, the other in truth-telling requires no special status other than
being the interlocutor for the self.
Koenig proves time and time again to be the perfect interlocutor for Adnan.
They speak freely and easily. It is engaging to listen to. As a listener, I feel like these
two have a real relationship, beyond “interviewer and interviewee,” a relationship that
is well positioned—in our Foucauldian formulation—to explore truth. Truth, for
Foucault, is in no way equivalent to objective fact, a similarity his ethical philosophy
shares with the nature of Serial’s investigation. The recitation of formulae or rules, for
example, does not count as “truth.” Parrhesia—truth telling—is a position one adopts
in regard to the truth, to speaking it, to investigating it. Parrhesia demands that the
individual risk their self in the act of telling the truth. This risk of offending or
challenging the other stands as the measuring stick for the effectiveness of the act of
parrhesia. Speaking truth by necessity incurs backlash, censure, rejection. The
investigation of truth, as we see in Serial, must be vulnerable to the very attacks levied
against it that we saw above. Equally true, Sarah Koenig and Adnan Syed’s
relationship must be vulnerable and open to risk.
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There is, however, a significant exchange between Sarah Koenig and Adnan
Syed, one that adheres almost exactly to what Foucault describes as “the parrhesiastic
game” in The Courage of Truth. Koenig tells the listener that after six months of
speaking to Adnan over the phone, he asked her what her interest was in the case.
Koenig, as she recounts, rifles through a list of things she thought were interesting
about the case and finally says, “[W]hat really hooked me most, was him. Just trying
to figure out, who is this person who says he didn’t kill this girl but is serving a life
sentence for killing this girl” (“The Case Against Adnan Syed”). Koenig’s answer
results in, as she says, the closest thing to a “hostile” interaction they had while
working on Serial—it is also the moment where we see that Adnan is the perfect
interlocutor for Koenig herself.
She tells Adnan that she thinks he’s “a really nice guy” and that she likes
talking to him, that driving her interest in the case is figuring out “what does that
mean?” Sarah is attempting to understand how much she enjoys Adnan’s conversation
and company with the idea that he is also a violent killer. Adnan pauses a while before
responding; a silence that is remarkable for Sarah and Adnan’s communication simply
for its exceptional status. Adnan is flustered and stutters his way toward eventually
saying “it’s weird to hear you say that because, I don’t even really know you” (ibid).
Sarah is immediately taken aback and she asks, “are you saying I don’t know you at
all?” (ibid). Adnan is still incredulous that Sarah can make the judgment that he is “a
nice person” given that they have only talked on the phone “a few times” (more than
thirty hours of phone call by this point, which Koenig points out is “way more than
I’ve talked to a lot of people I think I know. People I consider friends” (ibid).
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We can see a lot in this interaction. We see further affirmation that, yes, Sarah
Koenig does have quite a lot of “skin in the game,” as she more or less tells Adnan—
and the listener—that she considers him a friend. We see Adnan engaging in
parrhesia—frank speech—risking his good standing with Sarah Koenig, his
interlocutor who really could be his savior or executioner (as Adnan refers to Koenig
in another episode). The stated point of Serial’s investigation is to find “missing
evidence” or question the evidence that exists. If the convicted murderer outright tells
the person taking new interest in his decades-old conviction that “you don’t really
know me,” that’s as convincing an argument for “maybe he did do it” as Adnan could
have offered. Simply put, it makes it easier to believe this “nice guy” could have killed
somebody if he brazenly tells the person investigating his conviction “I know you
think you know me, but you do not.”
We do, however, encounter a problem with Foucault here. The skeptical reader
will ask, but does Adnan know he’s speaking parrhesiastically? Wouldn’t one have to
have knowledge of their ethical act before doing it? Or is it that the ethical act is a
matter of retroactive interpretation? Foucault’s entire system of truth-telling and
ethical speech/ action is premised on an unstated and untenable notion of intention. In
Foucault, we can read intention directly from actions. That is, if one practices
parrhesia as Foucault describes, one is ethical. We do not question the motivations
and machinations of the interlocutor if their actions fit the system that Foucault details.
Foucault famously rejects the insights of psychoanalysis—particularly its call for, as
he might term it, a “hermeneutics of the subject.” If the entire psychoanalytic project
had to be boiled down to a singular idea, it would be this: people do not do things for
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the reasons they think they do them. One need not be an ardent reader of Freud or
Lacan to accept this idea; one need not even believe in an unconscious, merely a
subconscious.
Foucault utterly rejects this. There is no unconscious lurking in the background
of Foucault’s work and thought. It matters not the reason behind Sarah Koenig openly
questioning Adnan Syed’s character while on the phone with him, the only thing that
matters is that she did it. By affixing the locus of logic on one’s relation to others, in
the way Foucault explores, Foucault might say that the intention doesn't matter, all
that matters is the willingness to begin acting parrhesiastically, that it is a process.
Whether one begins with earnest intent or otherwise, the "intention" arises as a result
of practice or askesis, in Foucault’s terminology. This seems like a perfectly
Foucauldian answer to the problem that he, sadly, did not live long enough to
confront. It is, however, an answer that is open to psychoanalytic appraisal, which is to
say that if intent can only be apprehended through a process that reveals in the
rearview, then parrhesiastic acts and utterances acquire meaning through the very
same process that speech does during a psychoanalytic session—retroactively. And if
meaning only emerges retroactively, this implies that the gap within utterances—
precisely what the serial form privileges—marks an interruption in truth-telling as
practice. In this moment of interruption, the subject’s unconscious intention or desire
manifests itself. The interruption trumps the truth of our practice with the truth of the
subject’s desire. In this way, the serial (and Serial) takes us beyond Foucault, who
admits no theory of desire, and to the terrain of psychoanalysis.
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Koenig avec Lacan
As I have shown above, while Foucault appears a natural resource for a
discussion of the ethical speech that can arise between interlocutors—and theorizing
the interlocutor is necessary for considering Serial season one—his ideas stumble
when we consider the desire that might be at work in that relationship. This is a critical
factor in Serial and the ethical project I’m locating in its first season. While the issue
of intention is an impediment in Foucault, it is a site for theorization in French
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, to whose works we now turn. In The Courage of Truth,
Foucault thinks alongside Ancient Greek philosophy, culture, and the “practices” at
work in everyday life in an attempt to develop his notion of parrhesia. Lacan, starting
with his seventh seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, takes aim at what he calls
“traditional ethics” emanating from the Ancient world, specifically in the work of
Aristotle. Traditional ethics aim at “the service of goods” or attend to the good at the
expense of desire, according to Lacan (314). Lacan’s work, then, stands in opposition
to Foucault’s project, which has a theory of the ethical act but no theory of intention, a
theory of pleasure with no theory of desire.
Lacan famously asks and examines, Che voui? or What do you want? This is
the question posed to the Other that inaugurates the subject’s desire. Lacanian
psychoanalysis is premised on the idea that our desire is not our own, our desire is
always aimed at the Other. Lacan begins this thread of thought simply: when you’re a
kid and you make your parents laugh, you don’t know why they’re laughing but it
makes them happy, so you keep doing whatever it is that makes them happy, even
though you do not really understand it. Children are thrown into a world full of the
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“secret” codes of symbolic interaction (e.g. not actually answering “How are you?”
when one says that to you on the street) so one’s whole way of relating to the world
occurs in this very matrix: yes, I know exactly what to do to appear normal in public
but I don’t know why I need to or want to. What we are looking for, according to
psychoanalysis, is the Other’s approval. In Serial, this question is implicit and
undergirds much of Sarah Koenig and her team’s investigation in the first season.
Why didn’t Christina Gutierrez contact Asia McClain? Why didn’t Adnan mention
speaking to her at the library? Why does Jay change his account of the crime to the
police over and over and over again? What do these people want? (What does the
Other want?) The audience asks this question of Sarah Koenig, and Sarah Koenig asks
this question of everyone and everything she encounters. The issue of desire is here
woven into the very fabric of Serial’s narrative.
Which brings us to how desire offers Lacan a “way out” of Lacan’s reading of
traditional ethics (and how the immanent presence of desire separates Serial from
traditional journalism). Lacan identifies the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as the
introduction of desire to ethical philosophy. He deals with this notion in three separate
works: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, “Kant avec Sade,” and Encore, a seminar that
works through a revision to some of what he put forth in the previous ethics seminar.
Lacan begins, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, by claiming that “a radical repudiation
of a certain ideal of the good is necessary” (230). This ideal of “the good” comes
straight from Aristotle and traditional ethics, an ethics preoccupied with, according to
Lacan, “The cleaning up of desire, modesty, temperateness, that is to say, the middle
path we see articulated so remarkably in Aristotle” (314). What Lacan is looking to
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develop in his own ethical project is something that breaks with this notion of the
ethical being tied to the advancement of the good.
For Lacan, Kant marks the breaking point from the ancient morality of the
good. Kant enables us to consider ethical acts regardless of the contribution that they
might make to what people today refer to as “flourishing.” As he turns ethics away
from the good, Kant also turns it away from the merely possible. As Alenka Zupancic
neatly unpacks:
By insisting on the fact that the moral imperative is not concerned with what
might or might not be done, Kant discovered the essential dimension of ethics:
the dimension of desire, which circles around the real qua impossible. This
dimension was excluded from the purview of traditional ethics, and could
therefore appear to it only as an excess. So Kant’s crucial first step involves
taking the very thing excluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning
it into the only legitimate territory for ethics (3).
It is in this very territory that Sarah Koenig and Serial operate. Through his reading of
Kant, Lacan allows us to see that the criticism levied at Sarah Koenig for breaching
objective journalistic standards is not viable, or if it is, it relies on separating desire
from the ethical (as in traditional and Foucauldian ethics). Since desire is at the core of
the subject, “not giving ground relative to one’s desire”—Lacan’s ethical maxim—is
perfectly sensible. This does not fit exactly with the ethical territory I have been
crafting for Serial and Sarah Koenig. I am adamant that her desire needs to be present
in her investigation. Rather than “compromising” her ethical position, this enables and
constitutes it.
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The Adnan Syed-Sarah Koenig relationship enables truth-telling, as we learn
from Foucault. It does not enable “verification bias,” as some detractors have argued,
nor does it compromise Sarah Koenig’s objectivity. 3 A belief in some objectivity,
here, is the lie. Jesse Owen Hearns-Branaman, in the recent Journalism and the
Philosophy of Truth: Beyond Objectivity and Balance, calls for new theories on
journalism’s epistemology. The heart of his project is finding a way to theorize
objectivity, rather than simply name it. He rejects any approach that resembles a
taxonomy, arguing that most of the journalism scholarship from the 1970s to today
shows a stagnation in approach, a circularity in debate (15). Significantly, his route to
new thinking on objectivity and truth in journalism passes through Lacan. It is not
hard to understand why. Yes, there must be some notion of objectivity that supports
journalistic inquiry, but there is not a supposedly pure form of “objective journalism”
on the one hand and then there is Serial on the other. Serial season one gives us an
opportunity to see how desire complicates a notion of “bias free” reporting. Serial
simply invites this complication to drive its investigative narrative.
What we come to, finally, is a consideration of the ethical dimension of
seriality observable in the form, backlash, and innovation in Koenig’s reporting. In
Encore, Lacan’s revision of his first ethics seminar, Lacan has made a subtle shift. As
Joan Copjec glosses in Imagine There’s No Woman, “[Lacan’s] ethics takes off from
the proposal that being is not-all or there is no whole of being” (6). In a sense, this is
what Serial offers us. What inheres seriality is the gap. This gap in knowing, the gap
in meaning, of possibility. This gap raises expectations and, of course, disappointment.
This is what endows the serial with its particular character and this is what Serial’s
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detractors do not reckon with: the way its form shapes the investigation and its ethical
dimension is the podcast’s most intriguing feature from a theoretical perspective. As
Foucault says, “parrhesia . . . is only [parrhesia] after it has opened up an essential,
fundamental, and structurally necessary moment of the possibility of hatred and
rupture” (25). Foucault and Lacan both acknowledge the structural necessity for a gap
to be present for the ethical to emerge. 4 For Lacan this gap occurs between the demand
of the other and the act of the subject (Antigone’s refusal of Creon’s injunction against
burying her brother is Lacan’s example). This gap is utterly constitutive of the serial
and it is what has made Serial so fascinating for those who extol it (like Joyce
Barnathan) and those who take issue with it (like Edward Wasserman).
What Serial does is return us, in a way, to Dickens and how he wrote alongside
his readers reading. This is a formal echo of this aspect of seriality that attracted
listeners. When people listened, they felt that they were part of an ongoing criminal
investigation—which they were (especially when listeners connected with the 1999
murder contacted the show willing to offer testimony and information). This was the
first thing that drew listeners in and is the first thing that anyone who critiqued the
show brings up; that it went about its investigation poorly because of this unfolding.
What Serial shows is how people get bound up in form (something we will see further
in the next chapter). We can look at the serial form as the object cause of desire, as
Lacan’s objet a is often translated in English. The problem with this formula though is
that it blurs how desire is prior to the object and that desire causes the object. Through
looking at Lacan’s formulation of the ethics of psychoanalysis— the working through
of desire and what at the time he calls Das Ding but is later (roughly) equivalent to
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objet a—Lacan gives us a framework for seeing how desire and seriality are
inextricably linked. In the previous two chapters, I show seriality as a function of the
psyche. If seriality grounds the subject, then in a way different from how Sartre means
it, seriality is also a form through which subjects relate to one another. Serial as a
podcast is literally two subjects relating to each other through the serial form, and how
that form is related to audiences, and how that relation ended up determining the form
of Serial. Desire is not simply want or that people wanted new episodes of the podcast
or wanted to know who had killed Hae Min Lee. Desire is disturbing and cannot be
consciously avowed.
This is the encounter with form and desire found in Serial’s first season that
the show would never revisit. This may be because of the criticism they received or,
perhaps, it is due to recognizing the grim underside of how the serial form, the
interlocutor, and desire intersect. Julie Snyder said in a 2016 roundtable discussion on
popular seriality at Columbia University that the way that people reacted to the show
as though it were a fictional narrative disturbed her:
There was one point, while we were in the middle of the first season of
Serial—it was some coffee shop right up here by Columbia—and Sarah
Koenig told me, she had gone in, and there was a tip jar next to the cash
register, and one said, “Adnan did it” and one said, “Jay did it”—who are the
two characters, two of the people in the story—and you were supposed to tip
on it. And it makes you want to puke . . . It just felt like—“This isn’t what we
intended, this isn’t what we wanted. This feels gross to us. (121)
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At the same time that Snyder expresses disgust at the “fan” reaction to their
journalistic investigation, she offers a fascinating slip of the tongue: characters. Jay
and Adnan are “the two characters,” she says, before correcting “the two people in the
story” (ibid). Snyder here speaks exactly as a “fan” would of any fictional series. At
the same time that she decries some of the engagement with Serial’s first language,
she adopts the very language she attempts to disavow. This, we might be tempted to
underline, is desire itself irrupting.
The first season shows clearly the relation that seriality has with the
psychoanalytic notion of desire. Crucially, this comes from the form first and the
content second. This is one of the points of my work here, and one of the subtle points
of psychoanalysis I am trying to draw out—that psychoanalysis is concerned with how
form affects the psyche and how we should understand the psyche as form. Conscious
experience is riddled with gaps from which the unconscious emerges. It is analogous,
in this way, to the gapped form of Serial (and the serial, in general). It is through these
gaps that relation can take place and subjectivity can emerge. Gaps are not
imperfections or holes that denote incompletion. They are the very thing that allows
for Julie Snyder’s unconscious desire to see Jay and Adnan as characters to emerge.

Conclusion
Serial intervenes in culture at the unexpected intersections of narrative and the
law, journalism and desire, ethics and seriality. It has been hailed for pioneering a new
journalistic format (the podcast), and saving an old one (radio). It has been criticized
for its unchecked and unacknowledged white privilege, its sensationalizing of an
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actual murder, its flouting of established journalistic convention, and its potential bias
toward the convicted felon at the heart of it all. The question of Serial’s ethics
pervades all of these questions.
What cannot be debated regarding Sarah Koenig and Serial, however, is that
what the show does is new. It is. As such, I have argued that Serial requires a different
framework to evaluate its ethical content, since it is outside the bounds of established
critique. In a standard documentary series (like Netflix’s Making a Murderer) or
published works of journalism, the journalist is not the active interlocutor of the
subject of the story (here, Adnan Syed). For this reason, we need a model for
evaluating the ethical status of the relationship between Sarah Koenig and Adnan Syed
that drives Serial’s investigation. For insight into this new framework, I have turned to
Foucault and Lacan, whose ostensibly incompatible thought are indispensable. Despite
the problem of intention at the heart of Foucault’s ethics of parrhesia that Serial
allows us to see, his model is exemplary for showing how the interlocutor makes
ethical speech possible.
Critics have opined that Sarah Koenig becomes too close to Adnan Syed,
clouding her ability to evaluate his case objectively. Foucault would say that such
objectivity risks nothing. Were Koenig to be removed from Syed partially or
completely there would be much less to pull her toward the opinion that Syed is
innocent. A dispassionate investigation into the physical material of a possible
wrongful conviction is certainly a valuable practice but it can by no means be
considered the only way to investigate truth. There must be alternatives available.
Serial is this alternative. The question that none of Koenig’s detractors have asked is
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this: what does it mean if "responsible journalism" is opposed to the investigation of
truth? Koenig and former consulting homicide detective Jim Trainum say that the
detectives on Syed’s case “probably settled for what was good enough to be the truth”
(“To Be Suspected”). But Serial does not settle for this. If “responsible journalism”
would separate Koenig from Syed, prevent her from interviewing certain people,
prevent her from airing her speculations and accusations as they occur in her
investigation—distance her from the truth, in other words—then what is the ethical
status of this supposed “responsible journalism”? The issue of Serial’s ethics cannot
be so black and white as to rely on conventional models that fail to meet Serial on its
own ground (i.e., confront what it is actually doing).
These questions are fortified by Lacan, with whom we are able to look at the
ethical status of desire. Listening to Serial it is clear that Koenig desires—if not to
clear Adnan Syed of wrongdoing entirely—to be the person who can know
definitively what happened in this murder case. It is doubtless that Sarah Koenig
realized her desire to find the exculpatory evidence that would prove Adnan’s
innocence compromised her journalistic voice—a desire that, as I have argued, leads
her to position herself as this “lost” expert witness. But even as this compromises
traditional notions of “journalistic integrity” it increases narrative tension and listener
interest in the show. Crucially, it pushes Koenig toward a different territory of ethics,
one that sheds traditional notions of objectivity.
Perhaps the most enticing and disquieting element for some listeners has been
the narrative aspect of the series. Even Sarah Koenig, quoted by Ellen Gamerman of
The Wall Street Journal, tries to separate herself from the intersection of narrative and
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law that subtends Serial. Gamerman writes:
As they do with addictive TV, fans are already fretting that the last episode
will be a letdown. “I feel like we’re pretty good at making sure it won’t be a
giant disappointment,” Ms. Koenig said in an interview. “I’ll present what my
reporting bears out, and that’s my responsibility. It’s not my responsibility to
entertain you with some wonderful, perfect ending. I don’t mean that in a
holier-than-thou way at all—it’s just—I’m a reporter. (“Serial Podcast Catches
Fire”)
Here Koenig struggles with the ethics of seriality and desire that her podcast
develops—we even see seriality displacing Koenig’s reporting from herself. Koenig’s
statement fails to grapple with the space her podcast created for her: this impossible
hybridity of reporter and storyteller, interlocutor and subject of desire, distanced from
traditional journalism. In other words, if the principal author does not fully embrace
the narrative aspect of Serial, how can Edward Wasserman? By insisting ‘I’m just a
reporter’ Koenig refuses the radicality of her own project. That Koenig is even being
asked about her “series finale” alerts us to the uniqueness of her journalism. Further,
by recoiling from the full narrative import of Serial, Koenig misses a crucial insight
graspable in her listeners’ worry: the potential for disappointment is increased with
serial endings over episodic endings. I contend that disappointment is the virtue of
serial storytelling. Serial storytelling is so enriching, so engrossing, because it raises
ever higher our expectations for it. Fans ‘fretting that the last episode will be a
letdown’ is the point. One can only be disappointed because of the form. It raises
expectations and then (usually) disappoints, but this is a far more valuable narrative
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dynamic than one that meets requirements without ever raising them. This, perhaps
more than any other element of the podcast, is what definitively separates Serial from
traditional and everyday news reporting.
Consider Koenig’s final take on the story in Serial’s final installment:
As a juror I vote to acquit Adnan Syed. I have to acquit. Even if in my heart of
hearts I think Adnan killed Hae, I still have to acquit. That’s what the law
requires of jurors. But I’m not a juror, so just as a human being walking down
the street next week, what do I think? If you ask me to swear that Adnan Syed
is innocent, I couldn’t do it. I nurse doubt. I don’t like that I do, but I do. I
mean most of the time I think he didn’t do it. For big reasons, like the utter
lack of evidence but also small reasons, things he said to me just off the cuff or
moments when he’s cried on the phone and tried to stifle it so I wouldn’t hear.
Just the bare fact of why on earth would a guilty man agree to let me do this
story [makes me think he must be innocent]. (“What We Know”)
Indeed, what keeps Koenig’s “I think the case is weak but I don’t know if Adnan is
guilty or not” final statement from being disappointing is that the case (as of this
writing) is still active. Adnan will now face another day in court. There may be more
Serial Season 1. The possibility of more, the deferment of the ending, the possibility
of more possibilities is the only thing that keeps the serial from disappointing. As
psychoanalysis has it, complete satisfaction is an impossibility; were one to be
completely satisfied one would stop desiring. And who would want to stop desiring a
narrative whose form asks us, problematically, to continually reencounter it?
1

While, yes, a pre-recorded investigation of twelve episodes aired week by week is still serialized, such
a thing would lack the live serial aspect of what Koenig and her crew offered millions of listeners. The
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“live” aspect to Serial opened a gap in the narrative that most serialized-after-production stories close
down. Removing it would not simply cause Serial to “lose dramatic edge,” it would cleave from Serial
the very thing that made every listener feel like they were thinking, feeling, speculating, conjecturing,
wondering right along with Koenig. In short, the series would lack the very reason Wasserman was
contacted to comment on it in the first place.
See Jonathan Simon’s “Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime Victim
Speech.” North Carolina Law Review. Vol. 82. (2003): 1377-1414. Print.
2

3

See Conor Friedersdorf, Adrienne Lafrance, Tanya Basu, and Katie Kilkenny, "Serial Episode 8: A
Study in Bias?" The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 13 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 May 2016.
4

If the psychoanalytic subject is the subject of desire, the Foucauldian subject (he would prefer
“individual”) comes into being through “the historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (“What is Enlightenment,” Ethics, Subjectivity
and Truth 319). The subject who exceeds her historical limits is the ethical subject, the parrhesiast, but
it is not the case that this is an excessive subject as it would be in Lacan and in psychoanalysis. The
desire that exceeds biological or even situational necessity is not present in Foucault. We still have this
flattening of speech and act—result—with intention. For us, Lacan offers a way out of this problem in
Foucault. Indeed, with Lacan—in working with excess, enjoyment, and desire—we see a better fit for
discussing the ethics of the serial form that arise through Koenig’s reporting in Serial.
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CHAPTER 5

FILLING THE GAP

Academic inquiry into Netflix and streaming television has focused on the
employment of algorithms (Hallinan & Striphas, 2016; Gomez-Uribe & Hunt, 2016;
Amatriain, 2013), binge watching as the mainstreaming of “Cult TV” fandom (Jenner,
2015, 2016; Pittman, & Sheehan, 2015), viewer engagement/ digital reception
(Groshek, & Krongard, 2016; Matrix, 2014), and streaming as the next step in the
evolution of television form and content (Auletta, 2014). This work has attempted to
account for Netflix’s meteoric rise as producer of television content, while evaluating
its industry wide effects.
There is another thread of commentary on Netflix and streaming, however, that
cuts across both popular and scholarly writing. That is, pathologizing binge watching.
The issue of binge watching cuts to the very core of the psychoanalytic project and
this dissertation’s position that psychoanalysis is the serial media theory, as in a theory
of psychic life and social engagement that is primarily concerned with seriality.
Psychoanalysis begins in the clinic with an interest in not pathologizing behavior (e.g.
the complaints of women branded hysterics). The point of psychoanalysis is to
understand behavior rather than pathologize it. Binge watching is pathologized by
media critics both socially and academically. Scholars such as Jason Mittell do not
consider Netflix shows to be serial since they forgo a traditional distribution model
filled with schedule mandated gaps. Others consider binge watching a dangerous
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addiction that needs to be checked or perhaps regulated. Here we have a unique test
case for psychoanalysis as a media theory. We can move toward not pathologizing
binge watching, since this tells us very little about media released in the binge format
and we have an opportunity to see the work of the serial gap in media that purports to
be gapless. In this way we see the shape of seriality and the presence of the gap in the
relief of its apparent absence. Further, we will be able to explore the enjoyment
constitutive of binge watching television. 1 What emerges here is a consideration of the
body in binge watching, a key aspect to thinking about binge watching theoretically.

Setting the Stakes
The first prong of this chapter’s argument is this: media theorists and pop
culture commentators tend to pathologize binge witching instead of theorizing it. We
see this in the following popular news media sources. The Associated Press, in “Binge
Watching: Where Immersion, Indulgence, and Escapism Meet,” regard binge
watching as a kind of opting out of everyday life, a choice to remove oneself from
reality. The Guardian, writing on Netflix’s Narcos, asks “Full Immersion TV: is
Narcos too intense to binge watch?” Here the binge model is something that makes a
television viewer more vulnerable to televisual content, a point which Jan Van den
Bulck, co-author of a University of Michigan study on the negative effects bingewatching has on sleep patterns, agrees. In an interview on the findings of his sleep
study, Van den Bulck says, “[Binge watching is] a different kind of immersion—the
idea that you almost feel as if you’re in that world of science fiction or fantasy or
action . . . and it’s more intense if you have more hours of exposure” (MacMillan). In
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the study itself, Van den Bulck writes “the narrative complexity of these shows”
causes bingeing, as it “leaves viewers thinking about episodes and their sequel after
viewing them. This prolongs sleep onset or, in other words, requires a longer period to
‘cool down’ before going to sleep, thus affecting sleep overall” (1004). 2 It is difficult
to ignore that, at a cultural moment when television has been validated as an art form
in a way not seen previously, a strain of one of the oldest criticisms of TV reemerges:
that TV is bad for you and it will ‘rot your brain.’ Or, as an NPR article clumsily puts
it: “Too Much TV And Chill Could Reduce Brain Power Over Time.”
Perhaps there is no better scholarly example of the above skepticism of the
efficacy of binge watching than Dennis Broe’s recent Birth of the Binge: Serial TV
and the End of Leisure. Broe echoes the Sartrean approach to seriality we saw
described in the Introduction. Referring to the binge model as a kind of “heightened”
seriality, Broe establishes the stakes of his analysis:
The sociopolitical background against which this heightened seriality emerges,
with its much more intense luring of an audience into a more complicated and
extended fictional world, is one of a seemingly ever more powerful capitalist
system centered in the Anglo (American and British) world . . . as are the
television series that circulate out from it. This system has, on the one hand, no
limits, no recognizable opponents, as it continues to expand and commodify all
aspects of everyday life. But in the real world, capital is all the time surging
against boundaries and destroying them at its own peril. The earth itself is in
grave danger as the energy and resources needed to power the capital-
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technological revolution (oil, fracked natural gas, radioactive minerals stripmined for communication devices) are rapidly destroying the planet. (14)
Broe offers a critique of seriality—the binge model specifically—as a way of
critiquing capitalism. Interestingly, Broe’s logic actually buys in to capitalism as he
decries it: if only seriality had an opponent (i.e. a competitor) then the competition
would regulate itself. We saw this earlier with James H. Wittebols’s approach to “the
Soap Opera paradigm”: there is simply no opposing force to seriality. It spreads and
spreads. Broe’s stance fits comfortably with Wittebols and Crary, a philosophical
position we can recast thusly: seriality is the motor of ceaseless repetitive production.
To mount a successful critique of capitalism, we must see its logic. For those adhering
to the Sartrean school of capitalist critique, it is seriality that underpins capitalism and
it is at the level of seriality that capitalism must be critiqued.
I will, again, stress that the above scholars see correctly, to my mind, that
seriality is not a neutral form. It is not a structure empty of content until filled. It is
not, say, meter without a line of poetry. There is something inherent, active, and
structuring beyond conscious control in its constitutive gaps. Where the above
scholars see an inherent insidiousness to seriality, however, I am arguing for us to see
the serial suffering of the analytic session articulated by Freud and the real of Lacan.
Chapter Three showed how desire is intrinsic to the serial form. This is another
point at which it is important to observe a psychoanalytic approach rather than a
paranoid approach. Again, Dennis Broe’s book is instructive on this point. He sees the
situation with seriality beyond its close relationship to the form of capitalism: the
binge model of seriality represents the death of personal desire:
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Desire itself in this market model is manufactured along the model of
Hollywood genre production, with the spectator knowing exactly what rewards
are promised with each genre, what specific chain of desires are activated (love
in the rom-com, exhilaration in the action film) and the formula then
guaranteeing a variation slight enough to seem novel but not significant
enough to disturb the genre’s underlying routinized promises. These nowdominant forms of grammatization, different from the earlier processes of
writing, are the result of tertiary retentions being confiscated by [what Bernard
Stiegler calls] the “technologies of control.” They lead to a “logics of
dissociation” that do not bring people together but further entrench them in
their own isolated hell (which is no longer, as with Sartre, other people but
rather other people’s devices) all the while destroying the “desire of the
future.” (24)
Broe buys in to the idea that desire can be counted and accounted for and falls victim
to what that logic entails: that viewers are being spoonfed something against their own
interests, that “seriality is employed cleverly within a capitalist mode of production to
create the demand, ‘the desire to find out what happens next,’ [as Jennifer Hayward
writes,] that it then feeds” (138). Broe quotes Jennifer Hayward here as a way of
conflating the kind of quantifiable demand of capitalism with desire. For
psychoanalysis, desire is always unconscious. What Broe writes about here is “want,”
not desire. Interestingly, the Netflix limited-series Maniac nods toward this paranoid
logic in the opening minutes of its first episode. Maniac takes place in a retro-futurist
1980s Manhattan where the data collection of real-world contemporary America is
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given personification. Ad Buddies are actual advertising men who will front the cost
for various purchases as long as they can interview and collect data on a potential
client. When Annie (Emma Stone) attempts to use an Ad Buddy to pay for cigarettes,
she is told by the cashier, “Those assholes record client conversations. A National
Database of Desires. The businessmen, ever hear of it? They know you better than you
know you.”3 To believe that corporations—or seriality—control desire is to disregard
both conscious agency and the unconscious at the same time as corporate mastery is
totalized. The more difficult logic to observe is exactly what we saw in the previous
chapter: our desire is other to us. It is an intimate other, that is, the unconscious. To
believe in the “conspiracy” of the Ad Buddy or the absolute knowledge and power of
the corporation is to find comfort in the idea that someone really does know you. The
more discomforting revelation is that you are other even to yourself. For Sartre and
those following in the wake of his Critique of Dialectical Reason, seriality is the
engine of capitalist expansion and it is seriality which others us to each other. Broe
does move on to suggest that seriality can be used to unite rather than divide,
emphasizing Sartre’s notion that from seriality the group-in-fusion can emerge to
make a meaningful collective out of superficial seriality but, as we saw with Sartre,
this means moving on from seriality rather than engaging with it (138).
So, what does a non-pathological approach to binge seriality look like? We
might expect to find an answer in Jason Mittell’s Complex TV. It is worth carefully
tracking Mittell’s position on seriality here, as it will inform his later declaration about
the serial status of Netflix’s binge model. For Mittell, the central characteristic of
seriality is “its use of time” (Complex TV 27). “Story units” (41) are spread out
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“through a strictly regimented use of screen time,” a structure mandated by “material
reception contexts of television broadcasting” (27). These gaps are created by network
scheduling and, as Mittell goes on to say, have an added function. These network gaps
“allow viewers to continue their engagement with a series in between episodes,
participating in fan communities, reading criticism, consuming paratexts, and
theorizing about future installments” (27). Mittell’s discussion of the gap here is a
literal one but even he seems to acknowledge that seriality takes residence in the
psychic life of the subject through the paratextual engagement he describes. His
conception of the serial gap is importantly different from the analysis conducted here.
For Mittell, the serial gap is figured in terms of tabula rasa. It is an empty interval of
time which is endowed with meaning through the activity of viewers and consumers.
Given this definition of seriality, it is easy to see that Mittell would be skeptical about
Netflix’s binge model.
Mittell points to the “boxed aesthetic” as a way of consuming a television
serial without “a forced schedule,” as it would air on broadcast television (41). The
only way to re-create a network mandated gap would be by “self-pacing” a series (41).
Netflix programming seems to expand this boxed aesthetic, as Mittell calls it, which
for him complicates the serial form of Netflix shows:
Netflix’s move into original programming has embraced the boxed aesthetic
even without DVD boxes, publishing entire seasons of House of Cards,
Arrested Development, and Orange is the New Black all at once to its digital
libraries, forgoing the gap-filled serial broadcast experience altogether—and
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raising the question as to whether these multiepisode narratives can be
considered serial at all. (41)
It is important to point out that Mittell only raises the question of Netflix seriality and
does not take it up in the rest of his book. 4 We can safely conclude, however, that
Mittell does not think Netflix or streaming series have a claim on being considered
serial, since he writes earlier that “The experiences of Dickens’s readers who followed
his novels through the serialized publication process were unique and unable to be
replicated by those who read his bound volumes; similarly, the serialized television
viewing experience is ephemeral compared to the repeatable practice of boxed
viewing” (40 emphasis mine). Mittell’s choice not to engage Netflix seriality on its
own terms is curious. Early in Complex TV, Mittell distances his project of narrative
complexity and televisual aesthetics from earlier models, such as Robert Thompson’s
notion of “Quality” television, that borrow heavily from the language of film studies
and literary criticism. Mittell believes that mapping a “model of storytelling tied to
self-contained feature films onto the ongoing long-form narrative structure of . . .
television” misses the key components of contemporary complex television, such as
“continuity and seriality” (18). Further, he writes that praising contemporary television
series as “novelistic” does nothing so much as “obscure rather than reveal the
specificities of television’s storytelling form” (18). On these points I am in total and
enthusiastic agreement with Mittell, especially when he writes, “I believe we can more
productively develop a vocabulary for television narrative on its own medium terms”
(18). Given Mittell’s stated focus on developing vocabulary for studying television
that derive not from prior media models, it is unfortunate that Netflix’s failure to
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qualify as a serial is down to it subverting a standard of seriality that Mittell sources
largely from a TV production model that is itself rooted in the way literary fiction was
distributed in the Victorian era. I do not call our attention to this discrepancy to
pointlessly needle Mittell, rather I believe his push to define concepts for the study of
the poetics of television narrative “on its own medium terms” needs to be
meaningfully applied to the Netflix/ streaming model of binge seriality. So, the better
question is not “can something like Netflix’s Stranger Things even be serial?” as
Mittell might ask, but why is something like Netflix’s Stranger Things still serial?
Formulating the question in this way moves us from treating seriality as though it is
only a material quantity and moves us toward considering it as a theoretical construct
and will be taken up in the latter half of this chapter.
Recalling Freud’s letters to Martha discussed in an earlier chapter, we see that
Freud seems to have dabbled in binge reading with George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, “I
read [Deronda] with mounting puzzlement and interest until an hour ago, discounting
a few hours of sleep. My well-known impatience made me hurry to get to the end”
(74). The impatience to get to the end and staying up past a reasonable time to go to
bed are two aspects of engaging with binge seriality most commonly associated with
streaming television. A radio and print ad from the eye drop brand Visine
encompasses this attitude. The ad in print reads: “Just one more episode? For your
viewing pleasure,” “Give your eyes what they need to go all night,” “If you can’t stop
feasting your eyes on your screen buffet, VISINE TEARS DRY EYE RELIEF will
help keep them feeling their best.” Visine offers nothing less than the essential liquid
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to help viewers fully bask in the “warm glowing warming glow” (to paraphrase The
Simpsons) unique to streaming television.
Given this context, we can envision Freud as analogous to the kind of binge
viewer Netflix called “the new normal” in 2013. 5 We also see something vitally
important for a discussion of the binge model as seriality. Freud did not engage with
Victorian serials weekly or monthly, as readers contemporaneous with George Eliot’s
serial writing and release of Daniel Deronda would have. According to Mittell, serial
gaps are found in the live release of a serial only. Self-pacing a boxed DVD version of
a previously “gap-filled” serial release does not adequately recreate the gaps of the
initial release, as, in his definition of seriality. Mittell heavily emphasizes the weekly
engagement with paratexts undertaken by viewers. The implication here is that after a
serial narrative is bound in a boxset or a single volume it suddenly lacks the gaps
constitutive of its initial construction. We might be moved to conclude that it is no
longer serial.
What Freud shows us is that the effect of the gap transcends this attempt to bind
it. While locating the emphasis of the gap within a larger critique of capitalism,
Dennis Broe never disputes the seriality of Netflix shows. Broe sees that seriality has a
force to it that is not limited to a network schedule. Broe, however, pathologizes rather
than engages with the Netflix binge model. This is where we reach the limit of Broe’s
and Mittell’s approach to Netflix. For Broe, a la Sartre, seriality is a form social
control and we must move beyond it (as discussed at length above). For Mittell,
seriality occurs because of a broadcast or publishing schedule dependent upon literal
temporal gaps. Looking at the viewer or reader engagement around a serial narrative’s
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initial publication is a great way to study fan communities. Elevating the behavior of
fans to the decisive aspect of seriality means something we might intuit as the
“authentically serial” is only available in its live run. I think this is a false step. It
makes seriality out to be too elusive, too transient, too momentary to be conclusively
or adequately studied in a forensic manner. In other words, to fully understand what it
meant to watch ABC’s Lost, “you really had to be there.” The initial publication of
serial narrative is not a unity of discourse, textual production, and author/ audience
that can never be returned to. It is a gapped and interrupted experience that can only be
properly understood or engaged retroactively. This is formally consonant with the
distribution and creation of serial writing itself. In much the same way that one of the
principal appeals of serial storytelling is the idea that “this will make more sense
later,” with the arrow of meaning not pointing forward but backward, to theorize
seriality is not to see only the gaps installed by network scheduling but see how the
serial is always itself gapped. What studying binge seriality will show us is this
attempt to erase gaps—as Freud attempted to do as a reader of Daniel Deronda—
makes their effects more apparent.

The Serial Gap as a Problem to Be Solved, or Bingeing as Understood by Netflix
It’s worth pausing to consider the following question: why get rid of the
traditional temporal gaps of a publishing model that has been wildly successful—
across print, visual, and sound media—since 1836? The serial gap actually has a
history of being seen as troublesome and Netflix’s binge model is the latest in a long
line of attempts to solve the “problem” of the serial gap. As we saw in the previous
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chapter, critics of the first season of the Serial podcast wanted the serial aspects of the
investigation without attendant ethical concerns. The history of wanting the best of the
serial—its accessibility and ongoing complexity—without the worst of it—suffering
through the dialectic of closure and disclosure—is articulated perfectly by Karl Marx
in the preface to the French edition of Capital, vol. 1. The French edition of the first
volume of Marx’s Capital appeared in installments between 1872 and 1875 (Capital
106). Marx was convinced to publish the translation serially, as opposed to the full
volume treatments it received in its initial publication and later English translation, as
“In this form the book will be more accessible to the working class, which to me
outweighs everything else” (104). When Marx writes that it “outweighs everything
else” he is referring to one of seriality’s central obstacles and impetuses: the deferral
of meaning. As Marx writes:
[due to serialization] it is to be feared that the French public, always impatient
to come to a conclusion, eager to know the connection between general
principles and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions, may
be disheartened because they will be unable to move on at once. (104)
Marx realizes that, while a serialized version of Capital will increase its readership, it
will also cut off its readers from the conclusions he is painstakingly building toward.
The passions of French readers, the desire to get to the end (something the fiction of
Balzac and Eugene Sue inspired to great effect), is something Marx would prefer not
to arouse.6 Marx, evoking an instructive response to seriality wants the serial—in his
case, widespread accessibility and distribution—without the serial—the complication
of desire and the deferral of the end. Desire, as we saw in the previous chapter, is
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inextricable from the serial form. What Marx doesn’t see is that desire is unconscious,
and it is precisely the impossibility of meaning occasioned by the gap that propels the
serial. The gap is not a problem but is, rather, a feature that cannot be erased by
binding or bingeing. German philosopher Fichte developed a term germane for
theorizing precisely this crucial aspect of seriality: “Anstoß” (anstoss). As Slavoj
Žižek explains, “It is important to bear in mind the two primary meanings of Anstoss
in German: check, obstacle, hindrance, something that resists the boundless expansion
of our striving; and an impetus, a stimulus, something that incites our activity” (49).
The paradox at the heart of Fichte’s anstoss—the logic that the thing that acts as an
obstacle is the precise thing that acts as the impetus for the thing in the first place—
has a profound analogue in seriality. For Fichte, anstoss is at the center of subjectivity.
We might take this as an opportunity to see the serial gap, the obstacle that is also an
impetus, is at the center of subjectivity (as well as seriality). This is how we see, in a
different way, that the gap is not just constitutive of the serial but a central antagonism
in psychic life that cannot be foreclosed.
Serials are premised on saying too much and not enough (a gap in meaning). It
is this tension between the demand of episodic totality and the necessity of retroactive
serial meaning that propels seriality. In a very meaningful sense, a trademark serial
storytelling element—such as the cliffhanger Freud refers to in Studies on Hysteria—
radically refuses totality. It seems to be a blaring signal that there is more to the story.
And yet, a sufficient amount of storytelling must be accomplished for a cliffhanger to
have any meaning at all. With a serial television show, novel, or podcast, it is the
impossibility of communicating all possible meaning in a single episode that drives
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the interest in the episodes themselves. It’s this lack, or gap, in the individual units of
meaning that propels the audience to take an interest in the series. Despite all evidence
in support of the gap as either a model for good narrative or good business, it is and
has been Netflix’s stated objective to wade into the realm of television—a medium
defined by its relationship to seriality—and solve the problems of broadcast seriality.
Netflix embraced what it saw as a shift in viewership and turned it into a model for
television distribution. Based on an extensive survey of users, Netflix declared binge
watching television as the “new normal” in 2013. 73 percent of United States users,
according to this survey, reported that they binge watched their favorite programs
(“Netflix”). Bingeing, defined as watching 2-6 episodes of one show in a single sitting
was also something that a full 73 percent of those “bingers” said that they “felt good”
about bingeing on television generally (ibid). 7
The binge model championed by Netflix was offered initially as something that
solved the problems of network television seriality. With a binge series there are no
annoying ad breaks, no waiting for new episodes, and no being told by a TV network
when to sit in front of your TV (or when to set a digital recording time). Control over
the TV experience is given to the Netflix “user” rather than TV viewer, something
cultural anthropologist Grant McCracken credited as engendering this shifting in
viewing habits: “this TV watcher is different, the couch potato has awoken. And now
that services like Netflix have given consumers control over their TV viewing, they
have declared a new way to watch” (ibid).
In what at first seems remarkable but after reflection makes perfect sense,
Netflix’s “solution” to the problem of seriality is precisely the same one set out by
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Lacan in his “punctuated sessions.” As he began to come into his own as a
psychoanalytic practitioner, Lacan originated the idea of the short session, which no
longer followed the standard 50-minute or 60-minute session that Freud had
established. Lacan would end sessions at a key point for the analysand, always without
prior warning or schedule thereby forcing the analysand to not hold back. The
development of his “short” or “punctuated session” proved to be Lacan’s most
controversial move as an analyst. Many saw this punctuating the session as a bald
money grab, but it is the end, Lacan seems to be arguing, that always endows meaning
to the beginning. The most important strategy an analyst could employ, ergo, would be
to make the ending of a psychoanalytic session always meaningful. The imperative is
to always end with the unconscious revelation of the patient—when someone says
more than they mean to—and not the inevitable tick-tock of the clock. 8
Rather than leaving it up to the clock and a schedule of analytic sessions to
determine meaning, Lacan turned to stopping sessions at the precise moment a patient
said something worth thinking about between this and their next session. Lacan is
attempting to endow real meaning to the end of a session and have that quicken the
revelatory aspects of “the talking cure.” It’s also clear that he is attempting to solve the
problem Freud first articulated about the analytic situation. Rather than having patients
“suffer more” because they are unable to articulate the last thing they wanted to talk
about, Lacan stops patients at the precise moment than they say more than they mean
to. Is this not the same impulse that has encouraged Netflix’s challenge to the
broadcast and premium cable distribution model? Rather than having viewers “suffer”
between episodes, Netflix gives viewers everything at once. Netflix wants to move the
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meaning making signifier from the gap in a network schedule to a “user” decided
punctuation. The point here is simply that Lacan’s view of the psychoanalytic session
and Netflix’s view of the serial situation common to broadcast and premium television
are tantalizingly aligned. Both agree that the solution of the problem is to change the
point of punctuation. Again, seriality has quite often been approached as a problem to
be solved, rather than a real to be engaged with. (Even someone who should have
known better, such as Lacan, has done this.)
Now, it must be said, that it is hardly surprising to see a company put out a
news release touting the findings of a self-reported survey that enthusiastically crown
its own platform as possibly the best thing that’s ever happened to television. (It is
worth recalling, however, that Mittell partially buys in to the streaming company’s
stated objective to undo the traditional gap-filled broadcast and premium cable model
of television seriality.) Netflix has, by all accounts, changed the televisual landscape.
It is useful and enlightening to read how they have interpreted their own intervention
into the industry. Moreover, it is crucial to realize two things. The first, as Netflix
understands, television viewing is changing. This shift in viewing habits reveals that
the network-dominated model for television has become outmoded and is now,
clearly, a problem. As Ted Sarandos, Chief Content Officer of Netflix, says, "Our
viewing data shows that the majority of streamers would actually prefer to have a
whole season of a show available to watch at their own pace" (ibid). Traditional
network and cable television models are here positioned as a problem to what is
emerging as a new and preferred way to watch TV. Netflix, subsequently, is the
solution to this problem. Or, as Sarandos puts it, “Netflix has pioneered audience
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choice in programming and has helped free consumers from the limitations of linear
television” (ibid). It’s difficult to ignore the language of capitalism coming through
here (and yet another example of the close relationship seriality has with capital).
Framing Sarandos’s comments, consumer choice—not “viewer” choice—is the
solution to the problems of the staid and stagnant programming strategies of the past.
Netflix “has helped free consumers” from the shackles of “linear television.” The
network television model is here rendered as something of an oppressive force that
limits not just creativity but (consumer) freedom itself. One would think Netflix has
liberated “consumers” from the “prison house” of traditional network seriality. A
laughable fantasy on the face of it but one which, we are obliged to note, has resonated
both with viewers and TV critics (consumers, in Netflix’s parlance). Since House of
Cards premiered to rave critical and user reviews, Amazon, Hulu, YouTube and others
have adopted Netflix’s binge model of serial television distribution. Indeed, for
streaming video providers, the binge model has itself become the formal distinction
between streaming video and traditional television. The “problem” of seriality, here
viewable in the network model, has been thoroughly and widely solved.
The second important thing to recognize is that binge-worthy media is
inseparable from the serial form. Again, quoting Sarandos, “Our own original series
are created for multi-episodic viewing, lining up the content with new norms of viewer
control for the first time" (ibid). As Netflix understands, it is necessary to keep the
serial in focus (“multi-episodic viewing”) while discussing bingeing because bingeing
is itself a serial process. Netflix has not risen to the top of the television production
game by pumping out episodic procedurals such as Law & Order and CSI. It has been

146

through the consistent crafting of bingeable serials such as the aforementioned House
of Cards, Orange is the New Black, Stranger Things, Glow and serial documentaries
(“docuseries”) such as Making a Murderer and Wild Wild Country. Furthermore, with
the binge model, content creators are allowed to write episodes free of the anticipation
of network-mandated ad breaks and other network norms that serve advertisers over
creators. TV series need not conform to the network 30-minute episode model (which,
today, means a 22-24-minute episode with 6-8 minutes of ads) or a 1-hour model (4446 minutes of episodes with around 15 minutes of ads). Rather than composing
individual stories around the narrative intrusion of advertising, or whole seasons
according to a network demand of 20+ episodes, streaming television episodes can be
written until the story is finished. In the ten episodes of the recent season of Netflix’s
Glow, for example, episode length ranges in a way one simply would not see on
network television: Episode 3, “Concerned Women of America” comes in at 26
minutes; Episode 6, “Work the Leg,” is 31 minutes long; Episode 8, “The Good
Twin,” is 34 minutes; Episode 9, “Rosalie,” is 36 minutes, with the season finale
coming in at 46 minutes. While American television premieres and finales tend to be
longer than other episodes, the variability of episodes on display here is a standard for
Netflix in a way that would be exceptional for network television.
Putting Netflix’s intervention in the context of the network model shows us
this: viewers want to watch multiple episodes of television on their own schedule. The
network model—forcing viewers to watch shows at prescribed times and enforcing
mandated ad breaks—is outmoded and anti-consumer. New series, released with all
episodes available at once, allow for “choice” and “freedom” to flourish. Allowing
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television writers to write without the constraint of ad breaks and allowing viewers
(consumers) to watch free of commercial breaks and episode breaks, aims at providing
a gapless narrative experience absent any interruption. Netflix has identified that
contemporary viewers do not want a network to tell them how and when they can
watch their shows. The intent, then, is to eliminate gaps and to introduce a seamless
viewing (consuming) experience. So how can interruptions be constitutive of the serial
when there aren’t any interruptions? How do gaps “ghost write” the serial when there
are no gaps? The notion that Netflix, or Netflix style television, offers gapless
entertainment is a fiction. “Consumer choice” may mitigate the obvious appearance of
interruptions in the binge serial but it does not eliminate it. Bingeing—both as viewer
practice and method of serial narrative production—aims at overcoming seriality
(understood here as a narrative held together by interruption). Bingeing, therefore,
allows us to see quite clearly that the serial gap confronts us. Through the
confrontation of seriality, bingeing emerges as a way to distance oneself from the
interruptions and gaps constitutive of seriality. Bingeing is the repetitive failure to
obtain an impossible object that always appears in new guises. Rather than
overcoming the serial gap, the binge series finds a new way of expressing how the
interruption is immanent and inviolable to the serial. We can see this clearly in the
second season of Stranger Things, Netflix’s most popular series.

Stranger Things
It’s important to note that the above has been interpreted by Netflix users as a
strength of streaming television, something that puts it in contradistinction to network
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television (even premium cable television). The emphasis on “control,” however, is an
illusory one. Users have control to the extent that content creators allow it. The season
two episode of Stranger Things, “The Lost Sister,” is exemplary of this point.
Stranger Things, a series released by Netflix in the “binge model,” has many of the
traditional interruptions we come to expect from broadcast television in its episodes:
act breaks, episode breaks, and cuts to black as though there would be a commercial
break. With “The Lost Sister,” Stranger Things accomplishes something that a binge
series would seem to foreclose: a gap filled with content. That phrase is surely obscure
at the moment, but let’s proceed thinking along the lines of the function of the
cliffhanger. Since one can simply proceed to the next episode on Netflix without even
watching a series’ opening credits, resolving the tension installed by a cliffhanger is
seemingly a click away. Anticipating an end and not getting it is no big deal because
absent from the Netflix series is the temporal delay Mittell writes about as being
constitutive of seriality. It doesn’t matter if the characters have five minutes or an hour
or a week to rescue Timmy, as long as the viewer has enough time to watch the next
episode the tension will resolve itself. In other words, traditional serials accomplish
the cliffhanger by way of installing an almost mandatory wait time. An inviolable gap.
What Stranger Things season two does is accomplish the cliffhanger while giving
viewers a whole episode to watch. (This is what I mean by “a gap filled with
content.”)
The episode preceding “The Lost Sister,” “The Spy,” ends with a season
changing event that leaves many of the series prominent characters in imminent
peril—in a traditional cliffhanger situation. It’s important to stress that viewers of a
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binge series do not expect a cliffhanger to be a “real cliffhanger.” And so what
actually creates the cliffhanger is not that Stranger Things interrupts a scene, nor is it
that the episode pivots away from the previous action entirely (what Luke Terlaak
Poot has recently called “continuous” and “discontinuous” cliffhangers). 9 What
creates the cliffhanger here is twofold: 1. “The Lost Sister” does not pick up on any of
the previous episode’s story lines. And 2. More importantly, the Netflix viewer is
unaware that it is even possible to introduce a cliffhanger in a streaming series. One of
the great myths of Netflix as television producer is that it has freed itself—and
viewers—from the shackles of the network schedule. The notion that a popular Netflix
series would engage in a “dirty trick” typical of traditional television is almost beyond
belief, given what we read above regarding how Netflix has positioned itself in
contradistinction to traditional broadcast methods of storytelling. And yet, to get to the
episode that resolves the tension introduced by “The Spy” one has to watch all of “The
Lost Sister.” In other words, Stranger Things introduces a proxy for the week-long or
months-long gap that viewers of traditional television serials experience. In fact,
between episode three “The Pollywog” and episode four “Will the Wise,” Stranger
Things cuts in half a dramatic sequence where Will Byers attempts to confront the
demon creature that has been stalking him. “The Pollywog” ends with Will screaming
at the creature to leave him alone. Rather than take orders from a child, the
supernatural being dives into Will’s mouth, possibly (for all the viewer knows) killing
him. Cut to black. “Will the Wise” begins on the other side of this cut, with Will alive
but with the creature seemingly possessing Will’s body. This is the expected kind of
cliffhanger on Netflix. Sure, an episode might end in such a way that a viewer is
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required to move on to the next one, but the viewer can simply watch the next five
minutes of the next episode immediately to resolve the tension. “The Lost Sister”
refuses to allow Stranger Things viewers to evade the “To Be Continued” and the
registration of the interruptive gap.
Unsurprisingly, “The Lost Sister” is, by some length, the show’s worst rated
episode by viewers on IMDb.10 Having to watch a character-based episode that not
just interrupts the tension produced by “The Spy” but seems to rip Stranger Things
away from every single urgent storyline has been met by widespread annoyance. The
following is an excerpt of what is considered the “most helpful” (read: most
representative) review of “The Lost Sister.” It is titled, “Why did this exist? Save
yourself the trouble and skip it!!”:
This episode was such a jumbled piece of garbage. I love this show (excluding
this episode), and the episode was written in a vacuum probably for the sole
purpose of one or more spin-offs. It doesn't even feel like it's on the same time
line, nor does it feature any of the other main characters doing anything
important.

I dug my IMDb account out of the graveyard just to review this monstrosity . .
.This is just such a train wreck that I have to speak against it, lest it become
more common in the future. As subscription television becomes more popular
and common it should not need to relive the historical downfalls of traditional
TV and the reason we cut cords in the first place.
User: tggrif. Accessed July 4th 2018.11
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It’d be easy to dismiss the relevance of this kind of critique for an academic argument,
but this IMDb user’s comments are extraordinary for a number of reasons. The first is
that tggrif, in panning this particular episode of a Netflix series, affirms the “consumer
choice” model of television that Netflix is chiefly responsible for creating. The user
even warns against any Netflix series from writing an episode such as “The Lost
Sister,” associating the structure of Stranger Things season 2 with “the historical
downfalls of traditional TV.” If the register of these comments seems unnecessarily
high (i.e. a bad episode of television is maybe not a “monstrosity”), we should recall
Sarandos’s comments that Netflix has “free[d] consumers.” A cliffhanger episode like
“The Lost Sister” is a reminder that one cannot be freed from the specter of a serial
interruption. As Freud showed us in Chapter One, the interruption causes the patient to
suffer more than if the session—or serial story—came to a complete and selfcontained end. The binge model mitigates a number of non-narratively mandated
interruptions, as previously discussed, but it cannot turn serial television into a gapless
five or ten-hour movie. As Jason Mittell observed above, film is a far more radically
self-contained medium. To think of streaming television as simply a long movie is to
ignore the ongoing interruptive aspects that simultaneously break and bind it. It is to
imagine the erasure of the gap. As I’ve been arguing, erasing the serial gap is formally
impossible.
The second insight we should take seriously from this non-academic
assessment of Stranger Things is that the user inelegantly identifies exactly the kind of
“ethical” and “aesthetic” flaws in narrative that scholar James Phelan brands a “cheap

152

trick” in Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory of
Narrative. As Phelan writes:
Surprise endings provide strong evidence of the interrelation of ethical and
aesthetic judgments, as a quick look at the classic example of the ineffective
surprise will show. A story that puts the protagonist in peril and then ends with
the sudden and unprepared-for revelation that the protagonist has been
dreaming is ethically and aesthetically flawed. Such a story is ethically flawed
because its implied author asks the audience to invest themselves in the
protagonist’s actions while knowing all along that those actions are merely
illusions even within the world of the fiction. Such a story is aesthetically
flawed because the sudden revelation requires the audience radically to
reconfigure their understanding of the story for no benefit other than the
surprise itself. In short, such a story is built on the aesthetics of the cheap trick.
(95)
Phelan is writing about “surprise endings” here, but his thoughts deepen our
discussion of the “The Lost Sister” and the stakes of being confronted with serial
narrative design in a binge series.12 For the IMDb user (and many others), the
confrontation of “The Lost Sister” is basically being forced to see “behind the
curtain,” so to speak, and peek at the mechanism of serial narrative. As the IMDb user
sees in “The Lost Sister,” there is no benefit in the episode other than interrupting the
overarching narrative of Will Byers and co. dealing with a new threat from The
Upside Down in Hawkins, Indiana. (There’s even the cynical suggestion in the
comment that the episode is intended to establish a spin-off series for which there is no
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evident basis.) In effect, there is “no benefit other than the surprise itself.” Indeed,
even my sympathetic reading of the episode—that it gives the second season a breath,
a necessary simmer to the boiling action of the season up to that point—agrees that the
episode’s merits are at the level of form and structure. In other words, to tggrif’s point,
I’m not saying that the dialogue or acting is transcendent or that the new characters
introduced needed to be introduced. The user says that the episode was “written in a
vacuum” and uses this to say it is fatally disconnected from the rest of the season, I am
in general agreement here: though my evaluation of the episode is, obviously, far more
positive, the success of the episode is how it halts the myopia that the only thing that is
important or noteworthy in Stranger Things is what happens in Hawkins, Indiana. It
shows us that the world is wider than the concerns of characters we have already met
(and that the kidnapping and scientific testing of young children has been going on for
a long time with far more affected in far more places than viewers realized). It even
harkens back to what, in retrospect, looks like a half-hearted cliffhanger between “The
Pollywog” and “Will the Wise.”
What distinguishes “The Lost Sister” is that it radically reconfigures the
viewer’s understanding of the shape of Stranger Things season two and allows for the
show to exist outside of the snow globe of Hawkins. Here, I intentionally mimic
Phelan’s language of negative judgment for such narrative design. Not to say that
there are bad uses of the cliffhanger and good uses of the cliffhanger; uses of the
cliffhanger that evince effective narrative design and those that confirm the opposite.
Rather, the virtue of “The Lost Sister” is in its capacity to manipulate, misdirect, and
mislead. The cliffhanger, recalling Freud, should cause the viewer, reader, or listener
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to “suffer more” than if the story had simply played out for another five minutes. 13
Freud wrote Studies on Hysteria in 1895, but the notion that the “To be continued”
causes suffering is just as prevalent in 2018 as it was at the end of the Victorian era. 14
Stranger Things should be commended for creating an interruptive gap within a serial
publishing model that seems intent on eliminating them. That the interruptive gap
comes by way of providing content is, to me, a radical gesture. Finding a way to
introduce a serial gap into the binge structure shows the supposed “user control” (or
mastery) over a Netflix series is illusory (this is something the above IMDb user
recognizes but as a negative). This also shows us that significant interruptions can
arise in narratives seemingly liberated from such interruptions.
The Stranger Things example shows that the serial gap is not a relic of a
bygone era of network television programming, as our intrepid IMDb user would like
to think, but is an effective narrative tool. The serial gap evidences that the viewer is
not just caught up in the serial fiction but is literally caught. Ensnared. When
streaming television “falls” to the standards and tropes of traditional television, we see
the spirit of seriality emerge: this thing that has not just “hooked” a viewer but has its
hooks in a viewer. It is a confrontation with our inability to control or direct the
narrative (despite what Netflix executive Peter Sarandos would like to think).
Seriality, as Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary showed us in the Introduction, is something
of a scandal. A threat. It needs to be overthrown (it can’t be, as we have shown in
different ways). But it is worth continuing to hold on to the “scandal” of seriality. That
this shows it is not simply something that can be scheduled around or eliminated with
“choice,” as Netflix has claimed.
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Bingeing as Enjoying Fatigue
The new normal Netflix has helped to ossify has been met with immense
critical interest, both inside and outside of the academy. As scholars come to grips
with how to discuss bingeing as an inextricable intersection of both viewing practice
and method of textual production, we begin to grasp a commonality between the
critical response to bingeing and Netflix’s own internal marketing: binge television is
something new. It is successful in its aim at being “different” from traditional
television and therefore the task for scholars is to understand it. However, we need to
see that the binge model is not a meta-language. It is not a position within seriality that
is also outside seriality. Another way of putting it is that a signifier cannot signify
itself. It depends on other signifiers for meaning. What bingeing shows us is that
seriality is not a “prison house.” We encounter within seriality a limit—or an obstacle
that it is also its impetus—that serves as a kind of opening. The binge model seizes
this opening and allows us to read back on seriality as such. The binge model, as
discussed above, is an attempt at overturning the Anstoss at the heart of seriality. In
other words, seriality is itself an obstacle to a totality of meaning. If the obstacle to
serial meaning can be removed—that is, episodic installments that disrupt totality—
then the problem of seriality is solved. Again, the goal seems to be attempting to get
the best of seriality (long form storytelling, engaging characters who viewers “live
with” over the life of the show) without the “worst” of it (having to wait for anything
and being interrupted by gaps).
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In terms of understanding bingeing as a viewership practice and phenomenon,
Mareike Jenner writes that binge watching is best understood “as an intersection of
discourses of fandom filtering into the ‘mainstream’” (13). Specifically, the viewing
habits typically reserved for marathoning episodes of “cult TV favorites” (Twin Peaks,
X-Files, Buffy the Vampire Slayer) in earlier eras has now become widespread. This
notion that binge watching is the result of “cult TV fandom” becoming mainstream
has its basis in the cultural etymology of the phrase in popular culture. As Ben
Zimmer of Visual Thesaurus explains, the earliest recorded usage of the phrase “binge
watching” appears as a plaintive request for VHS tapes of the X-Files appeared in a
New England area usenet chat room. 15 The idea that bingeing is the result of cult
fandom becoming mainstream makes perfect sense, especially in an age where the
highest grossing films each year are either Star Wars movies or comic book superhero
films. While this describes the practice of binge viewing it does not delve in to the
enjoyment constitutive of bingeing.
The argument I have been pursuing is that bingeing needs fundamentally and
meaningfully to be understood as an (attempted) “solution” to the Anstoss that is at the
center of seriality. Remember, it is the obstacle (a totality of meaning) that is also the
impetus (gesturing toward totality, “filling in the gaps”) for the serial. Bingeing is not
only an attempted solution at the levels of viewing and content distribution, but the
“destiny” of bingeing qua solution is sewn into the word’s very history. The word
“binge” first appears in English dialect dictionaries, such as Anne Elizabeth Baker’s
Glossary of Northamptonshire Words and Phrases (1854), in the mid-19th century
(coincidentally around the exact same time serial narrative had begun making large
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scale cultural impact). The word was then used, according to Baker, as a term that
“primarily signifies the act of soaking, and is applied substantively to persons, and
adjectively and verbally to things. A man goes to the alehouse to get a good binge, or
to binge himself [to drink to excess.] A heavy rain is a good bingeing shower: but the
most general and frequent application of the term is to the soaking of tubs or wooden
vessels to prevent leaking” (49). By saturating wood, one prevents it from absorbing
any more water, wine, beer, etc. Here, bingeing is a “water solution” to the problem of
leaking. The binge model of seriality, by “submerging” the viewer in a series, aims at
eliminating the hallmark gaps and interruptions of the serial form, just as the process
of 19th century bingeing eliminates gaps in a wooden cask. The binge series highlights
the relationship to the gap audience members take up. Speaking of the traditional
broadcast model of television seriality, Sean O’Sullivan writes that it is “in that
between state [of old episodes and new episodes] that we as readers or viewers do
most of our interpreting” of a series (“Old, New, Borrowed, Blue” 123). We are in the
middle “bobbing on the narrative,” O’Sullivan writes (ibid). O’Sullivan does not seize
on the drowning implications of this image, as he determines, ultimately, that it is in
this interruptive gap that viewers “luxuriat[e] in the details” of a story’s construction
(ibid). Netflix’s model seemingly eliminates this gap but, as we saw in our Stranger
Things example above, the gap filled with content that is “The Lost Sister” hardly
inspired feelings of ‘luxuriating in a story’s construction.’ Rather, recalling
O’Sullivan’s word choice, the viewer is “bobbing” up and down in the middle—
submerged, as though drowning in a cask.
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To my mind, the reason it is easy to dismiss streaming television on the
grounds of pathology or poetics is the way it reveals the unconscious enjoyment of
narrative seriality. Conflicting with Netflix’s own account of bingeing and bingers,
Mareike Jenner tells us that “shameful indulgence” and “viewer guilt” arise as a result
of viewers having too little time to reflect on episodes—or even whole series—while
bingeing (4). (This seems to dovetail with Van den Bulck’s sleep study.) In effect, the
attempted refusal of seriality inextricable to bingeing makes people feel bad. As
Charlotte Brundson puts it, “The nausea implicit in bingeing comes from the
disturbance of temporal control of this repetition, the failure to understand that a little
forgetting is a necessary part of the pleasure of more” (66). Brundson adds this
Freudian clincher to her thought: “Without this forgetting, generic pleasure becomes
not repetition with difference, but repetition with too much of the same” (ibid).
Repetition, as Brundson rightly alludes, is the repeating of difference (as in Freud’s
death drive). It might be appropriate to term the repetition of bingeing that Brundson
writes about as constituting a continuation, rather than repetition. 16 My claim here is
that even if binge watching does make people feel badly that is the precise reason for
its popularity. To put it another way, binge viewers desire being submerged in the cask
of a TV series.
Speaking before the release of Transparent’s first season, Amazon Studios
head Joe Lewis told The Hollywood Reporter, “We’ve never looked at [Transparent]
as anything but a continuous piece of five-hour entertainment,” with showrunner Jill
Soloway adding that she thinks of it as “a five-hour movie more than 10 episodes”
(“Transparent team talks binge viewing”). This I want to connect to the image of the
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viewer submerged in a cask (of streaming content). As Lewis and Soloway state, the
goal is to provide a “continuous” viewing experience, one free from gaps or
interruptions. It is this growing approach in narrative design and television watching
that Djoymi Baker has recently termed “epic-viewing,” or television viewing that is
“predicated on spectator endurance of an extensive text” (48). The body grapples with
bingeing in a way different from other forms of textual reception, “epic-viewing
becomes a journey that is physically experienced in extended time, as our bodily
fatigue conjoins with, and partly underpins, our viewing pleasure of this new
paradigm” (ibid). The binge series, we can extrapolate from what Baker is saying,
takes up residence in the body.
Intriguingly, we can take what Brundson says of repetition in bingeing with the
notion of fatigue found in Baker’s notion of “epic viewing.” For our purposes, this
pushes the theoretical implications of Brundson—that repetition repeats difference—
and the more “common sense” notion of fatigue found in Baker’s statements. We need
to look at how three terms intersect: fatigue, repetition, and drive. Starting with the
idea that what repeats in the drive is difference, not sameness (i.e. when a child asks
for the same story to be told over and over what repeats is not a carbon copy, for such
a retelling is impossible, but “minimal difference” from one telling to the next), we
can see how the “continuation” of the binge model is opposed to the repetition
fundamental to the serial. It is this insistent continuity of the binge model that Baker
labels fatiguing. In her recent book What IS Sex?, Alenka Zupancic argues that there is
a link between Freud’s death drive and fatigue. 17 The death drive breaks us out of the
“fatigue of life” and allows us to “die differently.” Reformulating Beckett, Zupančič
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gives the motto of the drive: Die again, die better! (106). But this, it is crucial to
understand, is fatigue at the ontological level, not an epi-phenomenon of something
else (like bingeing). When Baker says that bingeing is fatiguing he means, literally
that it is an exhausting side effect of bingeing. For Zupančič, fatigue is a primary
phenomenon. One that grounds life as such and is not a side effect of other activities:
Life instincts are automatic (on autopilot), but they are not ontologically
primary (for Freud here, there is actually an ontological primacy of, quite
literally, “being-toward-death”). Life instincts are a form of “knowledge”
(know-how) necessary for the preservation of this detour from the fundamental
negativity implied in life, which is called death (drive). The death drive names
a kind of fundamental or ontological fatigue of life as such. (96)
Elsewhere Zupancic writes that the drive is not “necessarily experienced, “felt” as
fatigue; it is present as a kind of “objective affect” of life” (97). Why this insistence on
naming the drive as an “objective affect” through fatigue? Why make fatigue a
primary phenomenon (or, perhaps more precisely, the point at which “phenomena”
can even be registered)? The answer is in repetition. Fatigue best underlines what is at
stake in repetition in saying, as I have, that repetition is repeating difference.
Fatigue is much closer to the kind of compulsion to repeat Freud associates
with the drive than something like automation. This is no straw man argument.
“Repetition automaton” is sometimes the preferred translation, instead of
“compulsion” (even Lacan prefers it at times). Some scholars, such as Friedrich
Kittler, are keen to emphasize the word automaton or automation because of its
association with production and technology (among other reasons). As Joan Copjec
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has recently pointed out, however, “Lacan stresses that the repetition of the drive is
not designated by Freud by the German word Reproduzieren (reproduction), but rather
by the word Wiederholung, or hauling back” (“The Inheritance of Potentiality”).
Indeed, as Lacan says in Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis: “let me remind you once again of the etymological reference that I
gave you, holen (to haul), of its connotation of something tiring, exhausting” (67). As
in my example above, when a child asks for a story to be repeated, the adult is “hauled
back” to repeat the story. There is fatigue in repetition. If there is fatigue in repetition,
then we can see the body—as understood by psychoanalysis—in repetition as well.
What we will need to see is that the intimate relationship between repetition, fatigue,
and enjoyment is concretized in binge watching.
Emmanuel Levinas is another key touchstone for Copjec on fatigue. In his
Existence and Existents, “Fatigue is thought by Levinas as part of a complex of bodily
states—insomnia, exhaustion, sleep, being the others—that resist work” (“The
Inheritance of Potentiality”). For Copjec, Levinas is developing here a notion of the
body as “invested in time,” as the body “can be defined as that which wants rather
than needs sleep,” which recalls Freud’s Wunsch in The Interpretation of Dreams—
the wish to sleep. We can turn back around and use this understanding to extend the
relationship of binge watching and exhaustion that Baker introduces above. A person
becomes tired when bingeing a television series, yet this exhaustion “partly underpins”
the viewing pleasure perhaps unique to bingeing, as he writes. There is an opportunity
here to explore fatigue at the level of ontology, the territory Copjec and Zupančič
develop, and make a partial connection to the pleasure Baker sees in the “fatigue”
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(exhaustion) of bingeing. The drive is, as Zupančič puts it, what breaks one out of the
fatigue of life. The drive allows us to repeat difference, it aims at nothing but this
repetition. Is there a goal to bingeing? It may seem like the goal is to finish the series.
That there is a specific object to bingeing. This, I contend, is illusory. Bingeing is the
repetitive failure to obtain an impossible object that always appears in new guises. The
fatigue of bingeing is not the exhaustion of watching, let’s say, 10 hours of a television
series in a single day. It is in being “hauled back” to do this again and again. The
fatigue of bingeing is manifested between binges, rather than during. It arises in the
gap and touches on Levinas’s bodily states that resist work (insomnia, exhaustion,
sleep). Further, with bingeing, bingers repeat the “loss” of the series again and again.
This is what Freud saw when his grandson played “fort/ da”—the repetition of loss
and the failure to master or obtain an impossible object. We encounter this logic in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle when Freud famously recounts the story of his
grandson playing what is known as the fort/ da game. When his grandson’s mother
leaves, the boy throws a toy attached to a string. He casts the toy away (“fort”) and
brings it back (“da”) to where he is sitting. In this game, Freud sees his grandson
repeating a traumatic loss—the disappearance of the object—and finding enjoyment in
that repetition itself. In casting away the toy and bringing it back, the child reenacts
the dynamic of absence and presence, of trauma and recovery. But, crucially, though
there is an attempt at “mastering” the trauma here and steeling oneself to its effects,
fort/ da is not about the failure to master. It is about the repetition of loss. The child
repeats loss over and over again. The binger is encouraged by Netflix, Amazon, and
Hulu to do the same. 18
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We can confirm, almost empirically, that seriality affects the body by recalling
Van den Bulck’s sleep study. Remember it is the complexity of binge serials that
troubles the mind, refusing to allow it rest. What this pathologizing of binge serials
does show us is how Bulck, as with Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary are, perhaps, more
aware of the effects of the serial than other critics. In other words, it takes a thief to
catch a thief. While, as explained in the Introduction, we cannot totally agree that
seriality needs to be “overthrown”—further, we have shown that this is not even a
possibility—it is interesting that those who clearly see the confrontation of seriality,
the way it challenges the body, are those who most want rid of it. Perhaps surprisingly,
Freud himself, in his personal correspondence, also links bingeing to the body (Daniel
Deronda’s serial structure forced him to ‘discount a few hours of sleep’). Freud lets us
proffer an understanding of seriality at the moment of its historical inception that is
necessary to grasp in order to fully consider bingeing now.
We are compelled to return—to repeat—some of the observations we set out in
the beginning. We can now think about Freud’s experience with serial fiction,
described in Chapter One, as anticipating current engagement with binge serials.
Recalling the letter to Martha dated 26 August 1882, Freud writes, “I read [Daniel
Deronda] with mounting puzzlement and interest until an hour ago, discounting a few
hours of sleep. My well-known impatience made me hurry to get to the end” (74).
Freud returns us to the dominant present-day conception of what bingeing is: a
physically affecting activity where one sacrifices the body (sleep in this case) to push
ever forward in narrative endeavor. This is the body as understood by Freud and this
dissertation’s recourse to psychoanalytic texts following his lead. What we see
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through this consideration of the body is the following: While the contemporary doxa
concludes that bingeing is an immersive form of textual experience, that one attempts
to achieve something like a singularity with narrative—to chase the end, to finish the
show—we should make the further move to see that bingeing gives the appearance of
immediacy and immersion. Forcing oneself to get to the end actually serves to protect
the binger from the long-term and ongoing effects of serial narrative. Living with the
gaps in the serial is the true trauma, as Freud shows in Studies on Hysteria and in his
refusal to live with an interrupted reading experience of a serial story. Avoiding the
intellectual hit of the serial—the way it troubles and occupies the mind—and
absorbing the bodily hit—the missed sleep, in our example—is the enjoyment of the
binge serial.
It is not the fact that sessions must have an end that is the trouble. Rather, the
trouble is the gap that is created. Seeing the clear corollary to serial fiction, recalling
what Freud writes in Studies on Hysteria, “Every newspaper reader suffers from the
same drawback in reading the daily installment of his serial story, when immediately
after the heroine’s decisive speech or after the shot has rung out, he comes upon the
words: ‘To be continued’” (ibid). This gap in the contiguity of the story, or, in Freud’s
case, the psychoanalytic treatment, intensifies the importance of “the topic that has
been raised but not dealt with, the symptom that has become temporarily intensified
and has not yet been explained, persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be
more troublesome to him than it has otherwise been” (298). This is a vitally important
point: the content that becomes the interruption—the “To Be Continued”—assumes a
greater importance than it would have been had the narrative (either the analysand’s
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narrative or the serial narrative) simply played out a little bit longer. This is how
content, such as “The Lost Sister,” can assume the role of an interruption. The content
that marks the beginning of the gap grows in importance and engenders greater
scrutiny than any that came before. 19
Quite often, as in the cases of binge watching or Freud’s account of reading
Daniel Deronda, we resist the interruptive gap, or attempt to eliminate it. When we try
to eliminate the gap by bingeing is when we make it most apparent. The gap’s
capacity to structure our reading or viewing experience of a serial text is evident when
we resist or refuse it, as one does with bingeing. Living with the “To Be Continued” is
a primary condition for the reader, viewer, or listener of a serial, as Freud and Mittell
note. One conditions oneself—indeed, this may be the serial condition—to enjoy the
gap. A pain that is also a pleasure, a pleasure that is also a pain. It is intoxicating to
imagine what happens next. It is boring to realize you know what happens next. So,
we can see here that the gap persists once opened up and cannot be closed by rational
explanation. It can only be closed by the next installment (only to be opened up again
by the end of that installment).
When Freud “binge read” Daniel Deronda, he was anxious to get to the end, to
avoid the cut of the serial. Though Daniel Deronda was originally published as the
kind of “To be continued” serial that Freud wrote about in Studies on Hysteria, his
experience with it was as a bound volume. This is a vitally important point: the serial
form—even experienced as a single volume—is still punctuated by the gaps of its
construction (that is, how George Eliot wrote it). It does not matter what form the
serial takes after its publication or how individual readers consume it, the work stays
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serial, as the delay that Freud wrote about previously is still present. Eliot still wrote
anticipating story breaks. These delay-anticipating and delay-follow structures are still
present in the serial experience whether the physical delay of time is there or not and
are, in fact, made far more manifest by the attempt to eliminate or evade the
interruptive gap constitutive of seriality.
Further, in its raw attempted refusal of seriality’s constitutive interruption (its
constitutive confrontation), the binge model actually makes it more volatile, as we saw
in the Stranger Things example. The shape of seriality is somehow more present in the
binge model. The binge serial, while eschewing the “gap filled” network broadcast
schedule, is not itself free of gaps. This is the important relationship about seriality
that the binge model opens up for us. At the level of form, the binge model of
television shows us that the serial gap is inviolable. Bingeing is, in one view, an
attempt to fill the gap or eliminate the gap. I argue above that this attempt to “forgo
the gap,” as Mittell puts it, actually calls attention to the gap, making its theoretical
import more apparent. Bingeing is treated as a pathology and flight from the gap but
actually sustains it. The viewer model Netflix imagines for its binge series is as a
content experience free of interruption. What Netflix shows us most clearly is that
interruption is immanent to the serial form.
Repositioning psychoanalysis as concerned with thinking the serial shows that
psychoanalytic theory is intrinsically a media theory. Seriality and analytic
experiences share, as Freud notes, a frustrating gap. Just as one feels they are on the
verge of some knowledge—knowing who the killer is in a serial story, or realizing,
while in analysis, why one acted with unexpected hostility to a family member the
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week before—time is up, the narrative suspended. We have to get off the couch and
wait a week to take up the same topic again. The key is what we make of the
interruptive gap and how we engage with that gap. The experience of the serial is
punctuated by punctures—breaks, gaps, caesura, delays and agonizing waits for
closure. Serial storytelling introduces cuts to the narrative. Binding a narrative and
then bingeing it, in our example, is an attempt to dress the wound that the cut of
seriality opens up. This represents an ideal site to proffer fresh inquiry into both
psychoanalysis and media studies, to widen our appreciation of what seriality is and
does.
I use “binge watching” instead of “binge-watching” to indicate that the practice is not like “highjumping”—a discrete activity. I intend “binge” to modify the kind of watching that occurs across
various television viewing practices.
1

There is also a hint of Noël Burch’s notion of the “Institutional Mode of Representation” (IMR)
embedded Bulck’s study. Bulck’s study and IMR are premised on the idea that visual narrative, either
film or television, offers a seamless experience, such that viewers are unaware they are looking at a
screen. Both of these arguments fail to account for disavowal, or the Freudian idea that one knows very
well that they are not seamlessly immersed in another reality for the length of a film or television
episode, but just the same one pretends that they are. Even without recourse to Freud, to believe that
viewers really believe that they are in “another world” turns the fundamental appeal of fiction—getting
wrapped up in a diegetic reality as though it’s real—into slight condescension. It’s telling that neither
Bulck nor Burch indict themselves in this idea of the seamlessness of fictional worlds.
2

3

Or perhaps Netflix is taking a shot at Amazon and the casual consumer spying the company does
through Alexa devices. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/tech/amazon-alexa-listening/index.html
This is a minor point, but it’s not true that Netflix series have no literal temporal gaps similar to the
typical network model. Netflix series have a minimal gap—between ten seconds and a minute—that
arises between episodes and a much longer gap between seasons (up to a year between seasons for a
show such as BoJack Horseman and up to two and a half years for a series such as OA).
4

5

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/netflix-declares-binge-watching-is-the-new-normal235713431.html
During the 19th century, serials became “hotter and hotter” commodities and, as such, came to be
attended by ethical and political problems. The introduction and success of ad revenue allowed for
newspapers to reduce their price per copy and enjoy wider distribution and consumption. As a result,
“Britain saw a dramatic rise in the number of printed periodicals: from 643 magazines published in
1875 to 1,298 in 1885, 2,081, and 2,531 in 1903” (Keating qtd. in Miller 3). In Slow Print, Elizabeth
Carolyn Miller, notes that a tradition of Marxist critique (seen most notably in the work of Jameson)
links a “culture of overprint with the production of capitalist ideology” (307). As she writes, “the
speed—and profit—oriented print marketplace had become a synecdoche for reproducing the logic of
6
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mass production” (2). Marx is very much responding to the serial moment of his time but also to a
conflict that the serial has occasioned throughout time. We can see this in Soap Operas, radio plays
designed specifically to sell consumer products. We can also see this WEBZ Chicago’s Serial, which
told a true crime story supported in part by ads for the web service Mail Chimp, something many
listeners found problematic (i.e. should any corporate entity make money off of a grisly true crime
story?). Marx’s preface to the French edition of Capital brings together a number of issues constitutive
of seriality: accessibility, speed, the deferral of meaning, the necessity but insufficiency of the
installment, and seriality’s formal relationship to the logic of capital. What’s missing, of course, in his
analysis and that of Sartre and his followers, is a notion of the unconscious.
There is some disagreement as to whether 2-6 episodes should rightly be considered “a binge.” An
extensive discussion of the competing standards for what constitutes “a binge” and a recommendation
for a singular definition can be found in Jenner (2014), with three hours or more of continuous viewing
of a single series is the emerging consensus as to what constitutes “a binge.”
7

8

As part of his attempt to return to Freud through structural linguistics I argue that Lacan socializes
Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit. It was no longer the retroactive emergence of a prior trauma that
neurotic subject had. Instead it became the structure of signification as such. Lacan sees that
punctuation has determinative effect on signification. Theoretically speaking, Lacan’s notion of the
quilting point justifies his move from the traditional psychoanalytic session established by Freud to his
own punctuated sessions. The quilting point acts like the period at the end of a sentence, or in Lacan’s
example from Seminar III, the button in an upholstered chair. The button keeps the fabric inside the
chair and also works to provide a level of design coherence for the chair itself, just as the period creates
a single unit of meaning—the sentence—which can itself have multiple meanings, but the period needs
to be there to conceive of meaning at all. The point de capiton is the meaning making signifier of a
given chain of signifiers. The Internet comic Garfield Minus Garfield is a salient example of the point
de capiton and its meaning-making properties. From the website: “Garfield Minus Garfield is a site
dedicated to removing Garfield from Garfield comic strips in order to reveal the existential angst of a
certain young Mr. Jon Arbuckle.” By taking away Garfield—the meaning making signifier of Garfield
comic strips—Jon turns into an isolated everyman fighting a losing battle against loneliness and
depression in a quiet American suburb. While the case can certainly be made that removing Garfield
just reveals what is and has always been there in the comics, it’s clear that this dimension of Garfield
comics is only comprehensible by shifting the quilting point—by making Jon the meaning making
signifier of Garfield.
While Slavoj Žižek has never devoted a book-length project to narrative studies, we can locate in his
work a concern with certain aspects of narrative. In the case of 1991’s Looking Awry, Žižek helps us
further our understanding of endings, punctuation, and the quilting point. At one point in the book,
Žižek addresses the Hollywood legend surrounding the final scene of Casablanca (Michael Curtiz,
1942). As the legend goes, no one involved in the project could decide how the film should end, a
disagreement that lasted as late as the shooting of the climactic scene itself. Everyone who has seen the
film knows that Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) eventually leaves Rick (Humphrey Bogart) for the hero of the
resistance, Victor Laszlo (Paul Henreid); an ending that actually had been written, contrary to legend,
long before shooting began. But this is more significant than a mere Hollywood history lesson; it is a
perfect illustration of how the quilting point functions in narrative. As Žižek writes, “we experience the
present ending . . . as something that ‘naturally’ and ‘organically’ follows from the preceding action,
but if we were to imagine another ending—say for example, that Bergman’s heroic husband were to die
and that Bogart were to take his place on the plane for Lisbon together with Bergman—it, too, would be
experienced by viewers as something that developed ‘naturally’ out of earlier events.” 8 How? Žižek
posits, “[the experience of a] linear ‘organic flow of events’ is an illusion (albeit a necessary one) that
masks the fact that it is the ending that retroactively confers the consistency of an organic whole on the
preceding events.” 8 The end stitches the narrative together, allowing us to perceive contingent narrative
events as a single naturally flowing unity.
9

On Cliffhangers
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As of this writing, Stranger Things has “aired” 17 episodes. The 16th rated episode is season two’s
“MADMAX” at 8.4 out of 10 on IMDb. “The Lost Sister,” by contrast, comes in at a sickly 6.2.
10

11

One might rush to dismiss the relevance of this kind of critique, but this IMDb user is inelegantly
identifying exactly the kind of “ethical” and “aesthetic” flaws in narrative that narrative scholar James
Phelan brands a “cheap trick” in Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical
Theory of Narrative (95).
I owe the observation that Phelan’s above quoted remarks graft well onto thinking through the
cliffhanger to Luke Terlaak-Poot and his essay “On Cliffhangers.”
12

13

A cliffhanger is simply not worth talking about if our investment in the narrative is not upset in some
way. When we feel betrayed, we know that the narrative has “worked.” When we feel our time has been
wasted is exactly what a great serial narrative should aspire to give its readers, viewers, or listeners.
Especially, I contend, in the case of the so-called “bad ending.” What follows is wildly subjective,
which is why it is an endnote and not in the text proper. Reacting with revulsion at, say, the end of
Battlestar Galactica, lays bare one’s investment in the series. A merely “good” or “appropriate” ending
should never be considered “good enough,” in fact it should be considered worse than “bad.” The
finales to The Wire and Breaking Bad are fine. They work. They’re appropriate. Almost nobody has a
problem with the endings to these shows because they end at the status quo level of excellence that each
show established. Neither finale has inspired the sheer volume of (positive and negative appraisals) that
The Sopranos and Lost have. This does not make the endings to either show better “ethically” or
“aesthetically.” I am not calling for a re-appraisal of the bad ending. Simply that worthwhile narrative
should always raise our expectations for it. Viewers disappointed by Battlestar Galactica had their
expectations for what a television series could even accomplish raised for them (as Portlandia explores
in a well-known “binge watching” sketch). It is in moments of elation (the very good ending, such as
Six Feet Under) and disappointment that the confrontation of the serial form becomes unavoidable.
These moments should be cherished, not derided (in the case of the “bad” ending).
14

One can easily imagine Freud is speaking on behalf of contemporary television viewers. One needs
only to think about famous contemporary television series finales—The Sopranos, Lost, Battlestar
Galactica—to see how an unexpected (or undesired) ending proliferates “more suffering.”
15

I've just become hooked on the X-Files, so I'm a little behind... Does anyone by ANY chance have
tapes of this show back to season 1 they'd be willing to lend me so I can effectively catch up? I'd be
more than happy to travel out to wherever to get them and then bring them back (actually there are three
of us who all got hooked at the same time, so I'd predict that there'd be some MASSIVE binge watching
right away! :-)
—Bob Donahue, ne.general, Feb. 9, 1996
https://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/keeping-a-watch-on-binge-watching/
One might counter Brundson and offer that the “forgetting” necessary to repetition occurs between
repeat viewings of a whole season of a series, rather than between episodes or over a longer period of
time.
16

The idea of fatigue that Zupančič explores comes from Joan Copjec’s recent work. As she explains in
a recent interview: “Soldiers’ uniforms are called . . . fatigues and “battle fatigue” was the vague name
given to the psychological disorders resulting from the strain of fight on the war-front. Fatigue rather
than trauma. If you slightly shift your perspective and focus on fatigue rather than trauma as an entry
into psychoanalytic theory, its displacement of the notion of the body away from the strictly biolog[ical]
to the more complex psychoanalytic model that is dependent on the concept of the drive, you can
uncover many new ideas in the work of Freud” (“The Inheritance of Potentiality”).
17
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Amazon even ran a commercial calling the period between watching binge-worthy television as a
viewer falling into a “Showhole.”
For a contemporary example that shows the serial narrative implications of Freud’s idea, we can turn
to the closing moments of Breaking Bad’s season three finale, “Full Measure.” What happens in “Full
Measure” is something we might term an “accidental cliffhanger.” Central character Jesse Pinkman
(Aaron Paul) rushes to the apartment of a business colleague, Gale (David Costabile), to kill him.
Gale’s loyalty to protagonist Walter White (Bryan Cranston) has recently come into question and, like
any sane person in possession of self-preservation might, Walt sends Jesse to kill Gale. Breathlessly,
Jesse reaches Gale’s apartment. Gale opens the door. Jesse pulls out his gun and fires, killing Gale. The
cinematographic composition of this final shot to “Full Measure,” however, invites an unintentionally
ambiguous reading. When Gale opens the door, Jesse is shown from the chest up, arm extended with his
gun in the foreground of the frame, and the scene is intercut between shots of the two men. In the final
shot, the camera, facing Jesse, dollies just slightly right so we are “looking down the barrel of the gun”
from what one assumes to be Gale’s point of view. The shot approximates the famous image of the
cowboy shooting at the audience in Edwin S. Porter’s The Great Train Robbery (1903).
In the context of this particular moment in Breaking Bad, however, the camera movement
makes it appear as though Jesse either took aim at someone else (by moving the pistol leftward) or
decided not to shoot Gale. With the next installment of Breaking Bad 13 months away, viewers
speculated wildly about what Jesse might or might not have done. 19 This “To Be Continued” was
entirely unintentional, according to Breaking Bad showrunner Vince Gilligan, and yet—simply because
that final shot was content raised but not dealt with, as Freud might have it—the implications of that
final image persisted in viewer’s minds more than it otherwise would have. Viewers refused to believe
Vince Gilligan that there was no ambiguity intended in that shot. We need to be very clear here,
however: it is the serial form that makes the content persist. It is not the content of the Breaking Bad
quasi-cliffhanger that troubled and engaged viewers—it was the form itself. That this was the final shot
of the season is what caused the scandal here. As Freud points out, “There are patients who, in the
course of an analysis, simply cannot get free of a topic,” once it has been brought it up and, “are
obsessed by it in the interval between two treatments; since by themselves they cannot take any steps
towards getting rid of it” (298). It is this interruption—this instantiation of a gap—that retroactively
makes the content worthy of obsessing over.
19
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: MINDING THE GAP

This dissertation has examined a range of serial media texts from Victorian
England to Twitter to podcasts to Netflix series. I have brought into conversation
classic print media texts in the form of the Victorian serial novel, new media “print”
texts through Twitter, new audio texts in serial podcasts, and the evolution of
broadcast television to Netflix’s narrowcast. I’ve also explored a range of theoretical
texts, from Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential seriality to the narrative poetics of Jason
Mittell to undertheorized texts and ideas from major twentieth century thinkers such as
Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. In bringing together these theoretical and narrative
texts, this dissertation has attempted to cohere a disparate body of thought and codify
accessible specialist terminology (i.e. the serial gap) to help think through seriality as a
theoretical problem. For Sartre and others like him, as we have seen, seriality enforces
a logic of discontinuity and superficial connection between people, politics, and
culture. For Freud, the serial gap arrives always too soon. It cannot be properly
anticipated, nor satisfactorily ameliorated or fully understood after the gap’s
emergence. Lacan acknowledges the same problem that Freud does – that the serial
gap is a threat to the work of the analytic session. Lacan tries to control when that gap
occurs with his introduction of the variable length or punctuated session. Lacan,
however, fails to reckon with his own insights into seriality here, for it is Lacan who
understands that the serial gap writes its own rules and orders the logic of signification
around it. Theorizing the serial gap, as Lacan does in “The Purloined Letter” lecture in
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Seminar II and the “To Jakobsen” lecture in Seminar XX shows us that seriality is a
logic of radical coherence.
Despite the importance of seriality to Freud and Lacan, theorizing seriality has
been largely been left out of psychoanalytic theory, and psychoanalytic theory is
largely absent in studies of serial media. By attending to these overlapping oversights,
this dissertation has advanced a theory of psychoanalysis that realigns the projects of
Freud and Lacan. By highlighting the serial thread in their respective work, we realign
psychoanalysis as a mode of inquiry that has thought through seriality, one of, if not
the most, dominant media forms since the mid-twentieth century. Further, this is a way
of thinking concerned primarily with how the social and media interact with the
psyche. To think through seriality means you can think through three things – a
diverse set of narrative and non-narrative media, social formation, and the role of the
subject in both. This underscores how both media and the social exert force on the
subject. Because seriality is in so many things and it affects so much, it is tempting to
atomize and particularize our investigations, to think very small because seriality is so
complex. But to study seriality to me means to study nothing less than how the
subject—all of us—interact with the world of symbols and signification. It’s about
trying to understand how the group is inflected in the individual, and how the
individual is inflected in the group. The way we can see this is through a gap.
What my project tries to do is to bring together some fundamental questions
and concerns that, for example, would link the early film serial scholarship of Ruth
Mayer to Lacan and Lacan with the ethical investigations of a podcast such as Serial.
The fundamental question for me is, what do we make of this gap? Is this gap simply
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an interval of time for audiences? Is it a pleasing blank? Is it a bare canvas upon which
whatever an audience wants is written or thought? Or is it something that resists
formalization? Is it a site of tension? Is it a place that seems inaccessible but at the
same time totally orders one’s experience of a serial thing? In the rush to historicize
and contextualize and come to grips with various mediums’ development in
technology and what standout serial texts have done, the field of seriality studies at
large has never really reckoned with this relatively basic question: what is the serial
gap? What does it do? Why are we drawn to it? Why do we resist it (or do we resist
it)? Again, these are very basic but very important questions that are yet to be asked of
a growing field. These are the stakes of this inquiry for seriality studies.
For psychoanalytic theory, the stakes are slightly different. Scholars such as
Tom Eyers, Aaron Schuster, Frank Ruda, Rebecca Comay, Alenka Zupančič, and
Mari Ruti have, through various projects, written challenging books in the field of
psychoanalytic theory, broadly defined. In fact, some of the most exciting
observations and readings are being made now. My hope is to enter into this vibrant
field of psychoanalytic theory and offer this new inquiry into psychoanalysis as a
theory of serial media. None of these scholars are as engaged with media as I am in
this project. What I offer is an opportunity not just to read Freud and Lacan on their
own terms with their own language but to move psychoanalytic theory into more firm
media space. Much of psychoanalytic theory’s canonical media theory is through film,
not television or new media. My hope is to open the door to look at other forms of
media with the same intensity that psychoanalytic theory has typically reserved for
cinema.
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As a book project, I see this pushing further an articulation of the “gapped
subject,” as well as bringing new serial texts into the fold. This might seem
superfluous, as the way that I’ve conceived of the serial gap and what it does is as a
universal. This means it is like the unconscious in the following sense: everybody has
an unconscious but their unconscious is theirs. Its raw specificity to the subject cannot
be explicated in detail ahead of time. Accepting my argument means that we have a
level of expectation about what the serial gap would do in any form of media. But it is
nonetheless well worth looking into other diverse forms of serial media to see what
pushes against, reaffirms, or strengths my argument. 1
If seriality is inherently a notion of psychoanalysis, as I have offered here, and
if seriality is ubiquitous in media, then this means psychoanalysis is itself already a
theory of media. Observing the importance of the serial gap in the works of Sigmund
Freud and Jacques Lacan allows us to apprehend an undergirding logic to
psychoanalytic theory that has not been seized by critics. But this understanding does
not only go one way, as psychoanalysis enables us to properly theorize seriality in
media. We learn what it means to observe seriality as both social substance and
psychic cement. A gap that constitutes both a radical break and an impossible
coherence.
1

I am particularly interested in video game studies and non-Western texts (the overlap there is
videogames made for the West by Japanese studies such as From Software). As media scholar
Katherine Fusco has recently pointed out, there is yet to be a rigorous account of serial forms that are
non-Western and non-masculine. In a book review for editor Frank Kelleter’s Media of Serial
Narrative, Fusco writes: “Recent popular arguments about fandom, especially in the context of science
fiction serials such as Dr. Who and Star Wars, have drawn attention to the problem of assuming a
work’s audience. Nonetheless, it’s a bit shocking that women fans, feminized art forms, and women as
creators are so starkly absent in this volume. Though the essays of Media of Serial Narrative are
conscious of the fact that popular texts are sometimes deemed unworthy of scholarly attention (9-10,
281), there is little to no acknowledgment in the book that popular texts’ devaluation has historically
stemmed from their association with marginalized groups” (Review of Media of Serial Narrative).
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